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PREFACE 
Constantly confronted by history, man has what may be termed a 
natural impulse to make sense of the past. And indeed, the 
past cannot be understood without also understanding the present. 
Thus that fundamental historical impulse is profoundly philosophical 
in the Socratic sense. It is because hermeneutics explicitly 
identifies itself with the Socratic tradition , that my attempt 
to elucidate the nature of written history as an academic 
discipline has been located within a hermeneutic point of v~ew. 
In the course of this thesis I refer to several major debates ~n 
social theory. However, I make no pretense at covering these 
debates fully. They are cited insofar as they bear on issues 
arising in the development of the idea of a hermeneutic of history. 
I wish to express my thanks to my supervisors, Prof. J.W. Horton and 
Dr. J.A. Stofberg for their encouragement and constructive 
criticisms offered during the writing of this thesis. 
The examiners' assessments have been useful in stimulating me to 
rethink some of my ideas, thereby clarifying and in some cases 
modifying earlier arguments (and thus, of course, engaging in a 
hermeneutic exercise). Where I have disagreed with any points made, 
I have tried to express my own position more precisely. 
My thanks also go to Mrs. Esme Serfontein who very patiently typed 
and retyped the thesis. 
In conformity with the regulations of the University of Natal, I 
hereby state unambiguously that what follows is my own original 
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Hermes was the messenger of the Gods. His task was to transform 
divine communications, which were beyond human comprehension, into 
a form intelligible to human understanding. Hence the verb, 
"hermeneuein" and the noun, "hermeneia", meaning to interpret and 
interpretation respectively. Hermeneutics may therefore be 
" . . . ,,(1) . h h broadly defined as the SC1ence of 1nterpretat10n W1t t e 
1 
connotation that its concern is to render intelligible what is un- ~ 
intelligible. However, is this not what any explanation tries to 
do? Passmore, after examining various kinds of explanation, has 
argued that there 1S no one logical form of explanation; rather , 
what is common to all explanations is that in each case the 
explanation is a response to the puzzlement felt by the questioner. 
Hence, as he remarks, "an assumption of unfamiliarity is written 
. . ,,(2) 
1nto every request for an explanat10n • 
Hermeneutics as interpretation 1S, by general consent, concerned 
with theoretical reflection on what may be termed special kinds of 
explanation. The objects of such interpretations are texts, 
both in the literal sense and also text analogues such as human 
actions; the aim of the interpretation is to disclose the meaning 
of the text, and to make sense of an action by "showing the co-
herence between what the agent 1S doing and the meaning the 




Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (1969), p.33. 
The system of footnoting used in this thesis is that advocated 
by the University of Oxford. It is also a recommended pro-
cedure in the recent handbook issued by the University of the 
Witwatersrand. (Reuben Mus iker, "Style Guide for Theses and 
Dissertations", Occasional Publications, no 7, July 1980). 
John Passmore, "Explanation in Everyday Life, in Science and 
in History", History and Theory, Vol. 2, 1962, P .108. 
Quentin Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Role of History " 
New Literary History, Vol. 7, no 2, 1972, p.2l0. ' 
hermeneutic circle "by placing the text to be interpreted within 
the field of assumptions and conventions to which it contributes 
and from which it derives its distinctively meaningful 
character". (4) 
Historically the field of hermeneutics has denoted the theory of 
biblical exegesis, a general philosophical methodology, the science 
of all linguistic understanding, the methodological foundations of 
the geisteswissenschaften and systems of interpretation directed 
at reading the meaning behind myths and symbols. (5) The 
hermeneutic assertion, however, that understanding a text or text 
analogue is "an historical encounter,,(6) has had the consequence of 
extending hermeneutics to include reflection on the question of 
the nature of understanding itself, "in its most foundational and 
~~~~--:-:---~-- . (7) 
'existential' sense", as Palmer puts 1t. Insofar therefore as 
hermeneutics focusses both "on the problematic of a general theory 
of interpretation as the methodology for the .•. geisteswissen-
schaften", (8) as well as on the phenomenon of understanding, we 
may agree with Palmer that hermeneutics is "more than merely inter-
disciplinary". For, "through a study of hermeneutical theory, the 
(geisteswissenschaften) can achieve a fuller measure of self-
knowledge and a better understanding of the character of their 
t k " (9) as . 
2 
Ricoeur has pointed out that while hermeneutics has concerned itself 
with "a consideration of the historicity of human experience in 
general, it has taken little cognisance of "the practising 
--..\L-h· ., k· d f· . ,,(10) . . . 









Palmer, op.cit., p.33. 
op . cit., p. 10. 
Ibid. 
Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as 
Method, Philosophy and Critique (1980), p.l. 
Palmer, op.cit., p.10. 
Pa:r l Ricoeur, "History and Hermeneutics", Journal of 
Ph110sophy, Vol. 73, no 19, 1976, p.683. 
hermeneutic of history will be developed as an extended conception 
of a hermeneutic interpretation, that is an attempt will be made 
to elucidate a theoretical framework within which problems in-
volved in the interpretation of historical texts and text analogues 
may be analysed. An exposition of the history of hermeneutics is 
one necessary prerequisite for the development of such an idea. 
However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a 
detailed exegetical study of the field of hermeneutics per se; the 
writings of various philosophers within the field of hermeneutics 
are assessed in terms of the specific contributions they are held 
. k . h' h . (11) to make to the 1ssues at sta e 1n t 1S t eS1S. 
Consideration is also given to seminal historiographical issues. 
Furthermore, it must be stressed that the perspective in this 
thesis is not a purely philosophical one; it has also adopted 
the view point of a practising historian. Thus attention is fo-
cussed on the mutual encounter of philosophy and history, the 
point at which philosophical insights can open up the past to the 
historian's understanding, while at the same time making trans-
?arent to the his-to-rfat his point of view ·without which ~d~- '*-
standing is impossible. During the development of the idea of a 
hermeneutic of history an attempt will be made to demonstrate the 
sense in which a hermeneutic philosophy makes explicit the method-
ology implicit in the historian's craft. This junction of 
philosophy and history, the philosophical interpretation and 
evaluation of what historians have been doing has not, so far, 
------~---------~----------
11. It must be pointed out that because the original works of 
some ~f the early hermeneutic thinkers such as Ast, Wolf, 
Schle1ermacher and Gatterer, have proved inaccessible to 
the writer, reliance has had to be placed on secondary 
material. 
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been effectively demonstrated by philosophers of history. Comment-
ing on this point, Newman writes that "it might well be that 
philosophers concerned with methodological problems in certain 
areas must learn to live with the fact that they are writing about 
nothing of particular interest to people participating in the 
. . . . . ,,(l2) B N h disc1p11ne about wh1ch they are wr1t1ng . ut as ewman as 
pointed out, this should not be the case. Similarly there are 
historians who disclaim the relevance of a general philosophical 
analysis for their concrete empirical investigations. But the 
alleged polarity between philosophy and history, between general 
theoretical analysis and the unique event is a false one. Know-
ingly or not, the historian always incorporates a particular 
'--- -- -
theoretical perspect1ve 1n the practice of his craft ;-ana a----
"- -- --successful philosophical analysis is tested and elucidated with 
reference to particular situations. This thesis will therefore 
attempt to demonstrate the unity of philosophy and history as a 
means of elucidation and vindication of the idea of a philosophy 
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of history. The historical examples chosen are from reputable 
historical works, and they range from well-established points of view 
to an example of what might be called 'history in the raw', that 
1S works dealing with the witch-craze of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, a phenomenon not fully understood, and which 
therefore provides an i~eresting example of the search by 
historians for explanatory frameworks. 
The idea of a hermeneutic of history must come to terms with two 
fundamental issues, namely, how the past is interpreted and how 
such interpretations are to be judged. 
Hermeneutics began as aphilologicalenterprise concerned with the 
postulation of rules for understanding the meaning of texts. That 
mean1ng was identified with the intention of the author and had to 
12. Fred D. Newman, Explanation by Descr.iption (1968), p.ll. 
be understood contextually, within the hermeneutic circle. The 
Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
and the Enlightenment helped to widen the scope of hermeneutics as 
the provision of a methodology for the geisteswissenschaften, with 
the concept of verstehen regarded as appropriate to its particular 
subject matter as opposed to verstand, which characterised the 
. h f ., . f h' . l' (13) naturw~ssensc a ten. But D~lthey s analys~s 0 ~stor~ca ~ty, 
the view that man is fundamentally historical, implied that there 
is no absolute starting point for thought, no body of absolute 
standards outside experience which can be reached by pure specu-
lation. (14) This seemed to lead to relativism and a denial of the 
possibility of objective knowledge, issues which Dilthey tackled 
but was unable to resolve in a way ultimately coherent with the 
rest of his thought. 
The development of a methodology for the geisteswissenschaften, 
which took cognisance of that historicality, was made possible 
when the focus of hermeneutics was directed towards a phenomo-
logical elucidation of understanding as a specific mode of being-
in-the-world. 
Enlarging on Heidegger's analysis, Gadamer's thought emphasized 
the ~ole played by the interpreter/ in the constitution of the 
mean~ng of texts or text analogues. Thus the early hermeneutic 
13. 
14. 
I use the word 'historicality' to refer to one's situatedness 
in history, as Gadamer himself does. (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Truth and Method (1975), (henceforth TM)). See for example 
pp.235-274. Historicality is 'the afIIrmation of the tempo-
rali~y of human experience', as Palmer puts it. (Palmer, 
op.c~t., p.lll). Other writers use the word 'historicity' 
in a sense which seems to be synonomous with historicality. 
For example, according to- Hoy, historicity is 'the recognition 
that man's existence is always temporally and historically 
situated'. (David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle (1978),p.3.) 
H.P. Rickman, 'Wilhelm Dilthey', Encylopaedia of Philosophy 
(1967), Vol. 2, p.404. 
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belief that the mean1ng of a text lay solely in the recovery of 
intention required reassessment, a need reinforced by a critical 
reflection on meaning within the parameters of the speech act. 
Giddens' conception of a double hermeneutic, involving the media-
~~~frames of meaning, that is the imposition of theories 
-W 1ch may have been unknown to the original authors or agents 1n 
o~ to elucidate what is held to be the fuller historical mean-
ing, therefore substantially enlarged the initial hermeneutic 
enterprise. 
Insofar as historians employ the ~h1e hermeneutic, focus is 
directed upon the possibility of g1v1ng explanations of the hypo-
thetico-deductive kind, _thereby challenging the early hermeneutic -1nsistence on its own methodological autonomy. However, science's 
"hermeneutic turn", reflected particularly in the writings of 
Popper and Kuhn, demands a reassessment of the relationship between 
the geisteswissenschaften and the naturwissenschaften. Without 
denying the differences between them, both with respect to subject 
matter and aspects of their methodologies, the changed status of 
scientific laws gives credence to Nagel's view that there is no 
radical difference in the logical structure of the hypothetico-
deductive model used in each case. 
Other explanatory techniques, the elucidation of contextual mean-
1ng and the giving of narrative explanations, contribute towards 
6 
the fulfilment of the double hermeneutic. While, therefore, there 
is no specifically hermeneutic mode of explanation, all explanations 
~re~d to be ultimately hermeneutic insofar as the historian' s 
~im is to reveal the fuller historical meaning, that enterprise 
~~g conducted within the hermeneutic circle of understanding by 
the self-reflective historian. 
The recognition that all historical interpretation, like scientific 
investigation, must always take place from a point of view, requires 
that a hermeneutic analysis of Objectivity takes cognisance of that 
historicality. The past may be approached from different possible 
points of V1ew, each delineating its field of research, those 
questions which are regarded as legitimate and sometimes sanction-
ing the use of specific methodological techniques, as for example 
in cliometrics. Historical objectivity within a point of view 
depends on the account having satisfied the professional and 
intellectual criteria to which historians subscribe. But critical 
self-reflection alone cannot guarantee that this has been achieved. 
Objectivity is therefore founded upon the social aspects of his-
torical research, that is the co-operation and competition which 
take place in learned institutions and within the forums provided 
by books, journals and congresses. The possibility of communi-
cation amongst aZZ historians, irrespective of their point of 
view and notwithstanding ideological preferences, is contained 
within Habermas' concept of an ideal rational community which 
spells out the kinds of conditions required for perfect mutual 
understanding. 
The concept of a fuller historical meaning of the past provides a 
justification for the explicit imposition of moral values on 
historical accounts, thereby also supplying the opportunity for 
self-critical examination by historians and readers of their moral 
values. However, insofar as such accounts subscribe to the 
necessary intellectual values, their objectivity may be assessed 
separately from judgments of their moral relevance. 
Carr has argued that in the light of recent epistemological devel-
opments, there is a need for a new explanatory model in history and 
the social sciences: 
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•.• 1 have already argued that the social sciences and 
history among them cannot accommodate themselves to a 
theory of knowledge which puts subject and object 
'
asunder and enforces a rigid separation between the 
observer and the thing observed. We need a ne~ model 
which does justice to the complex process o ' nter-
r?lation and i IlJ;.er:connection between them. (15) 
The idea of a hermeneutic of history developed in this thesis ~s 
offered as an attempt to provide such a model. 
15. E.H. Carr, What is History? (1961), p.119. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EARLY HERMENEUTIC TRADITION 
Two events were crucial in the early development of hermeneutics. 
Firstly, the Reformation, which gave impetus to the formulation of 
rules for the interpretation of texts, and secondly, the Scientific 
Revolution which, by stimulating attempts to extend the methods of 
the science of the time to the study of man and society, provoked a 
reaction from thinkers who differentiated between what was to be 
called the geisteswissenschaften and the naturwissenschaften, the 
former being concerned with the meaning of texts and actions which 
could not be recovered by scientific methodology. 
(i) The interpretation of texts 
The interpretation of texts both secular and sacred has a long 
history. As Dilthey has pointed out, (1) in Classical Greece the 
education system devoted much time to an interpretation of Homer 
and other poets. Formal attempts to systematize interpretation 
were made by Aristotle, who in his works, Rhetoric and Poetics, 
discussed methods of analysis of literary texts. In Alexandria 
in the third and second centuries B.C., collections of literary 
works from Ancient Greece were subjected to tests for authenticity 
based on an examination of the content and coherence of the texts. 
The sixth century A.D. marked the appearance -of the Jewish TaZmu d 
formed by a un~on of the Mishnah and Gemara. The former was a com-
pilation of the answers given by Rabbis to the interpretation of 
issues in the Torah with respect to contemporary problems. Further 
commentary and interpretation of the Mi shnah constitued the Gemara. 
1. Wilhelm Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', New Literary 
History, Vol. 3, no 2, 1972, p. 234. 
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The Renaissance periad was af cansiderable impartance in the resur-
gence af interpretative schalarship after the Medieval periad. The 
need to. examine texts rigarausly far their authenticity and relia-
bility became recagnised as an essential prerequisite far the task 
af interpretatian. (2) Prabably the best example af the Renaissance 
achievement in this sphere is to. be faund in the demonstratian by 
Larenza Valla (1404-1457) af the fargery af the dacument, "The 
Danatian af Canstantine". Valla's analysis illustrates clearly the 
hermeneutic methad in terms af which a text must be lacated within 
the cantext to. which it cantributes and fram which it derives its 
awn meaningful character: 
Let us talk to. this sycaphant abaut barbarism af 
speech; far by this stupidity af his language 
his manstraus impudence is made clear, and his lie. 
'We give', he says, 'aur imperial Lateran palace': 
as thaugh it was awkward to. place the gift af the 
palace here amang the arnaments, he repeated it 
later where gifts are treated. 'Then the diadem': 
and as thaugh thase present wauld nat knaw, he 
interprets, 'that is, the crawn'. He did nat, 
indeed, here add 'gald af gald', but later 
emphasising the same statements, he says, 'af 
purest gald and preciaus gems'. The ignarant 
fellaw did nat knaw that a diadem was made af 
caarse clath ar perhaps af silk; whence that wise 
and aft-repeated remark af the king, wham they say, 
befare he put upan his head the diadem given him, 
held it and cansidered it lang and exclaimed, '0 
clath mare renawned than happy. If any ane knew 
yau thraugh and thraugh with haw many anxieties and 
dangers and miseries yau are fraught, he wauld nat 
care to. pick up; no., nat even if yau were lying 
on the graund!'. This fellaw imagines that it is 
af gald, with a gald band and gems such as kings naw 
2. The inventian of the maveable-type printing press gave an 
added stimulus to the need for accurate texts. 
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usually add. But Constantine was not a king, nor would 
he have dared to call himself king, nor to adorn himself 
with royal ceremony. He was Emperor of the Romans, not 
king. Where there is a king, there is no republic. But 
in the republic there were many, even at the same time, 
who were imperatores (generals); for Cicero frequently 
writes thus, 'Marcus Cicero, imperator, to some other 
imperator, greeting': though, later on, the Roman 
ruler, as the highest of all, is called by way of 
distinctive title the Emperor. (3) 
11 
The development of hermeneutics as that discipline specifically con-
cerned with the interpretation of texts received a major impetus 
from the Reformation. One of the areas of disagreement between 
Protestant and Catholic theologians concerned the question of the 
interpretation of the Bible. Martin Luther rejected the Catholic 
adherence to an institutionalized interpretation of the scriptures. 
In his seminal work, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, 
Luther argued against accepting an interpretation given by members 
of the Church, who assume authority but do not actually study the 
scriptures themselves. Therefore, Luther asked, "where were the 
need and us-e of the Holy Scriptures?,,(4) Specifically Luther 
rejected the authority of the Pope as final arbiter with respect to 
questions of interpretation: 
And though they say that this authority was given 
to St. Peter when the keys were given to him, it is 
plain enough that the keys were not given to St. 
Peter alone, but to the whole community. Besides 
the keys were not ordained for doctrine or authority, 
but for sin, to bind or loose; and what they claim 
besides the keys is mere invention ..• (5) 
3. Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense of the Past (1969), pp.55-6. 
4. Martin Luther, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation 
in K.M. Setton and H.R. Winkler (eds) , Great Problems in 
European Civilization (1954), p.272. 
5. Ibid. 
Luther's position was that all those who had faith had an equal 
right to interpret the Bible: 
.•• we are all priests •.. and have all one faith, 
one gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we 
not have the power of discerning and jUdging 
what is right or wrong in matters of faith? .. (6) 
This stand provoked a sharp reaction from Erasmus who correctly for-
saw that it would now be necessary to try to formulate rules in 
order to be able to arbitrate amongst interpretations. Pointing 
out that the Scriptures are not always perfectly clear, Erasmus 
argued that if they were, why over the centuries had "such eminent 
men" been blind to their truth?(7) While admitting that it might 
be possible that the Holy Spirit might reveal truths "withheld 
from a host of learned men" to a "humble and illiterate person", 
Erasmus opted for an acceptance of the authority of the Catholic 
Church: (8) 
.•• it is more probable that God has infused His 
Spirit in those to whom he has given holy orders; 
just as we believe that grace is more clearly 
given to the baptized than to the unbaptized. (9) 
In a letter to Paul Vo1z (14 August 1518) Erasmus expressed his 
views succintly: 
... the strange and often confused terms, the 
metaphors and oblique figures of speech, hold 
so much difficulty that we most often perspire 
with effort before we understand the meaning. 
6. Ibid. 





In my op~n~on it would be best if some men of both 
piety and learning were assigned the task of dis-
tilling from the purest sources of the Evangelists 
and the Apostles, and from the most approved 
interpreters the essence of the whole philosophy 
of Christ - as simply as is compatible with scholar-
ship, as briefly as is compatible with clarity. (10) 
The recognition that the Protestant view would result in a variety 
of interpretations prompted the Council of Trent to rule as 
follows: 
... to check unbridled spu1ts, it decrees that no 
one relying on his own judgment shall, in matters 
of faith and morals pertaining to the edification 
of €hristian doctrine, distorting the Holy 
Scriptures in accordance with his own conceptions, 
presume to interpret them contrary to that sense 
which holy mother Church, to whom it belongs 
to judge of their true sense and interpretation, 
has held and holds, or even contrary to the 
unanimous teaching of the Fathers, even though 
such interpretations should never at any time 
be published. (11) 
10. op.cit., pp.273-274. 
In what is arguably an uncharacteristic departure from his 
eminently rational method of argument, Erasmus wrote in 
De Libero Arbitrio as follows, ' ••• assuming that the 
Spirit of Christ should have left His people in error on 
some secondary point with immediate repercussions on 
human salvation, how can we admit that for thirteen hundred 
years He abandoned His Church to error and that in all the 
host of holy people not one could reveal to the Church that 
truth which, our recent rivals pretend, constitutes the 
heart of all Gospel teaching?', op.cit., p.276. 
11. op.cit., p.277. 
13 
14 
Thus, as Dilthey has pointed out, it now became necessary for Lutheran 
. . f T d" (12) Th P t scholars to refute th1s doctr1ne 0 ra 1t1on. e rotestan, 
Flacius (1520-1575), tried to show that it was possible to g1ve 
interpretations which were universally valid provided that two 
"rules" were followed. Firstly, argued Flacius, the interpretation 
must take into account the actual linguistic usage at the time of 
writing the text, and secondly the historical circumstances surround-
ing the creation of the text must be considered as an integral part 
of the investigation of its meaning. (In effect, these "rules" had 
been followed by Valla in his unmasking of the "Donation of 
Constantine"). Flacius was the first thinker to formulate explicitly 
the hermeneutic insight of the hermeneutic circle, that "the individ-
ual parts of a whole everywhere draw their comprehensibility from 
. .. hId h " (13) the1r relat10nsh1p to that woe an to t e other parts • 
Supporting the Protestant stand, and at the same time rejecting the 
institutionalized interpretations of both Catholics and Jews, the 
Jewish philosopher, Spinoza (1634-1677), expressed his arguments on 
the interpretation of the scriptures in Chapter 7 of his work 
A Theo Logico - PoLitical Treatise. Spinoza recognised clearly that 
meaning is contextual and that there may be what might be termed a 
"hidden" meaning in a text. He stressed the necessity of the 
interpreter's linguistic competence and insisted on the importance 
of using one's own reason, and not trying to explain the meaning of 
the words of the Scriptures "according to our preconceived opinions, 
twisting them about ... ,,(14) In short, Spinoza's contribution to 
contemporary hermeneutics is significant, a contribution not 
recognised in works dealing with the history of that discipline. (15) 
12. Dilthey, op.cit., p.238. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise (1951), 
p.1l7. 
15. See Dilthey, op.cit., Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: 
Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique (1980) 
Palmer, Hermeneutics (1969). ' 
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According to Spinoza, the institutionalized interpretations of both 
the Jews and the Catholics were constantly being attacked by each 
other, and the whole tradition of interpretation should be received 
with extreme suspicion. (16) Because "it is also in every man's 
power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment 1n 
this behalf (religion) and to explain and interpret religion for 
himself", (17) Spinoza proposed adherence to his method of interpre-
tation rooted in man's reason as opposed to Luther's emphasis on the 
guidance of faith. 
For as the highest power of Scriptural interpretation 
belongs to every man, the rule for such interpretation 
should be nothing but the natural light of reason 
which is common to all - not any supernatural light 
nor any external authority: moreover, such a rule 
ought not to be so difficult that it can only be 
applied by very skilful philosophers, but should be 
adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and 
capacity of mankind. (18) 
This method for interpreting the scriptures, (which Spinoza called 
the "true" method, (19)) is also the true method for interpreting 
any text because, based on the operation of natural reason, it 
"consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known, or 






Spinoza, op.cit., p.l07. 
op . cit., p. 119 . 
Ibid. 
Spinoza's "faith" in the ability of ordinary man to interpret 
the meaning of texts provided he exercises "the natural 
light of reason" may well be an over-optimistic vision. In-
sofar as it is argued in this thesis that the interpreter 
co~tributes to the historical meaning of a text, he should be 
sk1lfu1, that is thoroughly professional in his approach. 
op.cit., p.99. 
op. cit., p. 113 . 
16 
In the case of the scriptures, the goal of the method is to infer 
"the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its 
. . 1 ,,(21) Th f d t 1 . . 1 (h· h fundamental pr~nc~p es . ese un amen a pr~nc~p es w ~c 
may be said to contribute to the fore-structure of understanding, 
to use Heidegger's term);22) form the universal basis and foundation 
of the scriptures, insofar as they are commended by all the 
. (23) 
prophets as "external and prof~table to all men". Spinoza 
lists these principles as follows: 
God ~s one 







God alone should be worshipped 
God cares for all men 
God especially loves those who adore Him 
Love they neighbour as thyself. (24) 
The universal rule to be followed in any interpretation ~s to 
accept nothing as authoritative if it is not perceived very clearly 
. (25) 
when examined in the light of its h~story. Indeed the 
intention of the author cannot be recovered without a knowledge of 
this history. (26) What therefore does Spinoza mean by "this 
history?". Firstly the term refers to the language ~n which the 
Scriptures were written, and the interpreter must become what con-
temporary hermeneutics would call "linguistically competent". (27) 
In fact, Spinoza's discussion indicates his recognition that it is 
our mutual access to a shared linguistic tradition, made possible 
by the fact that we speak the same language, which makes understand-
. .b (28) . 
~ng poss~ leo For the mean~ng of words by and large endures 
uncorrupted. Spinoza makes it clear how difficult it is to change 
21. op.cit., p.113. 
22. Chapter 3. 
23. Spinoza, op.cit., p.104. 
24. Ibid. 
25. op.cit., p.10l. 
26. op.cit., p.lll. 
27. op.cit., p.10l. 
28. See Chapter 3 for a discussion on this point. 
the mean~ng of a word in ordinary usage - we can, he says, change 
the meaning of a sentence, but "if anyone wanted to change the 
meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep up the change 
. . ,,(29) 
among posterity or in common parlance or wr~t~ng • 
The phrase "this history" refers secondly to an analysis of each 
book, arranging the contents under heads so as to collate teachings 
on various topics. (30) And thirdly, it refers to the historical 
environment, "the life, the conduct and the studies of the author 
of each book, who he was, what was the occasion and the epoch of 
his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language •.• the fate 
of each book, how it was first received, into whose hands it fell, 
how many different versions there were of it, by whose advice was 
it received into the Bible, and, lastly how all the books now 
17 
. d d . d' . 1 h 1 " (31) un~versally accepte as sacre , were un~te ~nto a s~ng e woe . 
It is important to note that Spinoza \Vas not concerned with the 
truth of Biblical passages, but only with their meaning, their 
"1" . (32) h . h ' . f h d' rea mean~ng, t at ~s t e ~ntent~on 0 the aut or, an th~s 
.. 'd d (33) mean~ng ~s eluc~ ate contextual l y. 
Spinoza was aware that interpretation presented certain difficulties, 
with the specific nature of the Hebrew language itself and with the 
tracing out of the histories of the books and their authors, and 
hence the true meaning might be "inexplicable". (34) But these 
problems were not due to an imperfection of the method; rather they 
must be seen as a function of the difficulties of scriptural inter-
(Presumably Spinoza did not feel that contemporary 




29. Spinoza, op .cit. , p.107. 
30. op.cit., p .10l. 
3l. • p.l03. op.c~t., 
32. op.cit., p.106. 
33. op.cit., p .10l. 
34. op.cit., p .112. 
35. op.cit., p.1l3. 
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these "hidden" mean1.ngs ought not to be cause for concern, for 
after all, "the precepts of true- piety are expressed in very 
ordinary language, and are equally simple and easily understood". 
(36) 
"Thus", Spinoza goes on to say, "we conclude that we can easily 
follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from the 
history we possess of it and we can be sure of its true meaning". 
In short we can be certain about matters of blessedness and 
salvation which constitute the "kernel" of the scriptures. The 
. " b db" (37) rest, Sp1.noza assures us, we need not be trou 1e a out . 
As far as it goes Spinoza's analysis is acceptable to the idea of 
a hermeneutic interpretation of texts although, as has been pointed 
out, he was not unduly concerned with "hidden" meanings. The idea 
of a hermeneutic of history however, taking cognisance of that 
insight, also argues in favour of the practice of the double 
hermeneutic in order to elucidate the fuller historical meaning of 
a text (or text analogue). Spinoza has fleshed out Flacius's two 
rules in terms of which interpretation is based on an analysis of 
linguistic usage and on the historical context surrounding the 
text. However, it will be argued that an analysis in terms of 
which the interpreter is passive in the hermeneutic circle 1.S an 
<, incomp1et;~ne. (3 As such- Spinoza' s views, and those of F1acius , 
'= -
are incomplete. A reassessment of the role of the interpreter 
could only come about with the growing recognition of the his tori-
cality of man. 
The hermeneutics of Ast, Wolf and Sch1eiermacher (with that of 
Di1they) was influenced by the German Romantic tradition. As 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Chapter 3. • 
Bauman puts it, in terms of that tradition, the "nation" was viewed 
as a collective subject, complete with intuitive longings, emotions, 
a sense of unique destiny, distinctively individual colourings of 
. (39) 
word percept10n. An influential spokesman for the tradition, 
Herder, in his work Ideas on the PhiZosophy of the History of 
Mankind (1784), spoke of the spirit of each nation, its voZksgeist 
which expressed the individuality of the nation and differentiated 
it from other nations, and in which all members of the nation 
participated. It was in the creativity of the artist that this 
reached its highest form of expression. For the Romantics, the a1m 
of interpretation was to recapture the artist's state of mind, in 
short to reconstruct the artist's intention. Interpretation was 
construed as the empathic recapturing of intention. Dilthey was 
to try to extend this notion; · he saw it open to sceptical rebuttal. 
The Romantics focussed on the historicality of each nation, on its ------specific situatedness in history. But the implications of this 
insight for hermeneutics were not fully grasped at this time. 
Hermeneutics would thereafter have to grapple with the consequences 
of accepting that the interpreter's understanding and interpretation 
grew out of and was conditioned by his historical situation, by his -----own historicality. c 
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For Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) the a1m of a hermeneutic interpretation 
was "the clarification of the work through the development of its 
meaning internally and the relationship of its inner facts to each 
other and to the larger Spirit of the Age". (40) And it is, according 
to Ast, our common participation in the geist which ensures that we 
39. Bauman, op.cit., p.23. 
40. Palmer, op.cit., p.77. 
can understand the mean~ng of texts. (Ast believed that language ~s 
the prime medium through which the Spirit of Age is transmitted). 
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The hermeneutic task involved three parts, the first of which was the 
historical, that 'is, understanding in relation to the content of the 
work. The second part was grammatical, that is understanding the work 
in relation to the language used. The final part was the spiritual or 
geistige understanding of the work in relation to the total view of 
~ (41) 
the author and the total view of the age. In short Ast has not 
progressed beyond Spinoza although he did specifically enunciate the 
basic principle of the hermeneutic circle: 
One can only rightly grasp the combined unity of 
the spirit of antiquity if one grasps the indi-
vidual revelations of it in individual ancient 
works, and on the other hand the geist of an 
individual author cannot be grasped apart from 
placing it in its higher relationship to the 
whole. (42) 
Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824) conceived of hermeneutics as "the 
S " f h 1 b h" h h " f"" " d" (43) c~ence 0 t e ru es y w ~c t e mean~ngs 0 s~gns ~s recogn~se , 
and the aim of a hermeneutic interpretation "to grasp the written 
or even spoken thoughts of an author as he would have them to be 
(44) " grasped", that ~s, entering into the other's mental world. There 
were, he argued, three levels of interpretation, the grammatical, 
which presupposed k~owledge of the language being used; the 
historical, which meant that the interpreter took into account the 
historical context as well as his knowledge of the author's life; 
and finally the philosophical in terms of which the arguments given 
had to be coherent. It is clear therefore that Wolf had not made any 
new contribution to hermeneutics. 
4l. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. op. cit. , p.8l. 
44. Ibid. 
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On the other hand, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
was held by Dilthey, for example, to have played an important role 
in the development of hermeneutics, extending it from a concern 
simply with the art of interpreting texts to a concern with under-
standing itself. Dilthey wrote: 
Until then, hermeneutics had been at best a system of 
rules whose parts, the individual rules themselves, 
were held together by the aim of giving an interpre-
tation of general validity •.. Schleiermacher now 
sought for an analysis of the understanding that lay 
behind these rules or in other words, for a formulation 
of the goal of the activity as a whole, and from such 
a formulation he derived the possibility of a valid 
interpretation in general. (45) 
However, Schleiermacher did not conceive understanding as 
historical, although he said that understanding had to be "from 
out of life itself". (46) Nevertheless he did not explore the idea 
of understanding in the context of one's horizon of experience (to 
use Gadamer's terms). As Dilthey put it, "he was, however, only 
able to analyse understanding as a re-experiencing or reconstruction 
in its vital relationship to the process of literary production 
"t If" (47) U d d" h Id "" ~ se. n erstan ~ng was e to cons~st ~n the attempt to 
grasp the author's intentions and his mental processes. 
But as his analysis of understanding was psycho logistic it is 
therefore open to criticism. It also reflects his conception of 
understanding as unhistorical. An act of understanding for 
Schleiermacher consisted of two "interacting movements", (48) the 
45. Dilthey, op.cit., p.240. 
46. Palmer, op.cit., p.96. 
47. Dilthey, op.cit., p.240. 
48. Palmer, op.cit., p.86. 
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grammatical and the psychological. In short, we have to understand 
a text "as something drawn out of language and as 'fact' in the 
thinking of the speaker". (49) The grammatical moment used what 
Schleiermacher called the comparative method and was held to be 
historical insofar as the work was examined in the context of its 
language and in relation to other texts of the same type: 
Everything that needs a fuller determination in a 
given text may only be determined in reference to 
the field of language shared by the author and his 
original public •.• The meaning of every word in a 
given passage has to be determined in reference to 
its co-existence with the words surrounding it. (50) 
The grammatical moment sets boundaries in terms of which the 
psychological moment operates, the latter us~ng the intuitive or 
what Schleiermacher called the divinatory method: 
The divinatory (method) is that in which one trans-
forms oneself into the other person in order to 
grasp this individuality directly. (51) 
The cooperation between the two moments was described as follows 
by Dilthey: 
Grammatical exegesis works its way up through the 
text from individual connections to those larger 
relationships that dominate the whole. Psycholog-
ical exegesis begins by a projection into the 
creative inner process, and proceeds outward to 
the outer and inner forms of the work, and beyond 
that to an intuition of its unity with other 
works in the spiritual stance of its author. (52) 
49. op.cit., p.88. 
50. Bleicher, op.cit., p.14. 
51. Palmer, op.cit., p.90. 
52. Dilthey, op.cit., p.244. 
It follows therefore that Schleiermacher has also stressed that 
understanding always occurs within a circle. For as Palmer has 
observed, "by- dialectical interaction between the whole and the 
. ,,(53) 
part, each gives ' the other mean1ng • 
~----- ~ 
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This brief examination of Schleiermacher's thought reveals that, 
despite claims to the contrary, he did not make any substantially 
new contribution to hermeneutics as the interpretation of texts. 
However, his thought presaged the development of hermeneutics from 
primarily a philological discipline towards the concern with 
epistemological issues. 
(ii) Contribution to history 
The Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries played an extremely significant role in the development 
and extension of hermeneutics from the interpretation of texts to 
the interpretation of all works of man, including human actions. 
The successes enjoyed by the natural sciences in this period 
prompted thinkers in the following centuries to try to extend the 
aims and methods of these sciences to the study of man and 
society. Descartes' scepticism as to the ability of the historian 
to make true statements stimulated historians to improve their 
. (54) 
techn1ques. Von Ranke (1795-1886), for example, played an 
important role in the development of a scientific study of history. 
Both as historian and teacher he stressed the need to make extensive 
use of archive material, to examine documents critically in order 
to try to establish their authenticity and reliability. He 1S 
credited with providing what has been called "the manifesto of 
d . . 1 h·· " (55) "( ) mo ern emp1r1ca 1stor1ography, namely history wants to 
show only what really happened". Von Ranke was not a positivist, 
53. Palmer, op.cit., p.87. 
54. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Other Writings (1968). 
55. Hans Meyerhoff (ed), The Philosophy of History in our Time 
(1959), p.13. 
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as Meyerhoff has pointed out; rather he identified himself with the 
historicist Herder. (56) Nevertheless ~n his insistence on the use 
of scientific techniques he contributed to the view that history 
would, as it became increasingly more scientific in its method, 
become a fully-established science in its own right. 
Comte (1798-1857), the so-called father of positivism, argued that 
while history was not yet a science, it could be raised to that 
level by the discovery of universal laws, in terms of which 
historical and social phenomena could be explained. On the basis of 
of a study of the past, Comte put forward his so-called "Law of 
Three Stages" which proposed that human knowledge has passed 
through three main stages, the theological, the metaphysical and 
the scientific, the latter being the stage into which the world 
was entering (and to which Comte himself was contributing). 
Mill (1806-1873), while not himself a historian, was influenced 
by Comte, holding that "the collective series of social phenomena, 
in other words, the course of history, is subject to general laws 
which philosophy may detect". (57) Mill postulated that these laws 
were "the universal laws of the formation of character" which 
ld b d ' d b d" I ' 1 (58) wou e ~scovere y a new ~sc~p ~ne he ca led ethology. 
"It is by these laws", he argued, "combined with the facts of each 
particular case, that the whole phenomena of human action and 
feeling are produced, it ~s on these that every rational attempt to 
construct the science of human nature in the concrete and for 
practical purposes must proceed" . (59) Mill also said that once 
ethology had discovered such laws, it would be possible to derive 
56. op.cit., p.12. For a definition of historicism see the follow-
ing chapter. 
57. Ronald H. Nash (ed), Ideas of History: Volume II (1969), p.5. 
58. John Stuart Mill, 'Ethology - The Science of the Formation of 




from them the succession of states of soc~ety. Mill's programme 
was never realized. 
Reacting to these trends, there developed a strong movement, 
insisting on the autonomy of what Dilthey called the geistewissen-
schaften, the human sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences, 
the naturwissenschaften. This distinction rested on the different 
subject matter in each case, and hence, it was argued, each required 
a mode of explanation appropriate to that subject matter. Whereas 
the goal of the natural sciences was seen as the discovery of laws 
of nature, hermeneutic philosophers rejected efforts by philosophers 
like Comte and Mill to extend that goal to the human sc~ences. 
Rather the aim of the latter was to recover the intention of the 
protagonist involved in an action, and the method of obtaining that 
intention was understanding, or verstehen, conceived as imaginative 
rethinking by the interpreter of the action in question. In short, 
hermeneutic philosophers argued that history is a sui generis 
branch of knowledge with its own specific methodological technique 
appropriate to its subject matter. 
These arguments were anticipated by Vico (1668-1744) whose so-called 
New Science, the "queen of the sc~ences, dealt with the history of 
human ideas" accessible to the interpreter who thinks humanly, 
"that is who imaginatively rethinks himself into the period being 
investigated". (61) vico's importance to this thesis lies firstly 
in his attempt to put history in a sound epistemological basis, and 
secondly, in his emphasis on language as an access into historical 
ways of life. 
One of Vico's concerns was to establish history as a "science" 
hence the New Science. This task should be seen against the 
philosophy of Descartes (1596-1650) whose methodic doubt, resulting 
60. op.cit., pp.18-20. 
61. Giambattista Vico, "A New Conception of Historiography" in 
A. Donagan and B. Donagan, Philosophy of History (1965),p.49. 
~n the so-called certainty of the cogito, provided the basis of 
the scientific reconstruction of the physical world by means of 
mathematical ideas. According to Descartes, history could never 
be a science, for it rested on traditional authority, example and 
(62) 
custom. vico rejected the Cartesian argument. In fact, as 
Lowith has pointed out, he reversed Descartes' methodic doubt by 
arguing that within "the immense ocean of doubt" there is a 
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. (63) 
"single, tiny piece of earth" on which we can ga~n a firm foot~ng. 
This truth, according to Vico, is the principle that real knowledge 
is knowledge by causes. We know intimately and thoroughly what we 
ourselves have caused or made. Only God, who created the physical 
world, can have perfect knowledge of nature. Man can have perfect 
knowledge of Geometry, for man has created the world of geometrical 
fictions. But this knowledge cannot be the basis for "this world 
of nat~ons".(64) V· d th h t·· t th t h h d 4 ~co ma e e ermeneu ~c po~n ate met 0 
used to explicate an object must be appropriate to that object. 
As Gardiner puts it: 
The method we adopt must necessarily vary according 
to the things with which we are dealing. (65) 
We can know about "this world of matters" because it "has certainly 
been made by men .•• and history cannot be more certain than when he 
who creates the things also describes them". (66) 
There were, as Donagan and Donagan observe, two parts to the method 







Karl.Lowith, Meaning in History (1949), p.1l8. 
op . c ~ t ., p. 119 • 
Giamb~ttista Vico, 'The New Science', in P. Gardiner (ed), 
Theor~es of History (1965), p.20. 
op.cit., p.lO. 
op • ci t ., p. 21. 
Vico in Donagan and Donagan o·t 6 , p. c~ ., p. • 
ical aspect. By this Vico meant that, drawing from his own 
experiences, the historian could make inferences about the human 
mind in general. Thus from the experience of our needs, "the 
human necessities or utilities of social life", which are 
arranged hierarchically from the demands of necessity, utility, 
comfort, pleasure and luxury to extravagance, one can establish 
. . . (68) 
a parallel between the stages of the development of soc1et1es. 
History therefore reflects the different ways men have expressed 
themselves in different epochs, and the ultimate goal of the New 
Science was "to describe ••• an ideal, eternal history traversed 1n 
time by the history in every nation in its rise, progress, 
maturity, decline and fall". (69) 
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Secondly, vico's method has what he called the philological aspect 
which tested these hypotheses by inspecting the languages, laws 
and customs of nations. In short, philosophical inferences are 
.. d .. (70) d·· , ver1f1e by ph1lolog1cal proofs. In accor ance w1th V1CO s 
cyclical view of history, there are three ages through which human 
nations pass, and three languages proper to each age. What the phil-
lologian must do is to read and interpret documents in the light 
of this pattern. (Vico included under the label "philologian", 
"all the grammarians, historians, critics who have occupied them-
selves with the study of the languages and deeds of peoples, both 
in their domestic affairs such as customs and laws, and in their 
external affairs, such as wars, peaces, alliances, travels and 
commerce") . (71) L v· . d· . 11 . anguage, 1CO recogn1se , 1S espeC1a y 1mportant 
in providing access into ways of life during these periods, for it 
68. op.cit.,. p.48. 
69. op.cit., p.49. 
70. op.cit., p.50. 
71. vi co in Gardiner, op.cit., pp.13-l4. 
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,,(72) I h 
1.S "a great witness to the customs •.. of the world. n sort 
Vi co recognised "the part that etymology can play in shedding light 
upon forms of life and experience previously inaccessible to our 
knowledge and comprehension". (73) The aim of the method was to 
recover the "public grounds of truth" of ancient times, a truth which 
had in the passage of the years and through changes in language come 
" . h d" (74) Th' ld It' I I to be enveloped 1.n false 00 • 1.S wou app y par 1.CU ar y 
1.n the case of mythologies and popular traditions. Historical 
knowledge was found therefore by an effort of "constructive inter-
. (75) pretat1.on". This was a process of "recovering and recapturing 
the forms of thought and feeling" which his torical evidence and 
(76) sources embody . It involved the use of imaginative rethinking 
to recreate the character of the age, and required a critical 
attitude on the part of the historian who was required to sift 
"truth from falsehood". (77) 
There is, however, a fundamental problem in this method. vico held 
that men have changed over the ages, passing through various stages 
of development each with its own distinctive character. While he 
rejected the imposition of contemporary presuppositions on the past, 
he failed to state the problem as to whether it was possible in 
principle for the historian living in one age to understand someone 
living in another. Bleicher has argued that Vico's concept of 
the New Science was still tied to the ideal of knowledge character-
istic of the natural science at that time. (78) Future hermeneutic 
thinkers would have to come to grips with the question of how 
understanding could take place between historical periods, and 
would be required to analyse the idea of historicality of meaning. (79) 
72. op.cit., p.14. 
73. op.cit., p.ll. 
74. op.cit., p.14. 
75. Lowith, op.cit., p.119. 
76. Vico in Gardiner, op.cit., p.ll. 
77. vico in Donagan and Donagan, op . cit., p.51. 
78. Bleicher, op.cit., p.16. 
79. op.cit., p.17. 
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Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727-1799) explicitly raised the question 
as to whether it was in fact possible to bridge what Gadamer has 
. . . . b . d " (80) called "the personal and h~stor~cal distance etween m~n s . 
Gatterer, while accepting the sUbjective nature of historical ) 
understanding, offered criteria which he felt would guarantee the 
truth of an interpretation, albeit from a particular historical 
horizon. 
Historians in the seventeenth century tended to view history as 
the gathering 
some unifying 
of facts presented in a chronological sequence, within 
framework, usually Christianity. ~er, however, 
emphasized the importance of a critical examination of facts in 
order to present a thematic analysis of the past, rather than 
conceiving history simply as chronology. History, he held, 
was concerned with the posing of questions. This implied that the 
historian had to choose, select and arrange h~s mater~a 
80. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976), p.95. 
(henceforth PH). 
81. David E. Linge, 'Introduction' in Gadamer, op.cit., p.X1V. 
er 
(82) 
that determine the f~s of his unders~~nding of the past. 
Gatterer looked to the Greeks who, he argued, used the concept 
(83) "system of events" in accordance with which aspects of the 
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past were seen in their interconnections. Using these systems, 
which Gatterer called "analytical constructs", the historian would 
write a "synthetic history" as an analysis of their causal relation-
ships. (84) Bringing the notion of co11igation to mind, Gatterer 
held that historical events must be located in periods character-
ized by their own interconnections, "their own inherent rhythm 
and time span". (85) Gatterer stressed that understanding a past 
event involved understanding the larger whole, thus suggesting 
the idea of a hermeneutic circle. However, Gatterer tended to 
limit this whole to the event and its antecedents, ignoring the 
(86) future of the event. Whether or not any particular piece of 
evidence was to be included in the analysis depended, argued 
Gatterer, on the particular question being asked of the past. --This recognition of selection both on the level of questions posed ...... . 
and evidence used is an important aspect of the idea of a hermeneutic ~ 
of history. 
The subject matter of history, argued Gatterer, was the Spirit or 
. t f . (87) h . ., . . 
ge~s 0 a nat~on, t e h~stor~an s a~m be~ng to understand how 
and why people acted as they did. And in an implicit recognition 
82. It is, however, worth noting that Kant was correct in a sense, 
for it is the extent to which the knower can free himself 
from his own historical situation which will determine the 
extent to which he is able to reflect critically on his own 
starting-point. This does not imply, however, that the knower 
becomes ahistorical, for neither self-reflection nor reflection 
on the object can ever be exhaustive and final. 
83. Peter Hanns Reil1, 'History and Hermeneutics in the Aufklarung: 
~e Thought of Johann Christoph Gatterer', Journal of Modern 
H~story, Vol. 45, 1973. 
84. op.cit., p.31. 
85. op.cit., p.32. 
86. op.cit., p.33. 
87. op.cit., p.35. 
of the interaction between individual and society, Gatterer argued 
that this required a study of the ways society was organised and 
the relationship between the individual and his social and natural 
environment (as well as involving the attempt to rethink geist); 
change was to be accounted for by the results of the struggle 
between the individual and that environment in terms of certain 
, , 'b' " (88) c1rcumscr1bed POSS1 1l1t1es. 
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This conception of history, called "the ideal of universal history" 
by Gatterer, required a methodology appropriate to it. Gatterer 
rejected the commonly held view at that time that the paradigmatic 
, , 1 d ,(89) form of explanat10n was that of mathemat1ca emonstrat1on. 
Descartes, for example, had argued that because history did not 
qualify for that method, it could never qualify as a discipline 
guaranteeing knowledge of the past. But Gatterer denied that 
there was only one method of proof and demonstration for all 
branches of scholarly investigation. Indeed he too grasped the 
fundamental hermeneutic point that "the form knowledge took was 
d1ctatea oy the s ubject matter and the type of kno;ledge sought' ,(90) 
-----.-- - ----.. ... . 
as Reill has pointed out. Anticipating the idealist thesis, 
Gatterer argued that there were two types of knowledge: knowledge 
of the abstract, and knowledge of the individual. (91) The former, 
the province of the natural sciences, was concerned with abstractions, 
generalizations and ideal forms, and its method relied solely on the 
use of reason. The latter, the province of history, was concerned 
with actual, past, concrete events. The historian had to understand 
these using "the full range of human experience" including his 
h ' d h' , , , (92) reason, 1S senses an 1S 1mag1nat10n. 
88. op.cit., p.36. 
89. op.cit., p.37. 
90. a p.38. Op.C1t., 
9l. Ibid. 
92. op.cit., p.39. 
Thus while the method of the new history, "universal history", 
consisted initially in establishing the occurrence of the event 
and relating it to contiguous events, and thereafter bringing all 
into the system of events, what was also required was to rethink 
o 0 0 0 h (93) tho th ht or ~mag~nat~vely reexper~ence t ose events. ~s, oug 
Gatterer, was the highest form of historical understanding, 
providing a form of intuitive knowledge in terms of which the 
(94) past is made present. The combination of reasoning abilities 
32 
and the so-called powers of the soul make the past immediately 
evident to the historian. The most important powers of the soul 
are firstly memory, for it allows the reexperience of something, 
and secondly, the actual power which "enables us to isolate certain 
elements of our collective set of memories and form them into new 
o - . : t95) 
un~ts of exper~ence". With the aid of the imagination we 
reconstruct a picture of the past event(s). Although Gatterer 
initially conceived of this method as yielding a true picture, he 
was forced to recognise that it could produce no guarantees for 
an objective account. Hence as Reill remarks, "to emphasise the 
unique nature of historical reasoning and understanding was to 
abandon the shelter of normative scientific thinking". (96) And 
indeed, the more Gatterer tried to establish an "independent and 
reliable realm for historical understanding", the more he found 
himself forced to assert the subjective nature of history, 
abandon~ng the conception of the historian as an objective m~rror 
(97) 
tne past. Gatterer spelt out some of the relativist~c 
implications of his conceptions of history in an article published 
in 1768: 
93. op.cit., p.42. 
94. op.cit., pp.42-3. 
95. op.cit., p.44. 
96. Reill, op.cit., p.46. 
97. Ibid. 
What influence does the st andort and point of Vl.ew of 
the historian have in the choice of material; that 
is, what role does nationality, religion, customs 
and the spirit of the times, along with origins, 
talent, occupation and social prestige of the 
writer, play in his determination of the spirit 
of an event, and his choice of material? (98) 
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Eventually accepting that there was no absolute starting-point for 
any history and that no historian approached the past as a pre-
suppositionless mirror, Gatterer tried to avoid sub'ectivism by 
postulating that providing the historian used sound, critical 
historical methods and provided the account "reflected the lived 
, (99) 
truths of the respect1ve epoch", it counted as a true account 
(which is, of course, tautologous). Yet this is contradicted by 
his conception of each age as a self-enclosed unit. For this 
gives little hope of one age understanding the other. Thus the 
historian can never be sure that he has reflected the lived truth 
of an epoch from his perspective. Gatterer was thus forced to 
postulate something common throughout the ages in which all men 
shared and which made communication possible. This common thing 
is the "universal normative operation of the powers of the soul 
that provides the tie that allows us to understand, reexperience 
and integrate the individual experiences of former generations 
W1' th our own". (100) Th' "R 'II h 'd 1S concept10n 1S, as e1 as p01nte out, 
similar to Dilthey's idea of historical categories. 
Gatterer's contribution to the idea of a hermeneutic of history is 
fundamental. Reill writes that Gatterer challenged "the 
< -
traditional paradigm of historical study - the belief in the 
abi 1ty of the historian to reproduce the past objectively with 
little or no distortion, the emphasis on the directly perceived 
98. op.cit., p.47. 
99. op.cit., p.48. 
100. op.cit., p.49. 
fact, and the exemplar function of history, the concentration upon 
res gestae, all circumscribed and infused with a certain pattern 
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. ." (101) H d f' d h' t d t . d t f of un~versal h~story . e re e ~ne ~s ory an r~e 0 ace 
the methodological consequences of that redefinition. But he 
failed to analyse the dialogue between t~ historian and the past 
as it occurs in the hermeneutic circle. Indeed Reill claims that 
Gatterer's work pointed~ to a fu~damental epistemological circle 
from which "modern historiography is trying to escape". For "now 
history is seen as an active interplay between the historian and 
his subject matter ... (and) was dependent upon the subjective 
experience of the historian and his ability to receive past 
exper~ences. This, then, opens the door to the problems of recon-
ciling the objective claims of historical knowledge with the recog-
~ (102) 
~ nition of the subjective nature of historical understand~ng". 
But the point ~s that 'historiography must not try to escape from 
- , 
the circle. For it is only within the circle that the reconcilia-
tion Reill speaks of can occur through the mediation of frames of 
meaning of the past event and the historian's present. This ~s 
achieved by the self-reflective historian in his openness to the 
otherness of the past. 
The contribution of the early hermeneutic tradition forms a 
necessary starting point for the development of the idea of a 
hermeneutic of history. The parameters within which that idea 
must be developed and its fundamental issues resolved are becoming 
clear. The status of history in relation to the natural sciences 
must be examined, and in particular, a thorough investigation is 
required of the concept of imaginative rethinking, the mode of 
explanation regarded as appropriate to the subject matter of 
history. Recognition has been given to the interpreter/historian's 
linguistic competence and his familiarity with the historical 
101. op.cit., p.SO. 
102. op.cit., p.42. 
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period in question, as well as to the idea of a hermeueutic circle • . 
But only vico and Gatterer caught a glimpse of the problems of 
whether the intention of the author or historical protagonist ~s 
recoverable in principle, and of the possibility of giving 
objective historical accounts. It was only when Dilthey explicitly 
raised the question of the historicality of understanding 




In the history of hermeneutics the contributions of Dilthey 
(1833-1911) are seminal in the way they synthesise the various 
philosophies examined thus far and pose problems for the future 
development of that discipline and for the idea of a hermeneutic 
of history. 
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It was he who brought together the two hermeneutic traditions, 
namely the interpretations of texts and actions respectively, ~n 
his analysis of all objectification of geist. Recalling the 
distinction made by Vi co and Gatterer between the natural and human 
sciences, Dilthey defined them as the naturwissenschaften and 
geisteswissenschaften, delineating their differences and sameness. 
He extended verstehen from a psychologistic conception to include 
the idea of interpretation of the meaning of objectifications of 
geist in their historical context. Like Gatterer, Dilthey gave 
expression to the historicality of existence, holding that mean~ng 
is historical and that understanding always occurs from what we 
would call a point of view. Nevertheless he did not explore fully 
the question of the interpreteris own historicality. He recognised 
that objectifications of geist encompass past, present and future, 
that is, that past, present and future are part of any moment of 
lived experience, but he did not show how interpretations by 
historians also necessarily involve these temporal moments in the 
mediation of frames of meaning. Dilthey argued that an objectifi-
cation must be interpreted ~n its own context, but failed to see 
that what is also required is to understand such objectifications 
"in the horizon of one's own temporality and position in history", 
P 1 
. (1). , . 
as a mer puts ~t. D~lthey s analyses therefore re~terated the 
1. Palmer, op.cit., p.122. 
need for an examination of the temporality of understanding 
spelling out the necessity for a clarification of the modes of 
interaction between the horizons of the interpreter and text. 
This would amount to an overcoming of the subject - object 
dichotomy of the early positivist tradition rooted in the 
Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the thought of Descartes and the Enlightenment tradition. 
(i) Historicality 
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As pointed out above, Dilthey explicitly identified hermeneutics 
with the geisteswissenschaften. His uncompleted project, Critique 
of Historical Reason, was intended to clarify the epistemological 
foundations of the geisteswissenschaften. Dilthey saw this work 
as complementing Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Holding that 
Kant's approach was ahistorical, (2) Dilthey argued that Kant had 
restricted the realm of science to exclude a scientific investi-
gation of those phenomena concerned with the meaning of man's 
existence. He did not question the adequacy of Kant's categories 
for the naturwissenschaften, but he did question their adequacy 
for the historical character of existence, for Kant's categories 
are atemporal, static and opposite of the historicality and 
dynamism of life itself. (3) His aim was, as Palmer puts it, to 
"get away from the reductionist and mechanistic perspective of the 
natural sciences, and to find an approach adequate to the fulness 
of (historical) phenomena". (4) Dilthey, in short, asked in a Kant-
ian spirit, "How is history possible?". (5) He therefore consoli-
dated the movement within hermeneutics towards epistemological 
analysis. 
2. Bleicher, op.cit., p.19. 
3. Palmer, op.cit., p.lOO. 
4. Ibid. 
5. H.P. Rickman, 'Dilthey and the Writing of Intellectual 
History', Journal of World History, Vol. 13, 1971, p.480. 
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The term "ge{st", as used by Dilthey, included spirit, intellect, 
mind and idea; the term "wissenschaften" refers to any systematic 
body of knowledge. The geisteswissenschaften are clearly differ-
entiated from the naturwissenschaften with regard to their respec-
tive objects of study and to the mode of investigation in each 
case. Much in the same way as Vico, Dilthey characterised the 
former as follows: 
Their rank is identical with that of understanding 
and understanding has the objectification of life 
consistently as its object. Thus the range of the 
human studies is determined by the objectification 
of life in the external world. The human spirit 
(geist) can only understand what it has created. 
Nature, the object of the natural sciences, 
embraces reality which has arisen independently 
of the efficacy of spirit (geist). Everything 
on which man has actively impressed his stamp 
forms the object of the human studies. (6) 
Stressing the unique connection between life and history, Dilthey ---- -- --- -- - ----------
wrote that "we are, first of all, historical beings, and, after 
that, contemplators of history; only because we are the one do 
we become the other". (7) It is geist which is present to the 
is also that which reflection 
on past ex In short, it is geis which 
is "the mental structure .•• at the basis of th know.er's Qwn life - ~-
as well as the basis of the phenomena he studies". (8) 
Analysing the structure of lived experience, Dilthey argued that 
experience is temporal and historical, encompassing past, present 




Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on 
History and Society (1961), (henceforth PM), p.67. 
op . cit., p. 66 . 
David E. Linge, "Dilthey and Gadamer: Two Theories of 
Historical Understanding", American Academy of Religion 
Journal, Vol. 41, 1973, p.536. 
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the horizons of past and future, our understanding of life must be 
~n temporal terms, and we must therefore use categories appropriate 
to the historical nature of that experience. These categories are 
ways of interpreting things in terms of some relationship, for 
life ~s not experienced as a chaos of disconnected events, but ~s 
encountered as organised, as interpreted, and therefore as 
. (9) 
mean~ngful: 
All these categories of life and history are forms 
not of empirical statements developed from them 
by additional thought processes, which become 
generally applicable to human studies. They 
originate in experience itself. They are not super-
added types of formation ••. all our statements are 
already within the sphere of experience insofar as 
they are about the course of life and so •.• 
express predicates about it ... they achieve 
universality through having, as their background, 
the objective mind (geist), and as their constant 
counterpart, insight into other people. (10) 
The organisation of life occurs both on a 'pre-theoretical' level 
(to use a Heideggerean term) and well as on the level of deliberate 
consc~ous interpretation, the former constituting the basis of the -latter. There are, according to Dilthey, three major classes of 
expressions of life; firstly what man thinks, that is his 
concepts, judgments and what Dilthey calls his large thought 
structures such as the great philosophical systems; secondly, what 
man does, that is his actions; and thirdly what man creates 
including works of art and other "emotive expressions". (11) 
Of the categories meaning ~s the 'master' one, characterising all 
human life. The other categories therefore are different ways ~n 
h · h . (12) w ~c mean~ng ~n const~tuted. Hence, for example, to take the 
9. Dilthey, op.cit., p.86. 
10. op.cit. , pp . 110-11l. 
ll. 
, 
pp • 117-l2l. op.c~t., 
12. op.cit., p.96. 
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case of the category of value, a thing is experienced as meaningful 
insofar as it is valued, that is, it LS loved, or hated~ appreciated 
or resented by some one. In the case of the category of purpose, 
something is experienced as meaningful insofar as it serves either 
as a goal for a person, or as a means towards the attainment of 
that goal. In the parts - whole category, a thing is experienced 
as meaningful insofar as it is part of a whole, the whole deriving 
" "f h (13) Th """ LtS meanLng rom t e parts. us mean1ng 1S Lmmanent Ln 
life; it is "the encompassing fundamental category under which 
" " (14) "" h h" h " d " lLfe becomes graspable • MeanLng LS t at w LC LS graspe Ln 
the essential reciprocal interaction of parts as a whole, grounded 
f 1 " " "(15) h 1" Ln the nature 0 LVLng experLence. Thus t e structura unLty 
of experience, is not subsequent to lived experienc~, even although 
. it is not the case that "the whole of the self's mental structure 
" "1 "h "d " " "" (16) Th LS conSC10US y present Ln t e 1n 1vLdual experLence . e 
whole is immanent in any particular experience and the mind, when 
reflecting on an experience, is drawn into a p~ocess which 
"uncovers and draws out the manifold of experienceable connections 
" (17) makLng up the whole". Experience is therefore temporal, with 
the past and present pervading every moment, memory and antici-
pation spontaneously determining the place of a moment within the 
context of life as a whole. Thus, understanding of a particular 
experience may be extended into an attempt to make sense of · life 
as a whole; some events will be remembered, future plans may be 
reviewed and certain goals revised. Experience is therefore in-
trinsically historical. 
Thus, Dil~hey wrote, "To the impenetrable depths within myself I 
am an historical being", therefore affirming the fundamental 






~p.cit., pr86, 96-7, 129, 137-139. Other categories include 
Lnner-outer, power, causality, development, formation. 
Palmer, op.cit., p.120, quoting Dilthey. 
Ibid. . 
Linge, op.cit., p.54l. 
Ibid. 
the investigator of history is the same as the one who makes it is 
. .. . h· ·bl " (18) the first condition wh1ch makes sC1ent1f1c 1story POSS1 e • 
In so doing he posed the 
the relation between the 
historical understanding 
central problem for hermeneutics, namely 
historicality of human existence and 
(19) 
of the past. 
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As has been shown, by historicality Dilthey meant that the present 
1S always and only understood 1n the horizon of past and future, 
that understanding being part of the structure of experience. 
This insight has methodological consequences, for it means that 
interpretations of the past cannot be given in nonhistorical 
terms. 
According to Rickman, acceptance of man's fundamental historicality 
means that "there is no absolute starting point for thought, no body 
of absolute standards outside experience that can be reached by pure 
speculation". He goes on to argue that "all reflections on life, 
all valuations and moral principles, are the product not of a pure 
knowing mind, but of particular individuals living at a particular 
time in a particular place, determined by circumstances, influenced 
by opinions around them and bound by the horizons of their age". 
In s~ort, acceptance of man's historicality seems to lead to 
relativism and a denial of the possibility of objective knowledge, 
for "alL •• reflections and valuations are ••• tinged with 
1 
. . ,,(20) 
re at1v1ty • 
The consequence of the ontological historicality of man may be 
expressed in the concept of historicism. Rickman has formulated 
what he terms three principles of historicism as follows: 
18. Dilthey, op.cit., p.67. 
19. Linge, op.cit., p.536. 
20. Rickman, 'Wilhelm Dilthey', Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p.404. 
(i) All human manifestations are part of a historical process 
and should be explained in historical terms. The state, 
the family, even man himself cannot be adequately defined 
abstractly because they have different characteristics in 
different ages. 
(ii) Dif~erent ages and differing individuals can only be 
understood by entering imaginatively into their specific 
point of view; what the age or the individual thought 
relevant must be taken into account by the historian. 
(iii) The historian himself is bound by the horizons of his own 
age. How the past presents itself to him in the perspec-
tive of its own concerns becomes a legitimate aspect of 
the meaning of the past. (21) 
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These principles therefore imply that historical conSC10usness 1S 
consciousness of the limited perspective of every man and every 
age. Ebeling writes that "what earlier ages thought of as man and 
the world has to be understood historically, but for that reason 
1 , I'd' 'h' '11 " d" (22) 1 " a so 1tS va 1 1ty 1S 1stor1ca y l1m1te. Consequent y, as 
soon as historicity envelops the knower of history as well as th;] 
object of historical interpretation, the foundations for objective 
, (23) 
knowledge are underm1ned". 
The discussion above has raised certain fundamental issues with 
which both hermeneutics and the idea of a hermeneutic of history 
have to come to terms. Is it possible in principle to understand 
the past? How do we understand the past? What is involved in the 
concept of understanding historically? Are objective accounts of 
the past o§Sible? Dilthey's attempts to resolve these problems 
will be discussed prior to an indication of the way they are 
tackled in this thesis. 
21. Rickman, op.cit., p.405. 
22. quoted by Linge, op.cit., p.538. 
23. op.cit., p.539. 
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(ii) Understanding 
According to Dilthey, (and recalling Vico on this point), under-
standing the past is made possible because the "sameness of the 
mind in the I and the Thou, and in every subject of a community, 
in every system of culture, and finally, in the totality of mind 
and universal history, makes the working together of the different 
processes 1n the human studies (geisteswissenschaften) possible. 
In these the knowing subject is one with its object (geist) which 
. . ·f· ." (24) B . is the same at all stages of 1tS obJect1 1cat10n • y v1rtue 
of our possession of geist we can, therefore, not only organise 
and experience life as meaningful, g1v1ng it outward expression, 
but we can also understand meaning. 
Understanding therefore 1S the method whereby we make sense of the 
geisteswissenschaften. As Dilthey said, "we explain nature; 
understand". (25) "Th . t· haft" h man we must e ge~s esw~ssensc en, e 
wrote, "are distinct from the natural sciences precisely because 
their mode of understanding presupposes an inner underived mental 
structure which is present to the individual in experience or 
. (26) 
reflection on exper1ence". Understanding, or verstehen, was 
the term used by Dilthey as opposed to the Kantian use of verstand, 
for he wished to stress that only through verstehen was historical 
. (27) 
knowledge poss1ble. 
In his early work, Dilthey characterised verstehen as grasping the 
intention or feeling which i?formed an objectification, by means of 
an analogy with our experience. For as human beings we are familiar 
with the mental processes through which meaning is experienced and 
d (28) V t h . "h b h· .. . conveye . ers e en 1S t at process y w 1ch we 1ntu1t beh1nd 
24. Dilthey, op.cit., pp.67-8. 
25. quoted by Palmer, op.cit., p.115. 
26. Linge, op.cit., p.540. 
27. R.A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of Human Studies (1977),p.248. 
28. Rickman, 'Wilhelm Dilthey', p.405. 
the sign given to our senses, that psychic reality of which it is 
the expression". And the same process . ~s involved whether we 
understand "the babb1ings of children" or Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, "same" in the sense that "the process of understanding •.• 
h h .." (29) Cl 1 must everywhere present t e same c aracter~st~cs . ear y 
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this psychologistic conception of verstehen stood as a target for 
the sceptic's assault. Palmer writes that the methodology of the 
geistesUJissenschaften concerned "the possibility of understanding 
the inner experience of another person through a mysterious process 
of mental transfer". (30) Walsh has argued that verstehen in 
Dilthey's thought is not a process involving inference. Thus, 
"we pass directly, he appears to think, from awareness of the 
expression to awareness of that which it expresses; or, rather, 
though we do not get at the original experience itself, we have 
. 1 . . 1 1·k ·t" (31) hh ~n ourse ves an exper~ence prec~se y ~ e ~. Wals as two 
criticisms; firstly, if the process is immediate, why do we 
sometimes make mistakes? Secondly, Dilthey's argument leads to a 
29. Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics", p.232. 
30. Palmer, op.cit., p.l04. 
31. W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History 
. (1967), p.50. 
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sceptical position. (32) Dilthey was aware of the scepticism of 
his early psychologistic position. Curiously enough, although he 
speaks about the organisation of experience on a pre-theoretical 
level as being immediate (and surely error-free?), he does also 
write that a person can deceive himself as to his motives, and 
therefore "knows his motives only in an uncertain way". (An 
explanation as to why this is possible was not given by Dilthey). 
He goes on to argue that others have, therefore, even less of an 
insight into the motives of the historical subject. "What personal 
interest, ambition, need for power, and vanity contribute to 
historically decisive deeds can only be established to a limited 
degree. Even letters and verbal utterances can rema~n 
. " (33) . . . h· 
quest~onable . The pr~nc~pal actors ~n ~story may well 
" . . b h . ." (34) spread m~sconcept~ons a out t e~r own mot~ves • 
32. op.cit., p.Sl. Collingwood put forward the following argument 
as an attempt to refute the charge of scepticism which was 
levelled at his idealist philosophy. The thought of the 
individual in the past or the past act of thought A could, 
argued, Collingwood, be revived by the historian in the 
present B. But, he said, in the case of A and B, only one 
act of thought was involved even if the emotions, feelings 
and circumstances in each case differed. A and B are not 
two examples of the same kind of thought; they are not numeri-
cally different acts with the same content. Rather, argued 
Collingwood, when I read Plato, for example, I am reliving 
through my imagination Plato's act of thought, and am not 
performing an act like Plato's • . I think it, that thought, 
myself. To do this, the historian must have projected himself 
into the other's situation, so that historical knowledge is 
"the act of thought itself, in its survival and revival at 
different times and in different persons". But as Walsh has 
pointed out, Collingwood's position does contain certain 
ambiguities. Firstly, to say that thoughts are my thoughts, 
where thought means the act of thinking, implies they can 
never be identical with anyone else's. Secondly, if thought 
refers to the content .of thinking, then while people can 
think the same thoughts, and know that they are doing so on 
the basis that they understand each other, their acts of 
thinking are still not identical. 
R. Collingwood, The Idea of History (1946), pp.282-3lS. 
Walsh, op.cit., pp.9l-2. 
33. quoted in Makkreel, op.cit., pp.309-l0. 
34. Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', p.233. 
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Dilthey's later works, therefore, tended to stress verstehen as 
the elucidation of the context of the objectification. Understand-
~ng was therefore held to take place within the hermeneutic circle. 
Rickman, for example, has claimed that Dilthey's early proposals 
for an "understanding psychology" were abandoned in his mature 
thought in favour of Hermeneutics, as the interpretation of con-
. (35) textual mean~ng. However, it is clear from an examination of 
Dilthey's later works, that the psychologistic position was not 
abandoned. To be sure he gave it less weight, saying that "concrete 
exper~ence and not speculation must be the only admissable starting 
point for a theory of the geisteswissenschaften". (36) But even ~n 
the mature work, The Rise of Hermeneutics published in 1900, a 
work in which, according to Rickman, Dilthey had rejected the 
early psychologism, Dilthey stated unambiguously: 
The analysis of understanding takes its place 
beside the analysis of inner experience and 
both demonstrate the possibility and limits of 
the validity of human studies in general, to the 
extent that these disciplines are governed by 
the way psychic facts originally came before 
us. «37) 
Clearly Dilthey hoped that a hermeneutic interpretation, that is, 
h " . f . ,,(38) t e exeges~s 0 wr~tten monuments would complement the 
earlier conception as a means of conferring validity. For while 
the geisteswissenschaften "are able to go on to derive more 
general laws and more inclusive relationships from this objective 
apprehension of individual life, nonetheless the preliminary 
operations of understanding and interpretation form the basis" (39) 
35. Rickman, 'Dilthey and the Writing of Intellectual History', 
op. cit., p.481. 
36. quoted in Palmer, op.cit., p.99. 
37. Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', p.234. (my italics). 
38. op.cit., p.233. 
39. op.cit., p.231. 
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("preliminary" here referring surely to operations like 
. (40) 
reexperiencing and recomprehenswn). The "enlarged" conception 
of verstehen, therefore, shows affinities with the early hermen-
eutic tradition. Far from being solely "a subjective or purely 
intuitive leap, it implies a whole complex procedure of 
intellectual reconstruction", a procedure which unifies the gramma-
tical and psychological tendencies which dominated the historical 
. (41) 
development of hermeneut1cs. 
Dilthey distinguished various modes of verstehen, some of which are 
psychologistic. According to Bauman, sichhineinversetzen (putting 
oneself in someone's place), is fundamental as the foundation for 
nachbildung and nacherleben. Nachbi l dung 1S reconstruction in the 
sense elucidated by Dilthey as follows: 
••. the existence of other people is g1ven us only 
from the outside, in sensory events, gestures, words 
and actions. Only through a process of reconstruction 
do we complete sense perception which initially takes 
the form of isolated signs. (43) 
Nacherleben, which in his earlier thought meant the "projection" 
of self into the other, is in Dilthey's later thought, the 
recreation of contextual meaning, and its success is seen when 
"the fragments of a historical process are so completed that we 
think we have a continuous whole before us". (44) Nacherleben 
can also "go beyond the original" as Makkreel puts it. (45) For 
it can also include an understanding of what the objectification 
meant to the contemporaries of the author, and furthermore, it 
40. See below for an analysis of modes of verstehen. 
41. Frederic Jameson, 'Introduction' to 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', 
p.229. 
42. Bauman, op.cit., p.39. 
43. Dilthey,-rThe Rise of Hermeneutics', p.23l. 
44. Makkreel, op.cit., p.36l. 
45. op.cit., p.329. 
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may be that insofar as we understand the text or action 1n the 
context of the author's own life, and also 1n his socio-historical 
context, we may understand him better than he understood himself. 
NachfuhLen is a psychologistic term referring to the attempt to 
feel what the other is feeling, trying to reexperience "alien 
" ., . (46) >1 h t" d . states of mind, as D1lthey h1mself puts 1t. lVac vers an n~s 
is characterised as the recomprehension of individual action in 
the sense of attempting to grasp the motives of an action. (47) 
The distinctions between these modes are not always clearly 
demarcated, but it seems that nachfuhLen and nachverstandnis 
are part of nachbiLdung and nacherLeben. 
And finally, Dilthey speaks of einfuhLen or empathy. (48) Some 
commentators have interpreted verstehen solely in this sense. (49) 
While Dilthey did not actually use einfuhLen often, it is clear 
that all modes of verstehen do presuppose a direct contact with 
life, and that the psychologistic elements were never eliminated 
in the enlarged characterisation. 
The actual process of understanding is constituted by an elementary 
and a higher mode. (50) The former is concerned with a single life 
expression in any of the three classes 'of expression. Firstly in 
the case of concepts, propositions and larger thought structures, 
we understand through our mutual access to a shared language. 
Secondly, we can grasp the meaning of an action, "because of the 
relation in which it (the action) stands to a purpose, the latter 
1S contained in it. This relation of the action to the mind which 
it thus expresses is regular and so we can make assumptions about 
46. Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', p.230. 
47. op.cit., p.23l. 
48. Makkreel, op.cit., p.6l7. 
49. see Walsh, op.cit., Chapter 3. 
50. Makkreel, op.cit., pp.322-332. 
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. " (51) l.t • What Dilthey is claiming is that, within a context, men's 
actions are charged with conventional meaning through which practical 
concerns are revealed. From an observation of certain tools used 
by a man, for example, we know what he wants to do. (While Dilthey 
does not appear to anticipate the possibility of error, the intro-
duction of the higher mode may be regarded as providing the means 
of rectifying such errors). An elementary understanding of an 
action does not, however, reveal the meaning of an action in the 
context of his life. The third class of expression, those of 
lived experience including gestures, reflective writings, artistic 
creations, and so on, express the fulness of lived experience. 
These may be sincere or insincere and provide the most difficulties 
for verstehen. 
The move to a higher mode of understanding is prompted by the 
difficulties above and by the fact that the expressions may be 
ambiguous, contradictory or inconsistent. Furthermore the 
interpreter may wish to enlarge his understanding by analysing 
the nature of society, thereby trying to explain, for example, 
why the author wrote as he did. What is at stake, therefore, 
is the "grasping (of) the essential reciprocal interaction of the 
parts and the whole", as Brown puts it. Thus "as meaning is con-
textual so understanding is a process of clarifying and expanding 
the contextual relationship of the meaning unit under study". (52) 
The higher mode of understanding is further enlarged by Dilthey 
through incorporating "both the inductive application of general 
truths to particular cases and a process of comparison or 





Richard Harvey Brown, 'History and Hermeneutics: Wilhelm 
D~lthey and the Dialectics of Interpretative Method', in 
Rl.cha:d Harvey Brown and Stanford M. Lyman (eds), Structure, 
Conscl.ousness and History (1978), p.43. 
Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', p.243. 
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of verstehen must be seen in the light of Dilthey's clarification 
, , h ft (54) of his conception of the subject matter of ge~stesw~ssensc a en. 
Initially Dilthey focussed on the individual as the goal of under-
standing, for the individual was held to be the carrier of historical 
life, and the focal point of intersecting cultural systems. But he 
widened his focus to include communities and cultural systems as 
the carriers of historical life. Thus Dilthey spoke of the subject 
matter of history as being the dynamic system and its creations, 
for example, the Renaissance. A dynamic system differs from a 
causal system of nature in that it produces values and realises 
ends according to the structure of psychic life. "This", Dilthey 
said, "I call the immanent teleological character of spiritual 
dynamic systems by which is meant the nexus of functions grounded 
the1' r structure". (55) Th ' f h' t 'd t ' d 1n e mean1ng 0 1S ory 1S e erm1ne 
by an analysis of these systems. While holding that there are 
no laws which explain the development of dynamic systems and 
their changes, Dilthey argued that analysis of such systems "opens 
up the vista of sequences of states, innerly determined, presupposing 
each other, so that higher levels are built on lower levels, as it 
were, and in such a way as to lead to an increasing differentiation 
d ' '" (56) , , , an 1ntegrat10n. But such 1nterpretat10ns cannot be 1n terms 
of "natural causality" which entails the production of effects 1n 
accordance with the necessity of laws. For history, according to 
Dilthey, is concerned with relations of doing, suffering, action 
and reaction. (57) 
How does the enlarged characterisation of verstehen affect the 
dichotomy between the naturwissenschaften and the geisteswissen.-
schaften? Dilthey certainly accepted that procedures such as 
54. Makkreel, op.cit., p.3l2. 
55. op.cit., p.3l5. 
56. op.cit., p.3l4. 
57. op.cit., p.3l5. 
observation, classification, quantification, generalisation, 
compar~son, induction and deduction, the use of models, the 
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framing and testing of hypotheses could be a legitimate part of the 
latter. (58) He also insisted that understanding must "be 
. . " (59) constrained by theoret~ca1 knowledge of the natural sc~ences • 
Nor did he deny that "human beings can be considered as part of 
nature and to that extent subject to the explanative methods of 
the natural sciences". (60) Di1they himself gave an example of an 
historian postulating certain causes to try to explain why German 
. h d d f . 1· d (61) h l~terature a move away rom ~ts En ~ghtene phase. But t e 
dichotomy between the naturwissenschaften and geisteswissenschaften 
remains because causal explanations cannot provide a historical 
d d · f . . h·· . (62) un erstan ~ng 0 an event ~n ~ts ~stor~ca1 tota1~ty. As 
Dilthey wrote: 
History is a rea1m ••• where freedom appears at 
innumerable points in the midst of the total 
continuum of objective necessity character-
istic of nature. (63) 
In other words, to the extent that the individual can initiate 
changes, human life cannot be viewed as being totally determined 
by nature. Hence the geisteswissenschaften cannot achieve the 
knowledge sought without the use of verstehen. Objectifications 
of ge i st must also always be understood in order to grasp their 
meaning. 
R f . t th . . d 1· (64). . e err~ng 0 e ~ssues ra~se ear ~er, ~t ~s clear that 
Di1they's conceptions of verstehen constitute his answer to the 
58. Rickman, 'Wilhelm Di1they', p.405. 
59. Brown, op.cit., p.46. 
60. Makkree1, op.cit., p.60. 
61. op.cit., pp.316-7. 
62. op.cit., p.321. 
63. op.cit., p.61. 
64. op.cit., p.53. 
question as to how we understand the past. The idea of a hermen-
eutic of history developed in this thesis acknowedges the contri-
butions of Dilthey in this sphere. It accepts both senses of 
verstehen as integral aspects of making sense of the past. 
Verstehen as imaginative rethinking is, however, held to provide 
singular hypotheses which are expressed formally in hypothetico-
deductive form. Indeed it is held that causal explanations are 
a necessary part of historical explanations, but the model used 
~n this thesis draws on the contributions made to the philosophy 
of science by Popper and Kuhn. The 'hermeneutic turn' taken by 
sc~ence has undercut the distinction made by vico and Dilthey 
between the naturwissenschaften and the geisteswissenschaften, 
and that dichotomy must now be reassessed. Indeed, Dilthey's 
own recognition of the historicality of all understanding meant, 
as Brown has noted, that it was the subsoil in which all predica-
tive thought must take root, including the natural sciences. (65) 
(iii) Objectivity 
Makkreel has pointed out that one task of Dilthey's intended work, 
Critique of Historical Reason, was to explore the possibility of 
postulating critical standards for the geisteswissenscha~en. 
For Dilthey recognised that historicism needed a sound epistemo-
52 
I 0 I d· Of °t d· ° • o. (66) og~ca groun ~ng ~ ~ was not to ~s~ntegrate ~nto relat~v~ty. 
Dilthey intended that his analysis of verstehen would "preserve 
the general validity of interpretation against the inroads of 
romantic caprice and sceptical subjectivity, and to give a 
theoretical justification for such validity, upon which the 
certainty of all historical knowledge is founded". (67) He was 




Brown, op.cit., p.42. 
Makkreel, op.cit., p.4. 
Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneut~' 244 .LCS , p. . 
raised to objective validity" through hermeneutics, that science 
which provides the theoretical basis for the interpretation of 
objectification of geist. Dilthey stated unequivocally that the 
work of any great artist or genius "can never be anything but the 
true expression of his spiritual life" and is "susceptible of 
. .. . ,,(68) 
complete and obJect~ve ~nterpretat~on • 
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However, referring back to the discussion on historicality and 
hence to the concept of understanding historically, it is clear 
that Dilthey failed to provide a hermeneutic account grounded in 
historicism. Indeed, in order to put forward an objective account, 
. (69) Dilthey insisted that the ~nterpreter "efface the self". 
As Linge has pointed out, Dilthey's analysis of verstehen 
required that the interpreter refrain from imposing any external 
perspective; nor might he make judgments on the past from his 
. t of . (70) Th k f h . h own po~n v~ew. etas 0 t e ~nterpreter was rat er to 
recapture the past in its own terms. 
Every expression of life has a meaning insofar as 
it is a sign which expresses something that is 
part of life. Life does not mean anything other 
than itself. There is nothing that points to a 
meaning beyond it. (71) 
Success, therefore, depends on "the knower's negating and over-
coming the temporal distance which separates him from his object".c 72 ) 
As Lawrence remarks, Dilthey attempted to ground the geisteswissen-
schaften by "instituting an ideal of historical consciousness which 
methodologically raises itself above the SUbjective contingency of 
68. op.cit., p.233. 
69. Makkreel, op.cit., p.54. 
70. Linge, op.cit., p.543. 
71. Ibid. 
72. op.cit., p.544. 
its own standpoint and above the tradition accessible to it and 
. . kId" (73) thereby arrives at the objectivity of h~stor~cal now e ge . 
Dilthey believed that in so doing, the interpreter would be 
liberated from the dogmatism found in those who seek to impose 
their own views on the past. He saw this philosophy as "an 
enlightened pilgrimage to an ever-increasingly heightened 
. . 1 f " (74) R . th t·· t h~stor~cal se -awareness • ecaptur~ng e pas ~n ~ s own 
terms was therefore not merely an epistemological necessity, but 
a moral task. Thus Dilthey wrote: 
The historical consciousness of the finitude of 
every historical phenomenon of every human or social 
condition, and of the relativity of every kind of 
faith, is the last step towards the liberation of 
man. With it man achieves the sovereignty to enjoy 
every experience to the full and surrender himself 
to it unencumbered, as if there were no system 
of philosophy or faith to tie him down. Life is 
freed from knowledge through concepts; the mind 
becomes sovereign over the cobwebs of dogmatic 
thought. •• (75) 
Despite these noble sentiments, Dilthey did not analyse the 
consequences of the historicality of the interpreter who, like 
his subject matter, is immersed in history. Dilthey himself 
argued that past, present and future are all moments in under-
standing. Hence understanding the past is not simply a 
personal process; it is also at the same time an historical 
(76) 
process. The changing shape of history is traceable to our 
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preoccupations and concerns, which are also influenced by events 
in the past. What Dilthey failed to do was to explore his insight 
73. Fred Lawrence, 'Self Knowledge in History in Gadamer and 
Lonergan', in P. McShane (ed) , Language, Truth and Meaning, 
(1972), pp.171-2. 
74. op.cit., p.172. 
75. Dilthey, PM, pp.167-8. 
76. Brown, op:Cit., p.40. 
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that mean~ng ~s always from a perspective. As he stated, "interpre---tation always stands in the situation in which the interpreter 
. h· h· ,,(77) kk 1 h d himself stands; mean~ng ~nges on t ~s . Ma ree as argue 
that Dilthey proposed that the historian expand his notion of self 
"in order to uncover the transcendental conditions of inter-
subjective understanding". Through reflection, the historian makes 
his perspective exp~icit rendering it "less restrictive and more 
I~ amenable to refinement", Makkreel goes on to say. Palmer has 
also claimed that Dilthey regarded self-understanding as part of 
understanding. He quotes Dilthey as saying that "what man is only 
. . ,,(79) Th d· 1 h~story can tell h~m . us accor ~ng to Palmer, se f-
understanding in Dilthey's thought involves taking a "hermeneutic 
detour through fixed expressions dating back over the past". (80) 
But these claims cannot be upheld. It is true that Dilthey argued 
that "understanding is the rediscovery of the I in the Thou; the 
mind rediscovers itself at even higher levels of connectedness" .(81) 
But he was referring to the point that it is the sameness of mind 
(geist) ~n the I and Thou, the oneness of knowing subject and its 
object, which makes an understanding of the past possible. 
Brown argues that Dilthey was influenced by positivist ideals, and 
that his search for objective knowledge must be seen as "clinging 
to scientific ideals that were antithetical to the openness that 
he himself said historical understanding involved". (82) Bleicher 
has made the same point. He writes: 
77. quoted in Palmer, op.cit., p.119. 
78. Makkreel, op.cit., pp.54-5. 
79. Palmer, op.c~t., p.116. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Dilthey, PM, p.67. 
82. Brown, op:Cit., pp.45-7. 
..• Dilthey was too concerned with emphasising the 
need and value of taking a critical stance towards 
the past, and also trying to secure an objective 
status for this understanding. This posture shows 
Dilthey as a child of the Enlightenment and as 
following in the Cartesian tradition; but it 
leads him to overlook the challenge an historical 
'object' may make on the interpreter's conceptions 
and values and to remain blind to the need for 
self-reflection in which the subject realises his 
indebtedness to tradition and language as the 
bases and media of his thinking ••• (83) 
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Linge has proposed that towards the end of his life, Dilthey did 
appear to become aware of the need to make his historicality con-
sistent by including the contribution by the knower. However, he 
was unable to see how to save historical knowledge from relativity. 
Dilthey wrote, "Yet where are the means for overcoming the anarchy 
of convictions that threaten to break in?,,(84) Bauman also 
suggests that the following passage may reflect Dilthey's search 
f f h · . 1 1 .. (85) or a way out 0 ~stor~ca re at~v~ty: 
The comprehension of the system of interactions of 
history grows first of all from individual points 
at which remnants of the past belonging together 
are linked in understanding by their relation to 
experience; what is near and around us becomes 
a means for understanding what is distant and 
past. The condition for this interpretation of 
historical remnants is that what we put into them 
must be constant and universally valid. (86) 
Bauman holds that Dilthey may be advocating that the historian 
purify his starting point. But Dilthey did not elaborate on what 
counted as "constant and universally valid". 
83. Bleicher, op.cit., p.24. In fairness to Dilthey, it must 
be remembered that he argued that understanding occurs 
through language. But this does not affect the thrust of 
Bleicher's criticism. 
84. quoted by Linge, op.cit., p.545. 
85. Bauman, op.cit., p.45. 
86. Dilthey, PM, pp.139-40. (my italics). 
Bauman has also argued that "the whole history of the problem of 
understanding can be presented as a series of recurrent attempts 
to escape from the relativism of understanding which Dilthey 
.. ." (87) 
revealed, perhaps contrary to h~s ~ntent~ons . 
The idea of a hermeneutic of history put forward in this thesis 
attempts to resolve the problem through an analysis of the 
operation of the hermeneutic circle through which understanding 
takes place. Understanding is historical; past, present and 
future are moments in an interpretation of the past just as they 
are moments in the creation of the object of that interpretation. 
Understanding the past is always self-understanding in the 
hermeneutic thesis. Therefore understanding is not a question 
of "escaping" from a particular point of v~ew as has already 
been mentioned. Nor does it involve, as Dilthey thought, seeking 
a "constantly and universally valid" starting point. However, 
while there is no absolute starting point, the idea of a hermen-
eutic of history rejects the implication that "anything goes". 
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The appropriateness of any interpretative perspective is worked 
out through ~he_Qperation of the hermeneutic circle of understand-
~e self-reflective historian in a dialogue with the past. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of the idea of different points of 
view does not exclude the idea that accounts written within such 
perspectives may, under certain specified conditions, be judged 
objective. There are intellectual values and professional 
standards to which all scholars subscribe, and to which they must 
adhere as a necessary condition for the possibility of such 
histories counting as objective. 
87. Bauman, op.cit., p.46. 
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The contribution of Dilthey to the development of hermeneutics cannot 
be underestimated, even though he never succeeded in achieving 
"ultimate philosophical coherence". (88) For Dilthey's thought 1.S 
ultimately ambiguous because he tried to retain two positions 
simultaneously, namely, to have the facts speak for themselves, as 
well as the recognition of the historicality of existence. Never-
theless, as Jameson says, "Dilthey's false start remains indispen-
sable to any adequate statement of the (hermeneutic) problem". (89) 
The way was open to future hermeneutic thinkers to try to resolve 
that problem. Those contributions will be discussed in conjunction 
with the development of the idea of a hermeneutic of history. 
88. Jameson, op.cit., p.229. 
89. op.cit., p.230. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 
(i) Understanding 
Having posed the problem of the relation between the historicality 
of human existence and historical understanding, Dilthey suggested 
that earlier hermeneutic thinkers had begged the question as to 
whether it was possible to recover the author's intentional meaning. 
The need for an examination of the transcendental question, how is 
understanding of the past possible? was also revealed. And this in 
turn presupposed an even more fundamental question, how is under-
standing possible? Heidegger and Gadamer have been concerned with 
these questions, and the word "hermeneutics" is sometimes used to 
describe their analyses of understanding as a mode of being-in-the-
world (in Heideggerean terminology). 
Heidegger's analysis may be regarded as hermeneutic phenomenology 
since, as a phenomenology, it is an attempt to show or to reveal 
the being of Dasein as it is in its temporality. (1) This 
phenomenology may be regarded as "hermeneutic" in that it reveals 
~he meaning of being given in the understanding of being. It is 
an analysis which is concerned with the ontology of understanding 
and interpretation which renders possible the disclosure of being 
of things. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's being-in-the-world 
was not intended to provide rules of interpretation, nor a formal 
methodology for a hermeneutic exposition. His contribution to the 
idea of a hermeneutic of history l ies in his elucidation of the 
circle of understanding, that is i n his description of understand-
ing and interpretation as fundamental -modes of being-in-the-world. 
As Bauman has pointed out, to know how understanding is achieved is 
1. Da~ein, which in German means Be i ng-there, ~s the term 
He~degger uses for man. 
" ' bl (2) to know how understand~ng ~s poss~ e. Heidegger may therefore 
be said to have interpreted the transcendental question as a 
description of understanding's existential structure. 
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Understanding, together with state-of-mind, discourse and (most of 
the time) fallenness, constitute the fundamental ontological 
structures which characterise Dasein's being-in-the-world. This, 
in turn, includes both man's relationship to things, that is 
concern, as well as his relationship to others, that is solicitude. 
Understanding, as a mode of being-in-the-world, discloses 
possibilities for being within the horizon of Dasein's historical 
situation in the world both with regard to concern and solicitude. 
Understanding projects meaning on the world. Heidegger is not a 
Berkelean idealist, for the world is given whether or not it is 
understood. But without the projecting activity of understanding 
the world is meaningless. The meaning of objects lies in their 
relation to a structural whole of inter-related meanings. It is 
in the assigning of meanings to the world that understanding 
projects Dasein's possibilities. 
The practical understanding of things as ready-to-hand is, 
according to Heidegger, that fundamental form of understanding 
which makes possible the exercise of theoretical understanding. 
But practical and theoretical understanding are not antithetical 
to each other. Rather each arises from different ways of project-
ing the possibilities of man's being. 
Understanding is the basis for all interpretation; understanding 
sees things and interpretation makes the "as" explicit. (3) 
2. Bauman, op.cit., p.176. 
3. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1967), p.189. 
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Heidegger also characterises interpretation as part of any under-
standing. (4) Hence it may be suggested, that a distinction be made 
between, on the one hand, implicit interpretation of the "as", 
this being the case Ln understanding as it takes place in circum-
spective concern, ~~d, on the other hand, explicit interpretation 
during which the "as" is made explicit as part of a process of 
objectification. 
Interpretation always occurs within a set of already interpreted 
relationships. It can never therefore be a presuppositionless 
. f h· . . d (5) I grasp Lng 0 . t Lngs gLven Ln a vance. ~t~~~~. ____ ..-. __________ __ 
standing-O£ what is_~~~ 
of understanding •.. 
_This fore-str~cture is constituted firstly by a fore-having, that 
is we always already understand something in terms of a totality, 
some whole or particular context. Interpretation is grounded Ln ---........, . 
something we have in advance, but this understanding has the 
character of being veiled. (6) It is unveiled in the appropriation 
of the things under the guidance of a point of view. Thus inter-
pretation is also grounded in a fore-sight in terms of which we 
see something from a particular point of view. Insofar as we 
have this fo~e-having and fore-sight, having "set o,ur sights" 
Ln a certain direction, we do also conceive of the thing in a 
definitive way. Intepretation is therefore grounded in a fore-
conception, in something we grasp in advance. Thus as Heidegger 
puts it: 
Whenever something is interpreted as something the 
interpretation will be founded essentially upon 
fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. An 
interpretation is never a presuppositionless 
apprehending of something presented to us ... (7) 
4. op.cit., p.190. 





And further on in the discussion he puts the point succintly in the 
claim that "any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, 
. . d" (8) must already have understood what ~s to be ~nterprete . 
All understanding and interpretation therefore operates within a 
circle - the hermeneutic circle of understanding. It is clear that 
this circle is the "expression of the existential fore-structure 
of Dasein "itself" and it is the condition for the possibility of 
'liilderstanding anything at all. (9) It is not a vic'ious' circle and 
we must not t herefore think of looking for ways to avoid it. As 
Heidegger explains, we will only see it as a vicious circle if we 
accept the ideal of an ahistorical knowing subject which, as 
Descartes would argue, needs an indubitable, presuppositionless 
starting point in order that through the rigorous use of the 
correct rules of reasoning, universally true conclusions will be 
reached. What is decisive therefore, is to come into the circle 
in the right way, and not to try to get out of it (the latter 
alternative being impossible anyway). This means that we must not 
allow our fore-structure to prejudice us in our appropriation of 
an object so that we will understand in terms of ways we want to 
understand, or feel we ought to understand, without taking cog-
n~sance of the object being investigated. 
The constant task is never to allow our fore-having, 
fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us 
by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to 
make the scientific theme secure by working out these 
fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. (10) 
What this mean~ in practical terms is that we must, in the act of 
~~djng,also be eng.a.ged 'p self-llnderstandin.s.j this is a 
point with which Gadamer deals ~n detail). By being aware of our 
8. op.cit., p.194. 
9. op.cit., p.195. 
10. Ibid. 
fore-structure, that is our pre-suppositions, we must be prepared 
to amend the; e in the light . of what the obje-ct being ,,:appropriated 
presents to us. In the case of the historian he must, as it 
were, allow the text to "speak" to him. 
This amending of the fore-structure also involves the operation 
of a circle within the hermeneutic circle of understanding. This 
other circle, to which previous hermeneutic thinkers referred, is 
implicit in Heidegger's characterisation of understanding, and 
it may be called the parts/whole hermeneutic circle. Gadamer has 
spelled out the parts/whole relationship as follows: 
The anticipation of meaning in which the whole 
is envisaged becomes explicit understanding 1n 
that the parts, that are determined by the 
whole, themselves also determine the whole. (11) 
The two circles mutually reinforce each other. For every act of 
historical understanding is at once a movement between present 
.and past, that 1S between fore-structure and that being investi-
gated, as well as a movement between parts and whole. 
In an implicit recognition of the operation of the hermeneutic 
circle, Janeway quotes with approval Erikson's advice that 
"whenever you begin, you will have to begin again twice over". (12) 
Erikson is here referring to the way "an analyst works his way 
into a case of psychopathology", for the relevance of a g1ven 
item 1n a case history is derived from the relevance of other 
items to which it contributed relevance and from which, by the 
f f h · . b· . d· dd . . . (13) very act 0 t 1S contr1 ut1on, 1t er1ves a 1t1onal mean1ng. 
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Insofar as the analyst is "unable to arrive at any simple sequence 




Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975), p.259. (henceforth TM). 
Elizabeth Janeway, Man's World, Woman's Place: A Study-in 
Social Mythology (1971), p.3l. 
Ibid. 
he proceeds by a kind of triple book-keeping, if you wish, a 
. d·· 1 ,,(14) J systematic go~ng aroun ~n c~rc es . aneway concurs, con-
cluding her discussion on this point by stating that "with our 
explanation of that commonplace, persistent tag which declares 
that woman's place is in the home, let us begin knowing that we 
must expect to come around and begin again". (15) 
Gadamer's work Truth and Method is a critique of that "methodo-
(16) 
logical alienation of the knower from his own historicity" 
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as evidenced in the early hermeneutic tradition, including Dilthey, 
which accepted the possibility of the interpreter being able to 
transcend his historical situation. In the foreword to the work, 
Gadamer makes it clear that he is not proposing a hermeneutic 
method for the geisteswissenschaften but is trying, like Heidegger, 
to describe the ontology of understanding. Specifically his 
concern is to show how tradition enters into and shapes the act 
of understanding a text. Nevertheless his analysis has implications 
for such a method; for example, his description calls into 
question the possibility of an objectively valid interpretation, 
a consequence which he recognises, hence the ironic title of the 
book. (17) 
14. op.cit., p.39. 
15. op.cit., p.4l. 
16. David E. Linge, 'Introduction' to Gadamer, PH, p.XiV. 
17. Gadamer has, however, also pointed out that-,-the Greek 
word 'method' meant investigation, and did not have the 
Cartesian connotation of a unity of method and absolute 
certainty. Gadamer, 'Aristotle's Practical Philosophy 
as an Example of the Humanities'. Paper delivered on 16 
September 1980, at a Symposium entitled Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences held at the 
University of Zululand. 
A brief discussion of Gadamer's conception of understanding will 
be given in order to pose central issues relating to a hermeneutic 
interpretation of texts, and specifically historical texts. These 
issues include the role played by the author's intention in a 
hermeneutic interpretation, the notion of incommensurability and 
" " '1' ,,( 18) what Gadamer has called hermeneut1c n1h1 1sm • 
Understanding, argues Gadamer, is not psychological re-enactment; 
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, , " ' 'f 1" (19) F "d d' 1t 1S not a myster10us commun1on 0 sou s • or un erstan 1ng 
is not merely reproductive, but always a productive attitude as 
well". (20) The sense in which understanding the meaning of a text 
is reproductive is illustrated in the following passage: 
What is identical in reproduction is only that which 
was formulated. This indicates that 'reproduction' 
cannot be meant here in its strict sense. It does 
not mean referring back to some original source in 
which something is said or written (21) 
Thus what is reproduced by understanding is not the author's 
intention but "the hermeneutic horizon within which the meaning 
of a text is realized", (22) that is "we understand how certain 
questions come to be asked in particular historical 
C ~rcumstances". (23) And h d d h ' ,  w en we un erstan t e quest10n to wh1ch 
the text is an answer, then "what is understood in this way does 
not remain detached 1n its meaning from our own meaning". (24) 
Asking the question "opens up possibilities of meaning and thus 
what is meaningful passes into one's own thinking on the 
subject". (25) Hence "the interpreter's own thoughts have also 
18. Gadamer, TM, p.85. 
19. op.cit., P:-260. 
20. op. cit. , p.264. 
21. op.cit., p.354. 
22. op.cit., p.357. 
23. op.cit., p.338. 
24. op.cit., p.337. 
25. op.cit., p.338. 
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gone into the re-awakening of the mean~ng of the text". (26) The 
"hermeneutic conversation" involving question and answer, conducted 
between interpreter and text, is therefore both reproductive and 
productive simultaneously. Gadamer goes on to argue that because 
"a reconstructed question can never stand within its original 
horizon: for the historical horizon that is outlined in the re-
construction is not a truly comprehensive one", that question is 
"included within the horizon that embraces us the questioners who 
have responded to the word that has been handed down". (27) To 
understand is therefore to enter a tradition in such a way that 
the historian's present and the past he is investigating 
constantly mediate one another. Thus Gadamer writes: 
Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an 
act on 0 one's subjectivity but as the placing 
of oneself within a process of tradition in which 
past and present are constantly fused. (28) 
Understanding, as the fusion of horizons, entails that "not 
occasionally only, but always the meaning of a text goes beyond 
its author ..• lt is enough to say that we understand ~n a 
different way, if we understand at all". (29) New meanings will 
therefore always be found in any text, and understanding can 
never be final 
Furthermore, Gadamer argues that understanding the past must 
always involve self-understanding. For "understanding includes a 
reflective dimension from the very beginning". (30) _H.e~eneutic 
self-reflection makes clear the preunderstanding the interpreter ---- -.-
26. op.cit., p.350. 
27. op.cit., p.337. 
28. op. cit. , p.258. 
29. op.cit. , p.264. 
30. Gadamer, PH, p.45. 
has of the text, and helps to open up new directions of 
questioning. (31) Hence "the prejudgments that lead my preunder-
standing are constantly at stake right up to the moment of their 
surrender - which surrender could also be called a 
. ." (32) > h h" f h tansformat~on • In sort, t ~s ~s a restatement 0 t e 
Heidegg~rean idea of the hermeneutic circle of understanding. 
One of Gadamer's most vociferous critics is Hirsch who argues 
firstly, that Gadamer's thought has serious implications for the 
possibility of providing criteria for valid interpretations. 
Bringing to mind Rickman's three principles of historicism, 
Hirsch writes, "How can it be affirmed that the original sense 
of a text ,is beyond our reach, and at the same time, that a 
. (33) 
valid interpretation is poss~ble?" An even more fundamental 
criticism is that Gadamer's position raises the issue of 
incommensurability. 
The being of a past meaning cannot become the 
being of a present meaning for being is temporal, 
and differences in time are consequently differences 
in being •.. it is ultimately an argument against 
written communication in general and not just 
against communication between historical eras. 
For it is merely arbitrary, on this argument, to 
hold that a meaning fifty years old is ontologi-
cally alien while one three years or three 
minutes is not ••. (34) 
Moreover, Hirsch's argument continues, in a so-called single 
society, where members speak the same language, it is an illusion 
in terms of Gadamer's position for them to think that they 







Eric D. Hirsch (Jr.), 'Truth and Method in Interpretation". 
The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 18, 1965, p.497. 
op.cit., pp 499-500. 
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with all its members sharing the same world views. 
To say that men of different eras cannot understand 
each other is really to say that men who exist in 
significantly different situations and have 
different perspectives on life cannot understand each 
other. But if it is right to think that all men 
exist in situations that are significantly different 
one from another and that all have different 
perspectives, then the historicist dogma reduces to 
simple psychologism: men in general, being 
different from one another, cannot understand the 
meaning of one another. (35) 
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Furthermore if we accept Gadamer's argument that a text "if it is 
to be understood properly, that is according to the claim it makes, 
must be understood at every moment, in every particular situation, 
in a new and different way" (36) then, according to Hirsch, a text 
has an infinite and inexhaustible number of possible meanings and 
therefore no particular meaning at all. 
Quite clearly, to view the text as an autonomous piece 
of language and interpretation as an infinite process 
is really to deny that the text has any determinate 
meaning. (37) 
Gadamer's resolution of these problems is not helpful, according 
to Hirsch. For while Gadamer argues that the fact that the 
interpreter belongs to the same tradition as the text is a factor 
which prevents error in interpretation, Hirsch holds that tradition 
is itself a changing concept being the sum of previous interpre-
tations of earlier traditions. 
35. op.cit., pp.500-1. 
36. Gadamer, TM, p.275. 
37. Hirsch, oP:--cit-., p.492. 
Every new interpretation by its existence belongs to 
the tradition and alters the tradition. 
"tradition" cannot really function as a 
normative concept since it is in fact a 





How therefore could one arbitrate between disparate interpretations 
which were given by two members belonging to the same tradition? 
Hirsch's criticism will be examined by unpacking the concept of 
tradition which Hirsch has taken in the "narrow" sense of the 
literary tradition surrounding interpretations of any text. It 
will be argued that to claim that understanding occurs within the 
framework of tradition is to make a larger claim than is implied 
in Hirsch's sense of the word. And while it may be agreed that no 
tradition is ever homogeneous, nevertheless to use the word 
"tradition" is to imply a continuity with the past of specific 
ways of behaviour and patterns of belief. Even where there are 
innovations within a tradition these may still be seen as standing 
within the stream of the tradition, becoming "points of redirection" 
so that while retaining some elements of the old, they do also 
. (39) 
~ntroduce novelty. 
Certainly, with reference to the idea of valid interpretations, 
Gadamer himself rejects the idea that any interpretation is 
acceptable, calling this "an untenable hermaneutic nihilism". (40) 
(the phrase "hermeneutic anarchy" is held to be more apt). He says 
clearly that "it is still not the case that within this variety 
of what can be thought, that is of what the reader can find 
meaningful and hence expect to find, everything is possible". (41) 
38. op.cit., p.494. 
39. Edward Shils, 'Tradition', Comparative Studies ~n Sociology 
and History, Vol. 13, 1971 . 
40. Gadamer, TM, p.85. 
41. op.cit., ~238. 
And aga~n, "neither jurist nor theologian regards the work of 
application as making free with the text".(42) As will be elabo-
(43) rated upon later, there are two constraints which mitigate 
against the nihilist or anarchic conclusion, namely what Gadamer 
calls the "hermeneutically trained mind,,(44) and what the text has 
to say to such a mind. (Heidegger made the same points). 
Hirsch's own solution is to make a clear distinction between, 
firstly, the original meaning o f the text, that is the author's 
intention, and secondly, the significance of the text, that is its 
relevance to contemporary situations. 
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it 
is what the author meant by his use of a particular 
sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. 
Significance. on the other hand, names a relation-
ship between that meaning and a person, or a 
conception, or a situation, or indeed anything 
imaginable. (45) 
The former is linguistic, determinate and reproducible; the 
. (46) latter ~s changeable. But no interpreter can assess the 
significance of the text unless he has first understood the text 
on its own terms. Only then can he recast it in his own idiom or 
explicate it in the idiom of the present day. (47) For Hirsch the 
hermeneutic task is limited to the recovery of intention alone. 
It is, however, not possible to be absolutely sure that this has 
been achieved, even although the author's language has a shape 
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and scope that is governed by conventions in which the interpreter 
42. op.cit., p.297. 
43. Chapter 5. 
44. Gadamer, TM, p.238. 
45. Eric D. Hirsch (Jr), Validity in Interpretation (1967), p.8. 
46. op.cit., Chapter 2. 
47. Hirsch, 'Truth and Method in Interpretation', p.496, p.499. 
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can share when he is familiar with them. Hirsch holds that an inter-
pretation of the author's intention, the original meaning of the 
text, is a guess and needs to be tested using the hypothetico-
d 
(48) 
deductive model against relevant ata. 
Hirsch's arguments depend on his insistence that a clear distinction 
be made between the subtiZatis inteZZigendi and the subtiZitas 
expZicandi. (49) The former, which he characterises as understanding, 
is the reconstruction of intended meaning, that is grasping the 
meaning of the text on its own terms. The latter Hirsch refers to 
as interpretation, and is concerned with an explanation of that 
mean1ng. The significance of the text, that is its evaluation, is 
achieved by acts of judgment and criticism. Hirsch therefore 
maintains that there is a single correct understanding of a text 
. b . .. f' b d d' ff 1 (50) on 1ts own terms ut 1tS s1gn1 1cance can e assesse 1 erent y. 
Gadamer's error, according to Hirsch is to have failed to make that 
distinction. 
In this thesis, which has a central theme the possibility of a 
historical method within a hermeneutic framework, it is argued that 
the historian's concern may include the attempt to recover the 
intention of the author or historical agent, a concern reflected 
in the kind of question asked and in the giving of a rational 
. (51) 
explanat10n. However, as Giddens has pointed out, Gadamer's 
analysis has methodological consequences insofar as it points to 
. (52) 
the concept of "the mediation of frames of mean1ng", a concept 
which enlarges the scope of the historical meaning of a text or 
event beyond its mere identification with intention. For recog-
nition is also given to the contribution of the historian to that 
meaning from his point of view in the form of explicitly formulated 
48. op.cit., p.507. It is also argued in this thesis that the 
hypothetico-deductive model of explanation is used, but that 
model is conceived in Popperean terms. 
49. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p.129. 
50. Hirsch, op.cit., p.136, p.143. 
51. Chapter 7, iii(b). 
52. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976), p.64. 
theories imposed on texts or events in accordance with the idea of 
a double hermeneutic. The role that intention plays within what 
is held to be the fuller historical meaning of an event, is a 
matter of historical assessment. Nevertheless that judgment pre-
supposes that intention has been recovered. Thus agreement is 
expressed with Betti insofar as he includes amongst his criteria 
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and guidelines (hermeneutic canons) for hermeneutic interpretation 
the idea of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning, or meaning-
adequacy in understanding. (53) What this canon amounts to is that 
the interpretation of a text be "adequate" or in "the closest 
harmony" with the intention of the text's author, so that the 
interpreter's contribution and what is received from the text 
"resonate in a harmonious way". (54) 
(ii) Meaning 
In order to assess the role the recovery of intention plays ~n the 
idea of a hermeneutic of history it is necessary to exam~ne the 
question of meaning. An analysis of the speech act theory of 
meaning also allows us to deal with the issues of ~ncommensura­
bility and hermeneutic anarchy raised by Hirsch. 
Hermeneutic thinkers have recognised that understanding occurs 
through the medium of language. Gadamer argues: 
53. Betti's other canons which he argues to be necessary for the 
possibility of an objective interpretation are as follows: 
(i) The canon of the hermeneutical autonomy of the object, 
that is the text must be understood on its own terms. 
(ii) The canon of the coherence of meaning (the principle 
of totality), that is the text must be understood ~n 
the context of a whole/parts relationship. 
(iii) The canon of the actuality of understanding, that is 
it must be integrated into the interpreters framework 
of his own experience. 
Emilio Betti, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the 
Geis t eswissenschaften" in Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: 
Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique, p.58, p.59. 
p. 62. p. 84. 
54. Betti, op.cit., p.85. (The possibility of unconscious motivation 
also mitigates against the early hermeneutic view which identi-
f ied meaning with intention. This is discussed below Chapter 
7, iii (c» • ' 
Every interpretation of the intelligible that helps 
others to understanding has the character of 
language. To that extent, the entire experience of 
the world is linguistically mediated and the broad-
est concept of tradition is thus defined - one that 
includes what is not itself linguistic, but is 
capable of linguistic interpretation. (55) 
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As the medium of intersubjectivity, language provides the possibil-
(56) 
ity for understanding our world and the past. This claim will 
be fleshed out through a consideration of the speech act theory. 
The positivist v~ew that meaningful statements must refer to facts, 
and that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its method of 
verification, was challenged by a number of philosophers, the 
original thrust of that challenge com~ng from Wittgenstein's 
PhiZosophicaZ Investigations. In this work Wittgenstein argued 
that in order to understand the meaning of any proposition one must 
exam~ne how it is used in specific language games. Thus an analysis 
of the concept of mean~ng required an approach in which language was 
seen in terms of its communicatory purpose. One such approach, 
. d b A . (57) £ the theory of speech acts, f~rst propose y ust~n, ocusses on 






Any agent, in issuing any utterance, will always be 
doing something as well as merely saying something, 
so that an understanding of what the agent is 
saying presupposes a grasp not merely of the 
ordinary sense and reference of his utterance, 
but also of what Austin dubbed its illocutionary 
force, corresponding to what the agent saw himself 
as doing in issuing that particular utterance. (58) 
Gadamer, PH, p.99, TM, pp.336-405. 
Gadamer, TM, p.367,-PH, pp.59-68. 
See also _Hans Jonas,--'Change. and Permanence: On the 
Possibility of Understanding History', in D. Carr and E.S. 
Casey (ed~), Explorations in Phenomenology (1973), p.129. 
J.L. Austm, How to do Things with Words (1962). 
Skinner, op.cit., pp.2ll-2. . 
In this thesis, the speech act theory of mean1ng in which the 
hearer is a passive member of the speech situation is challenged 
and held to be incomplete. For it is argued that part of the 
mean1ng of an utterance is what it means to the hearer, that is 
the way he interprets it, and this depends on his point of view. 
An analysis of spoken discourse precedes a discussion on the 
meaning of texts, for it is in the ordinary speech situation 
that pre-reflective understanding occurs which makes theoretical 
understanding possible. As Dilthey wrote: 
Understanding arises, first of all, from the 
interests of practical life where people are 
dependent on communicating with each other. 
They must make themselves mutually understood. 
The one must know what the other wants. Thus 
first of all elementary forms of understanding 
arise. (59) 
Indeed the ontological priority of speech over the written text 
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is traditionally accepted. Hoy for example, has suggested that one 
reason for this is because of the possibility of using ostensive 
d f · .. (60) . 1 b d" e 1n1t1ons. But, as w1l e argue, 1t 1S also the case 
that in the face to face situation there exists the possibility 
of direct questions and answers in order to clarify what 1S 
b d h " " "" (61) o scure as a means towar s ac 1ev1ng commun1cat10n. 
59. Dilthey, PM, p.119. 
60. Hoy, op.cIt., p.80. 
61. A further justification for an analysis of spoken discourse 
within the context of this thesis is provided by the 
growing recognition of the legitimacy of oral evidence 
as historical material. This is reflected, for example, 
in the existence of various journals such as Oral Histor
r
, 
Journal of the Oral History Society (University of Essex ; 
Oral History Review, Journal of the Oral History Association 
(North Texas State University); Canadian Oral History 
Journal (Ottawa). 
In the face to face situation, a speaker says something to the 
hearer. He says it in a specific way using various semantic and 
syntactic rules such as verb tense, word order, gestures, tone of 
voice, ~n order to produce a certain effect on the hearer. In 
short, the speaker has an intention he wishes to communicate. 
if the communication has been successful, the hearer has under-
stood both the content of what was said and the way it was said. 
Thus he has grasped the intended meaning of the utterance. 
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The possibility of the hearer understanding the speaker is ensured 
by their both using the same language. This seemingly trivial 
and taken-for-granted point ensures that both know firstly what 
is being spoken about, and secondly the way the rules of language 
are used to bring about the required effects. In elucidating these 
points it will be shown that in a fundamental sense mean~ng ~s 
tradition-bound. For every act of understanding what things are 
in any present, is an historical act insofar as we interpret ~n 
terms of inherited concepts, that is in terms of a tradition of 
meaning. One condition for understanding spoken discourse is 
that there should be general agreement as to what counts as a 
fact. This agreement presupposes that we share the relevant 
concepts ~n terms of which we know what it is for something to 
be an X, that is we can pick out X's and describe them. In short, 
there are public criteria for the applicability of any concept. The 
classification of things (which is implicit in the possession of 
concepts) is arbitrary in that we classify not simply on the basis 
of the similarities between things, but also in terms of our 
interests and needs. But we are born into a certain conceptual 
framework, into a linguistic tradition, through which we learn to 
"see" the world. We therefore necessarily interpret things as 
things in terms of our inherited concepts. Thus Gadamer writes 
that "language maintains a kind of independent life over and 
against the individual member of a linguistic community and intro-
duces him, as he grows into it, to a particular attitude, and 
. . h ld 11" (62) relat~onsh~p to t e wor . as we . Furthermore, while words 
themselves are arbitrary signs, we do not sit down on every 
occasion we wish to communicate and work towards intersubjective 
agreement as to what signs will stand for what things in the 
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world and so on. Indeed, even to do so, we would already have to 
make use of a shared conceptual framework in terms of which we 
could communicate our agreement about such a contingent applica-
bility of signs. As Gadamer has .said, we cannot arbitrarily change 
the meaning of words if there is to be language. Hence "we do not 
. . d bId . " (63) f~rst dec~ e to agree ut are a rea y ~n agreement • 
It is, of course, true that the meanings of words can and do 
change, that man does have a certain freedom over and against 
language. But this freedom is, as Gadamer points out "a limited 
one .•. inasmuch as every language has a life of its own and against 
what is said at any given time, so that one senses from it with 
great vividness the way which the distant past is still connected 
(64) 
with the feeling of the present". Besides our inherited 
concepts there are also var~ous linguistic rules, such as tense, 
word order, punctuation and the like, which have acquired an 
independent existence and are prior to our successful use of 
language, for we must learn to use them in order to communicate. 
Hence the idea of public rules, both semantic and syntactic, 
depends on the mutual access by the linguistic community to a 
shared tradition, because language precedes individual experience. 
In short, meaning is prior to any individual, and language may 
be said to have a monolithic status for each member of a speech 
community. 
62. Gadamer, TM, p.40l. 
63. op.cit., ~405. 
64. op.cit., p.399. This point ~s implicit ~n Spinoza's thought. 
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It is, therefore, insofar as the speaker and hearer speak the same 
language that there exists the possibility of the latter under-
standing the meaning of the utterance, and hence of communication 
having occurred successfully. But in practice, understanding may 
not be immediate; the hearer may misunderstand or his understanding 
may be incomplete; or the speaker may not intend that the hearer 
understands him. 
Consider firstly the hearer. It has already been argued that 
understanding is never presuppositionless, and hence the hearer 
bring certain prejudices to hear on the speech situation which 
could prevent him from grasping the speaker's intention. There 
are indeed two fundamental kinds of presupposition. There are 
firstly those ensuring the possibility of communication, those 
which constitute our mutual access to our shared linguistic 
tradition, that is the semantic and syntactic rules of language 
which are possessed by the linguistically competent ~n that 
particular language. And secondly, there are various and wide-
ranging presuppositions, for example, the hearer's religious 
may 
views, his political beliefs as well as, for example, presuppo-
sitions about the character of the speaker and the context in which 
the speech act has occurred. These latter presuppositions may 
result in the hearer misunderstanding the speaker. (These brief 
remarks on presuppositions will be amplified in the discussion on 
the interpretation of texts. But they suffice to make the points 
below). In the speech situation it does seem possible to overcome 
such misunderstandings, for in the face to face context of spoken 
discourse, ostensive definition~ and cues such as facial and 
bodily expressions serve as useful checks, and perhaps most 
importantly, through the use of questions such as "what do you 
mean?". Hence the hearer can be brought to an awareness of pre-
suppositions which might prevent him from understanding; these 
may be put aside in his effort to grasp the other's meaning. 
Clearly, this involves the operation of the hermeneutic circle. 
78 
Let us turn to the speaker. As Speier has pointed out, the speaker 
may not necessarily want to spread knowledge, profess his feelings, 
guide the perplexed, give the best advice, enlighten or explain 
adequately. His intention may be to perpetuate ignorance, to 
. . d' (65) Th . lead astray, obscure, overs1mp11f y, propagan 1se. ere 1S 
clearly a whole spectrum of possibilities bounded by the two 
extremes of full disclosure and total withholding by the speaker 
of his intention. 
Thus full and unambiguous communication can be said to occur only 
in what would be an ideal speech situation where the speaker with-
held nothing, and the hearer self-consciously bracketed presuppo-
sitions which might prevent him from grasping the speaker's 
intention. It would be characterised by the mutual recognition 
of the authentic right of both partners to take their respective 
roles in the dialogue in order to ensure that understanding takes 
(66) 
place. While, therefore, there is an intended meaning of an 
instance of spoken discourse, it may not be easy to grasp that 
meaning. 
The hearer can also interpret what has been said in different 
ways depending on the fore-structure he has brought to bear on 
the speech ·situation. Thus an utterance's meaning can transcend 
the speaker's intention. For example consider a situation in which 
a speaker A says to the hearer B, "My wife is ill". B and the 
wife in question are 1n the throes of a passionate love affair and 
B may find it difficult under such circumstances to decide whether 
A is simply communicating a fact, probing for information, or 
making a veiled accusation. But even if B feels sure that A is 
unsuspectingly conveying information, he may interpret the remark 
65. 
66. 
Han~ Speier, 'The Communication of Hidden Meaning' , 
Soc1al Research, Vol. 44, 1977, p.47l. 
Habermas' model of idealized dialogue makes these kinds 
of points. (See p.107). 
as an indication of the intensity of the wife's feelings for him, 
or perhaps proof of her pregnancy. And furthermore, when 1n the 
future B remembers the remark, he may, with new knowledge 
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available to him or on the basis of the consequences of the remark, 
read a different mean1ng into it. Hence the fuller meaning of an 
apparently simple remark may transcend the intention of the speaker, 
for its meaning includes what it means to the hearer. It is there-
fore argued that a Searlean-type analysis in terms of which the 
hearer is conceived of as a passive member of the speech situation 
is incomplete. Interpretations of meaning are contingent upon the 
particular "historical" situations of the .speaker and hearer both 
at the time of utterance and during possible retrospective consid-
erations. 
The difficulties of achieving transparently clear communication in 
speech situations become compounded and complicated on the level 
of the written text. For the immediacy of the face to face 
situation has been lost and hence there no longer is the possibil-
ity of using cues such as gestures, facial and bodily expressions; 
nor can ostensive definitions or face to face questioning take 
place. As Rock says, "there is no participation in joint 
exper1ence or joint schemes of interpretation. There can be no 
. 1 .. . . ,,(67) reC1proca mon1tor1ng or quest1on1ng • 
The reader has to try to recreate the context in which the text was 
written, since he cannot participate in it directly. The writer 
may have written a text with an overt as well as a covert mean1ng. 
While these may be "playful" exerC1ses 1n certain instances, in 
political circumstances, where freedom of expression has been 
threatened, a writer's use of allusion may be considerable. Speier 
67. Pa~l.Rock, 'Some Probl:ms of Interpretative Historiography', 
Br1t1sh Journal of Soc1ology, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1976, p.296. 
gives as an example, a book by Ernst Jlirgen, On the Marb~e CZiffs, 
which makes use of "fantastic imagery" to depict aspects of the 
tyranny of Nazi Germany. The chief character in the book, the 
"Chief Forester" was intepreted as being Hitler, Goring (and 
even Stalin). Jlirgen noted that readers tended to co-operate 1n 
their attribution of meaning far more "powerfully" in times of 
. .. d d (68) censorsh1p than the author h1mse1f 1nten e . 
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In V1ew of such difficulties, 1S it possible to recover the intended 
mean1ng of a text? 
As was the case 1n the speech situation, the bare possibility is 
ensured insofar as author and reader share the same language, 
that is in terms of the linguistic competence of both protaga-
nists in the particular language of the text. For it is through 
language that the reader attempts to recreate the context in which 
the text was written and within which it was originally meaning-
ful. But the idea of a hermeneutic interpretation of historical 
texts recognises that the text cannot be understood unless the 
interpreter is self-conscious about his starting point, about the 
horizon within which he approaches the past (which, of course, has 
its own horizon). Gadamer writes: 
The task of historical understanding involves 
acquiring the particular historical horizon so 
that what we are seeking to understand can be seen 
in its true dimensions. If we fail to place our-
selves in this way within the historical horizon 
out of which the tradition speaks, we shall mis-
understand the significance of what it has to say 
to us. (69) 
68. Speier, op.cit., p.479, 480, 491. 
69. Gadamer, TM, p.270. 
Thus the historian will familiarise himself, not only with other 
primary sources which bear on the text in question, but also with 
the secondary sources which constitute the historical tradition 
surrounding its interpretation. This ensures his familiarity 
with the text and its historical context, and the history of its 
interpretations. For as Gadamer has pointed out: 
Hermeneutics must start from the position that a 
person seeking to understand something has a 
relation to the object that comes into language 
in the transmitted text, or has, or acquires a 
connection within the tradition out of which the 
text speaks. (70) 
However, hermeneutics is primarily concerned with rendering what 
is unfamiliar, familiar, what is obscure clear, and what is unLn-
telligible, intelligible. And there are, for the hermeneutic 
historian, both elements of familiarity and strangeness in his 
encounters with the horizons of the text. One element of this 
strangeness is explained by Gadamer as follows: 
The lack of immediate understanding of texts handed 
down to ,us historically or their proneness to be 
misunderstood is really only a special case of what 
is to be met in all human orientation to the world 
as the atopan (the strange), that which does 
not "fit" into the customary order of our 
expectation based on experience. (71) 
But as Heidegger has pointed out it is precisely the feeling of 
strangeness, unfamiliarity and unexpectedness which reveals things 
b · f . (72) as 0 Jects 0 contemplatLon. Strangeness is a necessary 
70. op.cit., p.262. 
71. Gadamer, PH, p.25. 
72. Heidegger-,-op.cit., p.154. 
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prerequisite for the possibility of coming to understand something. 
An example of this strangeness was shown in the discussion on the 
speech situation where, for example, hidden meanings in an utterance 
which may have been intended by the speaker, or which may be unin-
tentional, hinder the possibility of perfectly transparent communL-
cations. In the case of the written text, the strangeness LS 
compounded by the historical distance of the historian from the 
object of his LnquLry. Recreating the forms of life in which the 
text was written rather than direct participation in them may prove 
difficult because the historian feels alienated from that particular 
society. Historical distance also entails that some semantic and 
syntactic rules may change in time. In short, the "hermeneutical 
consciousness" is aware that it cannot be connected with the text 
." ·d" d . (73) Ln a self-evL ent way, as Ga amer puts Lt. 
The polarity of familiarity and strangeness onwhichhermeneutic 
work is based does result in a feeling of tension between the text 
and the present. But, as Gadamer argues, this tension arising ,from 
the encounter with the past, must be brought forward consciously 
in order to reveal the otherness, the strangeness of that past. (74) 
Hence a further condition for the possibility of understanding the 
meaning of a past text is that the historian must self-consciously 
operate within the hermeneutic circle of understanding. The non-
reflective historian may impose his prejudgment on the text, 
possibly thereby contributing to what Heidegger has called a crust 
of misinterpretation. What is therefore required in order to allow 
the text to speak in its own terms, is that "the hermeneutically 
trained mind,,(75) amend, eliminate or enlarge those presuppositions 
in the fore-structure of his understanding which may obscure or 
distort his understanding of the text's meaning in his dialogue 
73. Gadamer, TM, p. 262 . 
74. op.cit., ~273. 
75. op.cit., p.266. 
with the text. It is suggested in this thesis that this involves 
an attempt to recreate, as far as this is possible, the speech 
situation through the interpreter's questioning of the text and 
his openness ~n listening to its answer during the operation of 
the hermeneutic circle. 
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Of course the possibility of recover~ng intention is complicated 
where the sincerity of the author or agent is in doubt. No 
historian would be content, for example, simply to accept at face 
value Napoleon's writings made at St. Helena when the French General 
was at pains to create the so-called Napoleonic legend. The 
speeches and writings of Hitler also pose the same kind of problem. 
Hitler, an acknowledged master in the use of propaganda, held that 
when one lies, one must tell big lies. While these may be extreme 
cases, they are a warning to historians to go beyond texts on their 
own, examining them in the context of the character and history of 
the individuals, as well as in the context of the period as a 
whole, in order to understand the fuller historical meaning of 
writings and actions. 
The following extract from Napoleon's dictation to Las Cases at 
St. Helena, 1 May, 1816, may be taken as representative of the 
efforts of the ex-Emperor to justify his career for posterity: 
I closed the gulf of anarchy and cleared (away) the 
chaos, I purified the Revolution, dignified Nations 
and established Kings. I excited every kind of 
emulation, rewarded every kind of merit, and extended 
the limits of glory! This is at least something! 
And on what point can I be assailed on which an 
historian could not defend me? Can it be for my 
intentions? But even here I can find absolution. 
Can it be for my despotism? It may be demonstrated 
that the Dictatorship was abso l utely necessary. will 
it be said that I restrained l i berty? It can be proved 
that licentiousness, anarchy, and the greatest . 
irregularities still haunted the threshold of freedom. 
Shall I be accused of having been too fond of war? 
It can be shown that I always received the first 
attack. Will it be said that I aimed at universal 
monarchy? It can be proved that this was merely the -
result of fortuitous circumstances, and that our 
enemies themselves led me step by step to this 
determination. Lastly, shall I be blamed for my 
ambition? This passion I must doubtless be allowed 
to have possessed, and that in no small degree, but, 
at the same time, my ambition was of the highest 
and noblest kind that ever, perhaps existed! .•• That 
of establishing and of consecrating the Empire of 
reason, and the full exercise and complete enjoyment 
of all the human facilities. And here the historian 
will probably feel compelled to regret that such 
ambition should not have been fulfilled and 
gratified! ..• Then after a few moments of silent 
reflection, "This", said the Emperor, "is my whole 
history in a few words". (76) 
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Historians would be hard pressed to "defend" Napoleon unconditionally 
on the grounds he himself suggests. For example, Napoleon's 
"police" measures against political opponents, including the banning 
of all except thirteen Parisian newspapers, were accompanied by 
letters to Fouche, his Minister of Police, letters which revealed 
that these laws were not directed against those convenient scape-
goats, "licentiousness", "anarchy" and the superbly vague "greatest 
irregularities". The following extract from a letter to Fouche 
dated 22 April, 1805, is, it is suggested, the express~on of a 
dictator who will brook no personal opposition: 
•.. 1 want to write to the editors of the ••• 
newspapers that are most widely read in order to 
let them know that the time is not far away when, 
seeing that they are no longer of service to me, 
I shall suppress them along with all the others, 
and I shall retain a single organ. Tell them that 
the •.. Revolution is over, and that there is now 
only one party in France; that I shall never allow 
the newspapers to say anything contrary to my 
interests; that they may publ i sh a few little 
articles with just a bit of po i son in them, but 
that one fine day somebody wil l shut their mouths. (77) 
76. David L. Dowd (ed), Napoleon: Was he the Heir of the 
Revolution? (1964), pp.17-l8. 
77. op.cit., p.4l. 
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In terms of the analysis of speech acts above, it 1S clear that the 
attempt to recover the intended mean1ng of the author, by no means 
exhausts the historical meaning of the text, as was proposed 
earlier. Before continuing with the discussion, however, it 1S 
necessary to point out that, following Ricoeur, meaningful acts 
may be considered as texts. As Ricoeur has elucidated, such actions 
have "a propositional content which can be identified and re-
identified". Using the relevant Searlean terminology, they have 
o (78) 
the structure of a locut10nary act. Secondly, any such act, 
insofar as a "typology of action" is possible, may be identified 
d o 0 0 0 (79) Tho dl 1
0 k accor 1ng to 1tS 1llocut1onary force. 1r y, 1 e a text, 
"a meaningful action is an action whose importance goes 'beyond' 
0"1 0 0 0 0 0 0" (80) h f 11 0 1tS re&evance to 1tS 1n1t1al s1tuat10n • Thus teo oW1ng 
discussion on intended meaning in the idea of a hermeneutic 
of history applies both to texts and actions. 
A text or action may express or betray mean1ngs which were not 
specifically intended by the author or agent. For example, 
Luther's account of his profoundly revelatory religious 
experience has been expressed in terms which have invited an 
1 0 0 dO (81) d 0 eva uat10n 1n Freu 1an terms. As Ga amer p01nts out, texts 
therefore need to be understood "not only in terms of what they 
say but of what they bear witness to". (82) 
The significance of the intended mean1ng of a text or action has 
to be judged within the historical context of the text or action, 
as well as in terms of the historian's own present which is, of 
course, future to that text or action. Let us consider Luther's 
78. Paul Ricoeur, 'Human Sciences and Hermeneutical Method: 
Meaningful Action Considered as a Text', Social Research, 
Vol. 38, no. 3, 1971. Reprinted in Carr and Casey, 
op.cit., p.22. 
79. op.cit., p.24. 
80. op.cit., p.27o 
81. He was in the stage of anal f ixation. 
82. Gadamer, TM, p.263. 
action 1n WT1t1ng and posting the "Ninety Five Theses". He wrote 
) " . that Tetzel (a purveyor of indulgence has spurred me on aga1nst 
the Pope". (83) Luther also made it clear in an Autobio~aphicaZ 
Fragment dated March 1545, that he identified himself with St. 
Augustine and hence Catholicism, and that he was, at that stage, 
"a most vehement Papist". (84) Luther's intention 1n the protest 
against the sale of indulgences was to present for scholarly 
debate certain theological points, and the posting of theses for 
such debate was in accordance with common practice at that time. 
Luther was concerned as to whether the Pope had the right to 
grant indulgences, with how Papal love could be reconciled with 
the greed of a man like Tetzel. But the printing press helped to 
. " d ,,(85) Th change the theses 1nto watchwords of mass propagan a . e 
challenge to the Church, implicit in Luther's writing, was 
interpreted differently by various groups in Germany, providing 
justifications for their own ideals and aspirations. Luther's 
later writings served to crystallize these aims, the princes 
challenging the Church's authority for material ga1n in the form 
of Church lands hence providing themselves with increased power 
bases; the peasant using Luther's writings to support their 
protests against the intrusion of rural capitalism. The fuller 
meaning of the "Ninety Five Theses" therefore includes seeing 
that they marked the beginning of the Reformation. The fact 
that at that stage Luther did not intend to break with the Church 
is noted by the historian, but it tends "to get left behind" when 
the historical meaning of the theses 1S interpreted. (86) In 
short, the consequences of an action may go beyond the wishes of 
the individual concerned, and beyond his process of control. 
83. V.H.H. Green, Luther and the Reformation (1964), p.63. 
84. E.G. Rupp and Benjamin Drewery, Martin Luther (1970), p.6, 
p.173, p.174. 
85. Peter J. Klassen, Europe in the Reformation (1979), p.35. 
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86. This is, however, not always the case. Hitler's intention 1n 
sanctioning the holocaust, for example, was to eliminate 
European jewry as far as this was possible, reflecting his 
virulent anti-Semiticism. That intention is surely part of 
the fuller histor1cal meaning of that event. 
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What is future to an event is thus an integral part of its histori-
cal meaning. Pachter writes: 
That a monk nailed ninety five theses on the Church 
door in Wittenberg is hardly worth reading; for a 
century this has been the correct way of inviting 
colleagues to one of their frequent disputations, an 
intellectual past-time before the invention of 
coffee houses. The fact becomes an event because 
we now call "Reformation" the entire sequence of 
events that follows. (87) 
Melden makes the same kind of point when he states that "the 
historical importance of Caesar's crossing the Rubicon ••• cannot 
be grasped by the sort of perception of that public event which 
Caesar's own men enjoyed; nor could it be settled definitely even 
if the historian could interview the ghost of Caesar". (88) 
Thus, as Hubner writes: 
•.• things happening now very often look different 
when seen by him (the historian) and very often 
actually are something quite different when seen by 
him later in the light of the knowledge of everything 
which happened later on. And this would be true even 
if he knew each detail available to the witness. 
Some things which seen very important to the 
witness, may look even negligible in the light of 
later events and vice versa; some things may seem 
to him closely connected which later turned out to 
be far apart; he may describe something as a great 
evil which we see was something very good; he may 
interpret some facts in the frame of some historical 
systems which we may later be forced to construct 
completely otherwise ..• The reason is that with the 
growing distance in time these events will be seen 
in different relations to others, to more and later 
events ... things simply look different if we know what 
resulted from them and what happened later. (89) 
87. Henry M. Pachter, 'Defining an Event: Prolegomenon to Any 
Future Philosophy of History', Social Research, Vol. 41. 
1974, p.463. 
88. A.I. Melden, 'Historical Objectivity: A Noble Dream?' in 
Nash, op.cit., p.193. 
89. Kurt Hubner, 'On Theories in the Historical Sciences', 
Man and World, Vol. 8, 1975, p.378. 
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Quite simply therefore, "the historical context of meaUl.ng ~s 
larger than the contexts of meaning that may have been subjectively 
. (90) 
intended by the ~riginal actors", as Brown puts ~t. 
. . (91) th Because a text addresses a w~de range of ~nterpreters, e 
historian, with his particular point of view, contributes to the 
fuller historical meaning of that text. As Hoy says: 
The meaning of a text is in one sense the meaning 
given by the interpreter, since the text poses a 
question to him in his particular historical 
situation and he approaches the text with given 
expectations. But the text also has a meaning 
that claims our attention by addressing us in a 
manner relevant to our concern with our particular 
situation. (92) 
Agreement is therefore expressed with Gadamer that "every age 
understands a text in its own way, for the text is part of the 
whole tradition in which the age takes an objective interest or 
~n which it seeks to understand itself". (93) Allardyce's survey 
of theories of fascism illustrates this point clearly: 
••• The study of fascism has never been an exercise 
in bringing together opposing opinions, and even 
companionable views rest uneasily side by side. 
Conflicting interpretations have existed from the 
outset, shifting in emphasis as new evidence becomes 
available, and undergoing modification as the chang-
ing features of the present cast new light upon the 
past. If the earliest interpretations, written in 
the teeth of the emerging fascist movements, now 
appear inadequate and defective, it is in part 
because the movements themselves were transformed 
in the course of their existence. As they passed 
through changing experiences, they themselves 
underwent change. In the same way Europe - and 
Europe's position in the world - has changed since 
90. Brown, op.cit., p.SO. 
91. Ricoeur, op.cit., pp.20-1. 
92. Hoy, op.cit., p.67. 
93. Gadamer, TM, p.263. 
1945, g~v~ng contemporary historians a different 
perspective on the fascist years. The result has 
been a continuing reassessment of fascism and its 
significance in European history. New efforts 
toward understanding have sought not only to correct 
past inaccuracies but to investigate unexplored 
dimensions, bringing new intellectual methods and 
the advantage of greater hindsight to the task of 
creating a more complete vision of the fascist 
experience. Thus our existing conceptions of 
fascism have evolved from a continuing study of our 
times. They are historical images that have not 
yet fully emerged from the historical process 
itself, and therefore carry the impressions of the 
period that produced them. In this sense the 
historiography of fascism shoul d itself be 
understood historically. (94) 
Nevertheless it is argued that the particular point of view taken 
by the historian does have to be justified. An "anything-goes" 
attitude is anathema. Gadamer himself has written: 
The general requirement of hermeneutics is ••• that 
every text must be understood from the point of 
view which.. is ap.propriate to it. (95) 
For Gadamer "appropriate" means that "the interpreter's own 
context is itself conditioned by the tradition in which he stands, 
d h . f h· d··" (96) . an t e text ~s part 0 t ~s tra ~t~on • Th~s context 
provides him with his preunderstanding and a preliminary grasp 
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of the problem. However, the appropriateness of this stance 
depends also on the working out of two inter-related factors during 
the process of coming to grasp the meaning of the text within 
the hermeneutic circle of understanding. Firstly, that appropriate-
ness depends on the content of the text. As Hoy puts this point: 
94. Gilbert Allardyce, "The Place of Fascism in European History" 
in Allardyce (ed), The Place of Fascism in European History 
( 1971), pp. 7 -8 • 
95. Gadamer, TM, p.299. 
96. Hoy, op.cIt., p.95. 
The hermeneutic pos~t~on insists that every reading of 
a text contains an underlying subject matter (sache) to 
which the text refers and which guides the comprehension 
of the reader to an understanding that can be said to 
be true. (97) 
Heidegger, when describing the circle of understanding, also 
insisted that our preunderstanding must be worked out in terms of 
the things themselves, as has already been pointed out. 
Hence the second factor, which is a corollary of the first, is the 
openness of the interpreter to what the past has to say, and to 
the validity of his pre-understanding in that light. Self-
reflection is therefore a necessary moment in understanding. In 
short, then, a pragmatic criterion is involved - does the point of 
view work? does it have a productive value in open~ng up the 
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past? For no point of view can be justified by extra-historical 
standards. (98) While the tradition in which the interpreter stands 
may be the first word with regard to his interpretation, it can 
never be accepted unconditionally ~n the idea of a hermeneutic 
interpretation. But no amount of self-reflection can bring about 
an unconditioned standpoint. All interpretation is always from 
a point of view. 
97. op.cit., p.146. 
98. Hoy, op.cit., p.50, p.70. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RAPPROCHEMENTS 
Increasing interest in and contributions to hermeneutics have been 
witnessed in the past decades. What is of particular importance 
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has been the confluence of analytic philosophy, the philosophy of 
science and hermeneutics. Apel points out that while analytic 
philosophy was hostile towards studies in the geisteswissenschaften, 
and especially hermeneutics, "the emergence of ordinary language 
philosophy encouraged a progressive rapprochement between the two 
perspectives". (1) Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations may 
be regarded as a seminal work in this regard. Influenced by 
Wittgenstein's thought, Winch's The Idea of a Social Science and 
its Relation to Philosophy is an important contribution to that 
rapprochement. But whereas Winch's thought may be regarded as 
ambiguous on the historicality of understanding, so that he did 
not fully acknowledge what Gadamer calls the fusion of horizons, 
his critics have done so: Taylor, for example, in his idea of a 
language of perspicuous contrast, and Giddens' notion of the double 
hermeneutic. On the continent, critical hermeneutics has taken a 
stand against both Winch and Gadamer, and Apel and Habermas have, 
amongst other things, analysed the role of the interpreter as 
critic in the hermeneutical task. On the other hand, the work of 
Popper and Kuhn in particular, has been instrumental in the changed 
conception of science, a conception which is a hermeneutic one. 
While there are differences between the natural sciences and the 
human studies, including history, (and bearing in mind that early 
hermeneutic thinkers defined their field in relation to a positivist 
idea of science), that relationship must be redefined. 
1. Fred R. Dallmayr, 'Hermeneutics and Historicism.: Reflections 




Adopting an approach which is reminiscent of thinkers such as Vico, 
Gatterer and Di1they, Winch rejects the view that if the social 
sciences are to make progress, they must follow the methods of 
natural science (and Winch has in mind a positivist conception of 
science). Winch argues that the goal of cognition in general and 
of philosophy in particular, is to render reality intelligible. 
And "to ask whether reality is intelligible is to ask about the 
, d 1'" (2) 'h relat10n between thought an rea 1ty . W1nc goes on to say 
that "in considering the nature of thought one is led to consider 
(3) 
the nature of language". Rather than holding as analytic 
philosophy did that language is simply a tool of analysis, Winch 
says that "in discussing language philosophically we are 1n fact 
discussing what counts as be longi ng to the world. Our idea of 
what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language 
that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of the 
experience we have of the world". (4) Since his argument is based 
on the assumption that what is fundamental to cognition is the 
question of the nature and intelligibility of reality, it 1S 
necessary for him to ask what"intel1igibility" means, and 1n the 
tradition of hermeneutics, Winch poses the transcendental question: 
What is it to understand something, to grasp the meaning of 
h ' ? (5) somet 1ng,. Furthermore, what does it mean to call reality 
intelligible? (6) In order to answer these questions Winch says 
that "it is necessary to show the central role which the concept 
of understanding plays in the activities which are characteristic 
of human societies", and this leads him to an analysis of "the 
concept of human society". (7) This is to be achieved through an 
2. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation 
to Philosophy (1963), p.ll. 
3. Ibid. 
4. op.cit., p.15. 
5. op.cit., p.18. 
6. op.cit., p.20. 
7. op.cit., pp.22-3. 
examination of the everyday discourse used in that society, for 
"with it (discourse) one is face to face with the whole question 
of the characteristic way in which human beings interact with each 
" "" (8) Following Wittgenstein, Winch argues that other ~n soc~ety • 
(9) 
meaningful discourse entails the notion of following a rule, 
and that "it is only in a situation in which it makes sense to 
suppose that somebody else could in principle discover the rule 
which I am following that I can intelligibly be said to follow 
a rule at all". (10) 
"d b h" "1 d(ll) h " I" The ~ ea that all human e av~our ~s ru e-governe as ~mp ~-
cations for the methodology of the social sciences in radical 
opposition to that of the natural sciences. For while the latter 
proceed according to rules, these concern the procedures of the 
scientists who investigate an independently-given subject matter. 
But in the social sciences, not only are methodological procedures 
characterised by rules, but the phenomena being investigated are 
themselves carried out ~n accordance with certain rules. The task 
of the social sciences ~s to make sense of actions, and this can 




Winch does not claim that social science must stop at what he calls 
this "unreflective kind of understanding", for as he goes on to 
say, "the reflective student of society ••. may find it necessary to 
use concepts which are not taken from the forms of activity which 
he is investigating, but which are taken from the context of his 
" """ (13) own ~nvest~gat~on . But the use of such concepts presupposes 
8. 0E. cit. , p.43. 
9. °E·cit. , p.43. 
10. op.cit., p.30. 
11. °E·cit., p.52. 
12. °E·cit., p.87. 
13. op.cit., p.89. 
(14) 
a pr~or understanding of the activity in its own terms. Yet 
Winch also says that "it is not open to him (the s:ociological 
investigator) arbitrarily to impose his standards from without. 
Insofar as he does so, the events he is studying lose altogether 
• • . "1 " (15) 
the~r character as soc~a~ events . 
Giddens argues that Winch's stress that different language games 
must be understood in their own terms, that is in their own 
contexts, belies Winch's claim that his analysis describes what 
social scientists actually do. For "one of the things which 
sociologists and anthropologists already do ~s to try to establish 
generalizations about different societies that depend on similari-
ties which are not, and perhaps cannot be, formulated ~n terms 
employed by members of those societies, because they are either 
directed towards making comparisons that cannot be expressed in 






. d h .. (17) . , 
po~nte out t at even ~n h~s later essay, W~nch s 
. (18) 
amb~guous. For Winch warns against the tendency 
to treat life forms as isolated language games with mutually 
exclusive systems of rules: nevertheless he regards it as 
illegitimate to interpret witchcraft in the Azande tribe in terms 
of the canons of modern science. Thus Winch held that "Azande 
magic belonged to a realm of discourse distinct from the 
scientific analysis of external reality, a realm reserved to 
religion and mythology and ultimately rooted in the nature of 







Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976), p.49. 
Peter Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive society', in Bryan R. 
Wilson (ed), Rationality (1974), pp.78-lll. 
18. Dallmayr, op.cit., pp.69-71. 
. . . 1 . ,,(19) pract1.cal eX1.stent1.a exper1.ence . Nor does Winch appear to 
sanction the comparison of modern conceptions of mag1.c with those 
of primitive societies. 
Winch's lack of clarity on the active role of the investigator is 
seen again in his discussion on history. Winch draws attention to 
Collingwood's concept of history, as the history of thought, as 
containing the important insight that "the way to understand 
events in human history ••• is more closely analogous to the way 
in which we understand expressions of ideas than it 1.S to the way 
. 1 ,,(20) B W· h· h we understand phys1.ca process.es • ut 1.nc reJ ects t e 
Collingwoodian idea that the task of the historian is to rethink 
the thoughts of historical agents as "an intellectualistic 
distortion". (21) Winch goes on to say that while the historian 
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is concerned with the recapture of historical ways of thinking 
(through an understanding of the way language is used in the 
particular society),this activity "will be coloured by the fact 
that he has had to employ historiographical methods to recapture 
them". (22) Thus for example, if the historian is attempting to 
understand the medieval concept of courtly love, he would not be 
thinking of the lady in question in the same terms as did the 
medieval knight. But Winch does not say, for example, what impli-
cations this has for historical objectivity. 
Speaking of history in general, Winch asserts that each system of 
ideas, with its component elements being inter-related internally, 
has to be understood in and for itself. Insofar as "social 
relations really exist only in and through ideas which are current 
in society .•• it follows that social relations must be an ••. 
unsuitable subject for generalizations and theories of the 
scientific sort to be formulated about them". (23) 
19. op.cit., p.69. 
20. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, pp.13l-2. 
21. op.cit., p.13l. 
22. op.cit., p.132. 
23. op.cit., p.133. 
But Winch suggests that a historian might apply a sociological law 
of the kind used by Simmel (in order to try to understand the 
o 0 ) (24) ThO b relationship between Roman and old Cathol1c1sm • 1S may e 
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useful in directing attention to features of historical societies 
which may have been overlooked, as wel l as perhaps suggesting 
useful analogies; nevertheless he cannot simply understand an 
event through applying these laws alone. Indeed it is only insofar 
as the historian has understood the situation in its own terms 
(in Winch's words, he "has an i ndependent historical grasp of 
situations"), (25) that he appreciates the relevance of the law. 
But he could understand that particular form of life without ever 
having heard of that law. 
But it may be asked, what criteria does the historian employ to 
decide the suitability of a law? What makes Simmel's "law" 
acceptable and not arbitrary? The idea of a hermeneutic of 
history, as has already been argued, holds that understanding the 
past on its own terms does not exhaust the fuller meaning of the 
past, for that meaning is also contingent on the future and on the 
historian's own horizon in terms of which he appropriates the past. 
For understanding is always also interpretation and application. 
In attempting to grasp the meaning of an event, a historian may 
use any theory provided that it succeeds in rendering an event 
intelligible, and this he discovers by testing the theory against 
the evidence he has available through the operation of the 
hermeneutic circle. 
24. op.cit., p.135. The generalization reads as follows: 
The degeneration of a difference in convictions into hatred 
and fight occurs only when there were essential, original 
similarities between the parties. The (sociologically very 
significant) 'respect for the enemy' is usually absent where 
the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity. 
And where enough similarities continue to make confusions 
and blurred outlines possible, points of di f ference need an 
emphasis not justified by the issue but only by that danger 
of confusion. 
25. op.cit., p.136. 
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Finally Winch's claim that "historical explanation is not the appli-
cation of generalizations and theories to particular instances: it 
. ., 1 1 . ,,(26) 1 l' t ~s the trac~ng of ~nterna re at~ons, c ear y requ~res commen • 
Firstly, he states the hermeneutic thesis that meaning is context-
. . . (27) 
ual, or what Walsh has referred to as the ~dea of coll~gat~on. 
But secondly, as Winch himself has acknowledged, historians apply 
generalizations and theories to particular instances. While it is 
argued in this thesis that the activity of giving causal explana-
tions of the covering-law kind does not exhaust the historian's 
task, nevertheless this is a legitimate form of explanation in 
history, where these generalizations and theories are conceived 
of in the Popperean way as hypotheses or conjectures or trends. 
Although therefore not agreeing fully with Winch, Giddens' comment 
that Winch has not much to offer history, cannot be accepted 
unreservedly. 
(28) 
(ii) Giddens and Taylor 
In his attempt to answer the question of whether the sc~ences of 
man are hermeneutical, Taylor lists the characteristics and short-
comings of "a social science which wishes to fulfil the require-
f h ... d' . ,,(29) . . . ments 0 t e emp~r~c~st tra ~t~on • That trad~t~on, accord~ng 
to Taylor, "tries to reconstruct social reality as consisting of 
brute data alone". Such data includes firstly the behaviour of 
people identified by physical descriptions or by descriptions 
which are defined by institutions and practices; and secondly, 
26. op.cit., p.l36. 
27. Walsh, op.cit., pp.59-63. 
28. Giddens, op.cit., p.53. 
29. Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Science of Man', 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 25, 1971, p.80. 
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verbal response or overt non-verbal behaviour which is said to 
attest to the subjective reality of the beliefs~ attitudes and 
. d . . d 1 (30) H T 1 t values of ~n ~v~ ua s. owever, as ay or goes on 0 say, 
what such a social science excludes is "a consideration of social 
. . db' b" d . " (31) real~ty as character~se y ~ntersu Ject~ve an common mean~ngs • 
For this level of meaning is not exhausted in what Taylor calls 
brute data descriptions, and moreover it is crucial if we wish to 
understand why the actions were done. (32) A hermeneutical science 
of man is concerned with a study of such meaning and it has, says 
Taylor, "an essential place in the characterisation of human 
behaviour". (33) 
There are philosophers who would restrict the term "meaning" to 
linguistic meaning. But, referring to the discussion of mean~ng 
above, Taylor points out that "it would be hard to argue that it 
. '11 't ' f the term".(34) El 'd' h ~s an ~ eg~ ~mate use 0 UC1 at~ng t e term as 
used in this experiential sense, and restating the hermeneutic 
thesis, Taylor writes that meaning is for a subject or group of 
subjects; it is of something which onl y has meaning in a field, 
that is in relation to other things. For "there is no such thing 
. 1 1 d' " (35) as a s~ng e, unre ate mean~ngful element . Thus concepts 
contribute to and derive their sense from "the ambit of common 
meanings" and these are grasped by those who are participants in 
the practical way of life, or who imaginatively "get into" 
that life world. Hence understanding meaning necessarily involves 
moving in a hermeneutic circle and "we make sense of an action when 
there is a coherence between the actions of the agent and the 
. f h' .. . " (36) ( mean1ng 0 1S s1tuat~on for h~m • While Taylor like the 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. op.cit., p.65. 
33. op.cit., p.55. 
34. op.cit., p.56. 
35. Ibid. 
36. op.cit., pp.58-9. 
early hermeneutic philosophers) does not g1ve a formal eluci-
dation of such a mode of explanation, it is held that Donagan's 
characterisation of individ~al actions, discussed in a following 
chapter, does so. 
(37) 
In a later paper, Taylor has enlarged on the scope of a hermen-
eutical science of man. (38) Introducing the concept, the language 
of perspicuous contrast, Taylor is in effect restating the idea of 
the mediation of frames of mean1ng, arguing that we necessarily 
approach the past from our point of view, but that, while we do 
not accept that another way of life must be understood solely 
on its own terms, we must understand it in compar1son with our 
own so that we can assess both our own and the other. In short, 
in Gadamerean terms, understanding also necessarily involves 
self-understanding. 
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Presenting his V1ews after a survey and analysis of leading social 
theorists as well as a consideration of recent developments in the 
philosophy of science, Giddens summarises his attempt to make some 
essential contributions to the clarification of the logic and 




... the social world, unlike the world of nature, has 
to be grasped as a skilled accomplishment of active 
human subjects; the constitution of this world as 
'meaningful', 'accountable' or 'intelligible' depends 
upon language, regarded not simply as a system of 
signs or symbols but as a medium of practical activity; 
the social scientist of necessity draws upon the same 
sort of skills as those whose conduct he seeks to 
analyse in order to describe it; generating descriptions 
of social conduct depend upon the hermeneutic task of 
penetrating the frames of meani ng which lay actors 
themselves "draw upon in constituting and re-constituting 
the social world. (39) 
Chapter 7. 
Charles Taylor, 'Explanation in the Social Sciences', read 
at an open seminar, University of Natal, October 1980. 
Giddens, op.cit., p.155. 
Giddens is, of course, making the same kind of point as Vico, 
Gatterer and Dilthey, namely that method must be appropriate to 
the object. Giddens' hermeneutics, however, does not stop with 
an attempt to grasp the past in its own terms, as is the case 1n 
early hermeneutic thought. The idea of a hermeneutic of history 
endorses what Giddens calls the double hermeneutic involving the 
. (40) 
mediation of frames of mean1ng. The historian must immerse 
himself in the form of life, he must know how to find his way 
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about in order to grasp its meaning. This constitutes the first 
hermeneutic. Paraphrasing Giddens, it is further agreed that the 
historian, while dealing with a life world which is already consti-
tuted within frames of meaning by the participants, reinterprets 
or explains this fuller meaning in terms of theories, thereby com-
pleting the double hermeneutic. 
Apel has also focussed on the difficulties 1n Winch (already dis-
cussed) with regard to the use of theories as well as cross-
cultural studies, in an attempt to understand society. He writes: 
Winch rejects any theory which does not take the 
human behaviour under study in the way it is 
understood by the people being observed. (41) 
Apel agrees that we cannot, for example, understand the behaviour 
6f a medieval knight without knowing the rules of his behaviour, 
these rules stemming from his religious conceptions. But this 
does not render his behaviour completely understandable. For once 
"one admits that there is no total congruence between a person's 
'self-understanding'in terms o~ his institutionalize~ ideology 
and the motivations of his behaviour, then one will have to admit 
40. op.cit., p.162. 
41. Karl-Otto Ape1, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the 
geisteswissenschaften (1967), p.55. 
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that the sociologist interprets a given behaviour with the help of 
concepts which go beyond the conscious horizon of the epoch or 
culture to which it belongs". (42) Hence the social scientist cannot 
refuse the help of statistics, psycho-analysis and the critique of 
ideology, because the goal of the social sciences is "to understand 
" (43) h" men better than they understand themselves . In t 1S way, says 
Apel, "disobjectification" is achieved, "that condition in which man 
" "b ,,(44) 1S freed by knowledge to act respons1 ly . 
The specific way Apel formulates what Giddens calls the double 
hermeneutic reveals clearly that his thought falls under the label 
of "critical hermeneutics". 
(iii) Critical hermeneutics 
Critical hermeneutics specifically questions an uncritical accept-
ance of what something meant to those involved 1n an action. For, 
as Bleicher says, the existence of propaganda, lies, censorship, 
oppression of thought, "provide a prima facie case against the 
unquestioning acceptance of claims to kno~le0ge or truth". (45) 
Thus it calls for an investigation of those causes which operate 
d "1 " . (46) un er seem1ng y normal 1nteract10n. 
The introduction by Habermas, also a critical theorist (or critical 
hermeneutic thinker), of hermeneutics into the methodology of the 
social sciences was intended to "combat the objectivism in 
scientific approaches to the social world". (47) Nevertheless he 
recognised that scientific approaches have had some success, and 
42. op.cit., p.56. 
43. op.cit., p.57. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Bleicher, op.cit., p.143. 
46. op.cit., p.144. 
47. op.cit., p.158. 
this indicates that hermeneutics as the concern with intended 
meaning does not exhaust understanding of social existence. But 
Habermas also holds that socio-political interests and forces 
sedimented in social institutions preclude the unrestricted self-
.. . d d . (48) clarification of subJect~vely ~nten e mean~ng. 
Thus for Habermas the social sciences are hermeneutic insofar as 
their subject matter has to be understood; they are nomological 
or quasi-naturalistic in that the logical form of the natural 
sciences applies to the social sciences; and furthermore they are 
critical. (49) The task of critical hermeneutics is to "confront" 
the exposition of meaning for the subject with an identification 
of the underlying causes explaining why the subject thought and 
acted as he did, and in so doing it aims to provide an objective 
d d · f b· . 1· d d . (50) un erstan ~ng 0 su Ject~ve y ~nten e mean~ng. 
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Ideology ~n the capitalist system, according to Habermas, ~n fact 
g~ves us an illusory account of social existence which is 
characterised by the domination over and exploitation of one class 
with respect to another. False consciousness hides the contra-
dictions of a society behind scientific and emotive explanations. 
Hence Habermas criticises Gadamer for what the former feels is a 
too-ready acceptance of the authority of tradition, that body of 
shared assumptions of the society in question. (This debate will 
be discussed shortly). Habermas argues that once the origins of 
the tradition from which specific social practices emerged are 
grasped, then that tradition is opened to reasoned acceptance, to 
criticism or to pressure for reconstitution. (51) Psycho-analysis 
is held to provide the model for a theoretical framework for the 
48. Ibid. 
49. Giddens, op.cit., pp.58-9. 
50. Bleicher, op.cit., p.159. 
51. William E. Connolly, 'Review Essay on Habermas', History and 
Theory, Vol. 18, no. 3, 1979, pp.406-7. 
clarification of the distortion by an individual of his self-
understanding. Why has that model been chosen? Habermas writes 
that it is "the only tangible example of a science incorporating 
methodological self-reflection". (52) To put it briefly, critical 
theory concerns "social criticism of ideologies modelled on the 
. 1 ." (53) I h l' th . . parad~gm of psycho-ana ys~s • n psyc o-ana ys~s e a~m ~s 
to understand utterances by revealing their hidden meaning through 
a causal explanation of why these utterances are distorted. The 
dialogue between analyst and analysand is intended to liberate the 
latter from those unconscious forces which cause him to behave ~n 
a certain way. 
103 
Habermas' characterisation of the social sc~ences as hermeneutic, 
nomological and critical, corresponds to the kinds of cognitive 
interests men have in relation to their social and natural world. 
Hermeneutics aims to understand the meaning of 'forms of life' and 
its interest is in the improvement of human communication and ~n 
self-understanding. Nomological knowledge is concerned with 
control or technical mastery of causal relations. Critical theory 
is tied to an emancipatory interest in that it attempts to liberate 
men from forces they do not understand or control, and from the 
d · . f h (54) om~nat~on 0 ot ers. 
Commentators on critical theory have argued that the use of the 
model of psycho-analysis is a problematic one. Firstly, Connolly 
has suggested that Freud himself doubted whether the subject would 
always be able in principle to bring all the repressed ingredients 
of his unconscious to consciousness, in order to understand and 
52. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1972), p.2l4. 
53. Hoy, op.cit., p.117. 
54. Habermas, op.cit., pp.30l-307. 
control those elements. Habermas has not given any necessary set 
of limits with respect to the ability of the subject to make his 
. . (55) 
unconsc~ous transparent to h~mself. 
Secondly, the relationship between analyst and analysand is what 
Giddens calls "a markedly skewed and even authoritarian one" ~n 
Freud. (56) Gadamer says that whereas in psycho-analysis the 
patient is to be cured of his deviation and therefore submits to 
the analyst's authority, in social interaction, deviation from a 
norm is not necessarily a sickness because the norm itself may be 
h .. . (57) d . h· f w at ~s ~n quest~on. An as Connolly po~nts out, t e a~m 0 
the therapist on the whole ~s "to reconcile patients to the 
established system". (58) 
Habermas has tried to clarify the sense ~n which the psycho-
analytic model, as well as Marx's critique of ideology, can be 
used. He writes: 
Theories of the type of psycho-analysis and 
Marx's critique of ideology can be u~ed to 
initiate processes of reflection and to dissolve 
barriers to communication. (59) 
Furthermore, 
They can also be used in order to deduce explanatory 
hypotheses without having (or taking) the opportunity 
to initiate communication with the people concerned 
and having one's interpretation confirmed by their 
process of reflection. (60) 
55. Connolly, op.cit., p.40l 
56. Giddens, op.cit., p.69. 
57. Hoy, op.cit., p.l26. 
58. Connolly, op.cit., p.40l. 




As was mentioned earlier, Habermas' philosophy stands as a critique 
of Gadamer's conception of tradition and the role it plays in under-
standing. Critical hermeneutics argues that Gadamerean hermeneutics 
produces an attitude which is "more receptive than critical", as 
Bubner puts it. Bubner goes on to characterise this attitude as 
making tradition into a cult, and that "a complete lack of critical 
(61) 
evaluation and prospects for change" must be the consequence. 
To overcome this uncritical attitude to tradition, hermeneutic 
reflection must be combined with critical reflection. For while the 
former means becoming aware of "dominant prejudices", the latter's 
. . . h h· l·d· (62) task ~s to look cr~t~cally at t em, to test t e~r va ~ ~ty. 
However, it is held that these criticisms tend to misrepresent 
Gadamer's conception of tradition. Giddens argues that if conform-
ity to tradition is the standard Gadamer uses for jUdging interpre-
tations, how then can Gadamer account for a comparison of readings 
from different traditions, or for different vers~ons within the 
d · . ? (63) B d . same tra ~t~on. ut Ga amer says unequ~vocal1y: 
Changing the established forms is no less a kind of 
connection with tradition than defending the 
established forms. Tradition exists only in 
constant alteration. (64) 
Any interpretation must always be critical of the way it relates to 
a tradition, to traditional presuppositions as they work themselves 
out in the process of interpretation. Thus, in replying to 
Habermas on the point that hermeneutical reflection should and could 
be developed into critical reflection, Gadamer has said that this 
sort of critical reflection is i mplied in hermeneutical reflection, 
61. Rudiger Bubner, 'Theory and Practice in the Light of the 
Hermeneutic - Criticist Controversy', Cultural Hermeneutics, 
Vol. 2, 1975, pp.388-9. (See also Giddens who writes that 
Gadamerean hermeneutics produces a "paralysis of the critical 
impulse", p.65). 
62. op.cit., p.339. 
63. op.cit., p.63. 
64. quoted by Hoy, op.cit., p.127. (my italics). 
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and "that it was a misunderstanding of hermeneutics which made it 
. . f· '. 1 standards". (65) appear traditionally b~ased and ~n need 0 cr~t~ca 
Thus Gadamer states simply that "no real incompatibility between 
our respective positions is present insofar as methodology is 
concerned". (66) But Gadamer's interpretative self-awareness and 
Habermas' emancipatory reflection cannot easily be equated. For 
Gadamer, hermeneutics is transcendental inquiry - , it does not 
supply specific socio-historical norms, values and ideas as 
necessary. As Hoy says, expressing this Gadamerean point, "herme-
neutics should not •.• legislate a priori the range of assumptions 
that actually work, or the kinds of context into which a text can 
be introduced, but must investigate each development as it comes 
along". (67) Thus Gadamer writes: 
Inasmuch as it (the cr~t~que of ideology) seeks to 
penetrate the masked interests that infect public 
opinion, it implies its own freedom from any 
ideology; and that means in turn that it enthrones 
its own norms and ideals as self-evident and 
absolute. (68) 
Part of the concern of hermeneutics is with the need for greater 
methodological self-awareness of the interpreter's starting point, 
demanding too a clarification of his assumptions regarding the 
scope of his enquiry, and that he remain consistent within that 
mandate. Acceptance of a Marxist point of view, is simply that 
of a point of view; there are no ontological criteria for adopt-
ing that particular one. Rather the justification is pragmatic -
does it throw light on the past, rendering it intelligible? The 
idea of a hermeneutic of history does not locate itself within 





Bubner, op.cit., p.340. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Response to "Theory and Practice''', 
Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 2, 1975, p.357. 
Hoy, op.cit., p.130. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Hermeneutics and Social Science', 
Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol . 2, 1975, p.3l5. 
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On the question of hermeneutic self-awareness, Habermas' point is 
that "hermeneutic consciousness remains incomplete as long as it 
does not include a reflection upon the limits of hermeneutic under-
standing". (69) It follows therefore that "tradition as an on-going 
process, can never be completely objectified while at the same time 
. . . ,,(70) 
providing the basis for all methodolog~cal act~v~ty , as 
Bleicher comments. Habermas is specifically concerned with the 
case of "systematically distorted communication" in which speakers 
cannot recognise that there is a breakdown in their commun~­
cation. (71) Thus hermeneutics must be enlarged by a critique of 
ideology in terms of which meaning can be explained and distortions 
uncovered. But critical hermeneutics is faced with a fundamental 
problem, for if it points to systematically distorted communi-
cation, to what standard does it appeal in order to uncover those 
distortions? A suggested solution put forward by critical hermen-
eutics is the introduction of 
(72) 
to use Habermas' phrase. 
the concept of "an idealized dialogue", 
He argues that truth can "only be 
guaranteed by that kind of consensus which was achieved under the 
idealized conditions of unlimited communication free from domination 
and could be maintained over time". (73) Thus the possibility of 
understanding without deception depends ultimately also on politi-
cal considerations; as Habermas writes, "the enlightenment which 
results from radical understanding is always political". (74) And, 
as such, it is a goal, "the form of life to be realized in the 
future". (75) Nevertheless: 
69. Jiirgen Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" ~n 
Bleicher, op.cit., p.190. 
70. Bleicher, op.cit., p.155. 
71. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality", p.19l. 
72. Habermas, op.cit., p.206. 
73. op.cit., p.205. 
74. op.cit., p.209. 
75. op.cit., p.206. 
It is, however, only when we can show that the antici-
pation of possible truth and a true life is 
constitutive for every linguistic communication which 
is not mono logical that we are in a position not merely 
to demand but to justify that regulative principle of 
understanding. (76) 
Elaborating on the activity of idealized dialogue conducted by 
sincere members whose participation embodies "the principle of 
. . ,,(77).. f . H b . t . 
rat~onal d~scourse w~th~n a ree soc~ety, a ermas wr~ es . 
••• participants, themes and contributions are not 
restricted except with reference to the goal of 
testing the validity of claims in question, that no 
force except that of the better argument is 
exercised; and that, as a result, all motives 
except that of the cooperative search for truth 
are excluded. (78) 
Within such a community, each individual has the opportunity ~n 
principle to participate in discussions. Agreements, therefore, 
may be taken to express a common interest which has been attained 
without deception in a society free of political constraints. 
HilS 
Thus Habermas' concept of an idealized dialogue attempts to circum-
scribe conditions necessary for the emergence of a true consensus, 
for truth, he argues, can only be arrived at within such conditions. 
The idea of a rational community acting as a regulative principle 
is also held by Apel, whom Habermas quotes with approval. (79) Like 
Habermas, Apel has postulated the concept of an "ideal language 
game" which- is "oresupposed in every actual discourse and social 
life-form". (SO) In other words, Apel holds that a true statement 
76. Ibid. 
77. op.cit., p.205. 
78. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1976), pp.l07-8. 
79. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality", p.205. 
80. Dallmayr, op.cit., p.76. This point was made in the previous 
discussion on meaning (p.78). 
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is one which approximates to the consensus of an ideal community 
. . (81) .. . h h h . t of 1nvest1gators. Quot1ng P1erce, W1t w om e 1S 1n agreemen , 
Apel writes that Pierce "grounds the possible objectivity of natural 
sciences in the historical process of understanding by the commun-
ity of scientists". Apel goes on to say that "he also starts from 
the principle that it is precisely this process of understanding, 
if it is not interrupted, that will produce in the long run the 
consensus omnium that the 'transcendental consciousness in general' 
. . . d h b· .. ,,(82) sem10t1cally enta1ls an t at guarantees 0 ]ect1v1ty . 
The significance of the concept of an idealized dialogue for the 
(83) 
idea of a hermeneutic of history is discussed in a later chapter. 
(iv) Science's hermeneutic turn 
Referring to "the hermeneutic turn of the late Popper", (84) a turn 
which may be regarded as a further rapprochement, Bubner makes the 
point that there is a "certain irony in the fact that it is Popper 
himself who pleads for a combination of hermeneutical and critical 
attitudes, because both parties - the hermeneuticians and the 
critical theorists - used to consider Popper as the most stubborn 
. . . ,,(85) d . pos1t1v1St • Ga amer has adm1tted that there has occurred 
"the development of the hermeneutical side of science". (86) He 
writes that he was pleased when Kuhn published The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions because it supported his (Gadamer's) views. 
81. Hoy, op.cit., p.l08. 
82. op.cit., pp.l08-9. 
83. Chapter 6. 
84. Bubner, op.cit., ("late" 1S used here 1n the sense of 
Popper's later works). 
85. op.cit., p.339. 
86. Gadamer, 'Discussion' p.336. 
The framework of theoretical assumptions which guide 
scientific investigation has a communicative side 
which in the final analysis is connected with 
language. That argument supports the universality 
of the hermeneutical approach. (87) 
But science's hermeneutic turn does not consist solely of this. 
It refers also to the recognition that there are no theory-free 
observations or data, that is that there is no absolute start-
ing point for any investigation - investigations are always within 
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a context, or in terms of what Kuhn has called a particular 
paradigm. Certainly in his early work Gadamer has posed his 
hermeneutics as antithetical to natural science, and it is arguable 
that this was because he conceived of science in positivist terms. 
He writes of the book Truth and Method that "it is concerned to seek 
that experience of truth that transcends the sphere of the control 
of scientific method wherever it is to be found, and to inquire 
o 0 0 0 ,,(88) h f d h d dO 0 ~nto ~ts leg~t~macy • In t e orewor to t e secon e ~t~on 
of that work, Gadamer does not deny that the methods of the natural 
sciences have application in the social world, but says he is con-
d Oh dOff b O 0 (89) h d cerne w~t ~ erent 0 Ject~ves. But e oes not say that 
science is hermeneutic and that therefore the consequences of this 
recognition must be explored in relation to the geisteswissenschaften. 
And perhaps this ~s surprising in view of his own (and Heidegger's) 
analysis of understanding which showed that aZZ understanding is 
hermeneutic. 
Popper's philosophy of science made a radical break with the positi-
vist ,conception. Summing up the positivist conception of the 
methodologyof science, Fletcher writes that the scientist begins 
with observations in order to obtain a number of facts. Then he 
formulate hypotheses to try to interpret these facts, and thereafter 
proceeds to test these hypotheses by carefully controlled experi-
ments which are also ways of obtaining more facts. The scientist 
87. Ibid. 
88. Gadamer, TM, ~:x~~~. 
89. op.cit., p.xv~~. 
publishes his results. More facts accumulate through cooperative 
efforts of scientists and eventually an order ~s discerned within 
the facts, and the formulation of general theory begins. At this 
stage induction plays the major role. Upon the formulation of 
such a theory attempts are made to confirm or verify it and this 
involves further experiments to test predictions made by the 
theory. If predictions are confirmed then a new natural law is 
. b d' d (90) sa~d to have een ~scovere. 
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Popper has rejected this conception. The idea that scientists 
simply observe he regarded as incoherent. He illustrates this with 
the story of his lecture to a group of physics students in Vienna. 
He told them to observe carefully and to write down what they had 
observed. The students asked him what he wanted them to observe. 
It was therefore clear that the instruction to observe was absurd, 
and this led Popper to suggest that that instruction was in 
accordance with what he called the "bucket theory of the mind". (91) 
In short, the mind is compared to a bucket into which facts are (bf\ .... 
"poured". Popper replaced that image with wh,,?t he 
"searchlight theory of science" (92) in accordance with his argu-
" 
ment that "all scientific description of facts are highly 
se1ective ••. they always depend on theories". (93) He writes: 
If we wish to study a thing we are bound to select 
certain aspects of it. It is not possible for us 
to observe or to describe a whole piece of th~ 
whole, or a whole iece of nature; in' fact, not 
even the smallest whole piece may be so described. (94) 
90. D.J.C. Fletcher, 'Karl Popper's Scientific and Social 
Philosophy', Unpublished paper, p.ll. 
91. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (henceforth as) 
Vo 1. 2, p. 260. 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, (henceforth POH) , p.77. 
As an illustration of this, Popper cites Gomperz's example of a 
sparrow nervously fluttering about. It may be described by 
different propositions, for example, This bird is flying; Look 
here is an animal; Energy is being transformed here; The poor 
thing is frightened; each proposition corresponding to a 
. f' (95) 
d~fferent aspect 0 ~t. As Popper points out, it can never 
be the task of science to try to complete a list which is 
"necessarily infinite". (96) 
Popper's own idea of a searchlight suggests that the scientist 
,-
always operates from a certain point of view, or in terms of cert-
ain interests which, as Popper points out, are connecte 
theory which the scientist wishes to test: 
What the searchlight makes visible will depend on 
its position, upon our way of directing it, and 
upon its intensity, colour etc.; although it will, 
of course, also depend very largely upon the things 
illuminated by it. (97) 
The theory or hypothesis which we wish to test is "the crystalli-
sation of a point of view"; it is "a provisional assumption whose 
function is t 'o help u~ to serect, and to or er the fac ts tr • (98) 
In short, Popper showed that the search for ultimate certain 
scientific theories must be abandoned. 
As to the method of testing a theory or hypothesis, Popper put 
forward the idea of falsifiability as his response to his critique 
of induction. For, as he argued, the idea of the verification of 
laws cannot be achieved, because there is always the possibility 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Popper, OS, p.260. 
98. Ibid. 
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that an observation will be inconsistent with a law. Thus the 
scientist looks for facts to refute the theory, which can never 
-~~re -be "fina l ':'" every theory remains a working hypothesis 
, b h be false. (99 ) Th b t stat s an unless ~t has een s own to e es u 
hyp~tliesis can ha; e is that it has not yet been refuted. Science 
therefore proceeds by the elimination of error rather than by 
113 
the discovery of truth. 
- ') 
The idea of falsifiability provides Popper with a criterion of 
demarcation separating science from other forms of ~nqu~ry. For 
the criterion of the scientific status of a theory lies in its 
falsifiability. The idea also has important ethical implications 
because it asserts that scientists must always have a sceptical 
attitude towards scientific theories, and as such, it may be 
regarded as an antidote to dogmatism. 
It is, moreover, an integral part of Popper's characterisation of 
the public nature of science. It implies the idea of rational 
discussion among scientists for, instead of treating scientific 
discovery as involving only the individual scientist confronting 
his subject matter, Popper sees sc~ence as "a collective enter-
prise, an institutionalization of critical reason", to quote 
Giddens. (100) Critical discussions are important for they 
provide the forums for adjudicating amongst rival hypotheses or 
conjectures. Popper suggests criteria to which competing hypo-
theses might be rejected. A theory is preferable if it is the 
best-tested, or if it is the most testable. He admits that 
"tfiere is no 'absolute reliance'; but since we have to choose, 
it will be 'rational' to choose the best-tested theory. This will 
be 'rational' in the most obvious sense of the word known ~o me: 
the best-tested theory is one whicQ 
di scussion appears to be the best so far, and I do not know of an -
th~ng more 'rat~ l' th Ll d d " 1 d' '11 101) L Lona an a we -con ucte cr~t~ca ~scuss~on. 
99. Popper, as, p.260. 
100. Giddens,-op.cit., p.136. 
101. quoted by Fletcher, op.cit., p.9. 
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From this it follows that scientific objectivity is "a matter of 
scientific method"; it depends on the "social aspect of scientific 
h d" (102) met 0 • 
Like Gadamer, Popper acknowledged the need for scientists to be 
self-reflective about their presuppositions. As he pointed out, 
the history of science "shows that scientific theories are often 
overthrown by experiments, and that the overthrow of theories ~s 
o 0 0 Of 0 ,,(103) H 
~ndeed the veh~cle of sc~ent~ ~c progress • e quotes 
Einstein who, in the face of a problem in physics, found that if 
the theory of the time was altered "in a point which had so far 
been held by everybody to be self-evident and which had therefore 
o dO 0 1 ld b d" (104) B escaped not~ce, then the ~ff~cu ty cou e remove. ut 
what are prejudices can only be known when they are discovered to 
be so and have been dealt with (Gadamer would concur). Popper makes 
the important point that while scientists ought to reflect criti-
cally on their presuppositions, for any assumption can in principle 
be criticised, self-reflection aLone without the public character 
of sc~ence cannot be an effective way of ridding oneself of 
prejudices - for how would the scientist know he is free? (105) 
Thus Popper argues that if scientific objectivity is defined ~n 
terms of the impartiality of the individual scientist, "then we 
should have to say goodbye to it". (106) Rather it results from 
"the friendly - hostile co-operation of many scientists .•• (it) can 
be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method". (107) 
l02. Popper, OS, p.2l7. 
103 .. . op.cit. ,:-P.260. 
104.op.cit., pp.220-l. 
105. op.cit., p.223. 
106. op.cit., p.2l7. 
107. Ibid. Presumably Popper assumed that within such an atmos-
phere, the personal ambitions and vested interests of 
scientists will (in the long run) be eliminated. Kuhn's 
re70gni~ion of the resistance to new paradigms picks up 
th~s po~nt. 
Objectivity, insofar as it depends on the social aspect of SC1en-
tific method, also presupposes a political factor, namely the 
, ,(108) Th 
toleration by the state of free d1scuss10n. us to sum up: 
•.• what we call 'scientific objectivity" is not a 
product of the individual scientist's impartiality, 
but a product of the social or public character 
of scientific method, and the individual scientist's 
impartiality, insofar as it exists, is not the source 
but rather the result of this socially or institutionally 
organised objectivity of science. (109) 
As Giddens has suggested, Popper's thought prepared the way for 
Kuhn's philosophy of science as expressed in The Structure of 
S ' 'f 'R "1 t' ( 11 0) I h' k K h' d d h c"!;ent"!; "!;c evovu "!;on. n t 1S wor u n 1ntro uce t e 
notion of scientific paradigms, those shared beliefs and rules 
held by members of a scientific community, beliefs and rules 
which have both a cognitive and normative function insofar as 
they inform scientists what the world is like and how to go about 
solving problems within this world view. In short, a paradigm 
refers to the taken-for-granted unexamined assumptions which form 
the framework for conducting science, assumptions shared by a 
particular scientific community: 
Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are 
committed to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. That commitment and the 
apparent consensus it produces are pre-requisites 
for normal science i.e. for the genesis and con-
tinuation of a particular research tradition. (111) 
108. Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences" in G. Adey and 
D. Frisby (eds), The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 
pp.95-6. 
109. Popper, OS, p.220. 
110. Giddens,-op.cit., p.136. 
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111. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), 
p.ll. The term "paradigm" is used in this sense in this thesis. 
For a discussion on the multiple uses of the term by Kuhn see 
Margaret Masterman's paper, "The Nature of a Paradigm", in 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds), Criticism and Growth of 
Knowledge (1970). 
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Kuhn's idea of a paradigm (like Popper's insistence that all sc~en­
tific knowledge is always from a point of view) may, as Giddens 
has suggested, be seen as reformulation of the hermeneutic thesis, 
that is the meaning of terms and expressions must be grasped with-
. . .. (112) 
~n spec~f~c mean~ng contexts. 
Kuhn himself has drawn attention to those aspects of his thought 
which he regards as being "very nearly identical" with that of 
Popper's. Firstly, he writes that they are both concerned with 
the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired, 
rather than with the logical structure of the product of 
scientific research. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, both 
reject the idea that scientific progress is achieved by accretion, 
emphasising instead the revolutionary process by which older 
theories are replaced by new ones. And finally both stress the 
"intimate and inevitable entanglement of scientific observation 
. h . .. " (113) d . 
w~t sc~ent~f~c theory. However, Kuhn hol s that the ma~n 
difference in their thought lies in his clear distinction between 
what he calls "normal" and "exceptional" science, a distinction 
1 1 . d· ,. . (114) not c ear y ev~ ent ~n Popper s ph~losophy of sc~ence. 
Normal sc~ence ~s the research which is conducted within a partic-
ular framework or paradigm. It is concerned with the solving of 
puzzles which challenge the ingenuity of the individual scientist. 
Outlining the kind of research taken Kuhn writes that one objective 
is "to extend the range and precision of existing experiment and 
theory as well as to improve the match between them". (115) A 
further objective ~s "to eliminate conflicts both between the 
different theories employed in their work and between ways in 
h · h . 1 th . d· d . f f .." (116 ) w ~c a s~ng e eory ~s use ~n ~ erent appl~cat~ons . 
112. Giddens, op.cit., p.142. 
113. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" ~n 
Lakatos and Musgrave (eds), op.cit., pp.1-2. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics" in Lakatos and Musgrave 
(eds), op.cit., p.246. 
116. Ibid. 
Insofar then as certain theories are taken for granted, normal 
scientific research is free to "exploit" those theories, free to 
"explore nature to an esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimag-
inable". (117) The practice of normal science by the relevant 
community of professional scientists is bound by the acceptance of 
the value system of their discipline, a system imbued through 
training. (118) Thus, scientific knowledge is "intrinsically a 
product of congeries of specialists' communities", that is men who 
are "bound together by common elements in their education and 
apprenticeship, aware of each other's work, and characterised by 
the relative fulness of their professional communication and the 
117 
. (119) 
relative unanimity of their professional Judgment". (Kuhn does 
not, however, add the qualification that a free society ~s a pre-
condition for the possibility of full communication). 
Failure to solve a problem within normal sc~ence ~s, according to 
Kuhn, normally interpreted as a reflection of the shortcomings of 
the individual scientist rather than as a criticism of the whole 
f h . . . 1 . 'f' . (120) corpus 0 t eory un~t~ng a part~cu ar sc~ent~ ~c commun~ty. 
However where,for example, there is what Kuhn calls "gross failure" 
or "repeated failure by the most brilliant professionals", a 
crisis situation occurs which produces the necessary conditions 
f h 'b'l' f . 'f' . (121) or t e poss~ ~ ~ty 0 a sc~ent~ ~c revolut~on. Thus when 
"the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the 'ex-
isting tradition of scientific practice", they "begin the extra-
ordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to a new 
set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science". (122) 
117. op.cit., p.247. 
118. op.cit., p.238. 
119. op.cit., p.253. 
120. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research", p.7. 
121. Ibid. See also Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Chapter'8. 
122. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.6. 
In short, there is a change to a new paradigm, this change con-
stituting a scientific revolution. It "implies a change in the 
rules governing the prior practice of normal science", and insofar 
as scientists in the new paradigm have reconstructed prior theory 
and have re-eva1uated prior fact, the new paradigm is "never just 
. ,,(123) Th f h an increment to what 1S already known . ere ore, t e con-
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ception of a paradigm may be taken to express the idea that science 
is historical; that there is no absolute starting point for 
scientific investigations, and that scientific laws are valid with-
in certain contexts. 
Kuhn has pointed out that it is difficult to specify the criteria 
which ensure commitment to a paradigm change. As a concomitant to 
the idea of resistance to paradigm changes by those with vested 
interests in the older paradigm, Kuhn observes that the logic of 
d k · 1· (124) P . an argument oes not ma e 1t compe 11ng. ersuaS10n may 
therefore be required, but this must be on the basis of episte-
mological criteria such as the accuracy, scope, simplicity and 
(125) fruitfulness of the new theory. In the end, though, the 
explanation for the choice of paradigm will be "psychological or 
sociological", describing a particular value system as well as 
those institutions through which those values are transmitted and 
enforced. (126) 
Kuhn holds that Popper's descriptions of the workings of SC1ence are 
concerned with the practice of exceptional science alone, that 1S 
with the critical testing of basic commitments and the need to 
h b . h . (127) . . c oose etween compet1ng t eor1es. The heart of the1r d1spute 
123. op.cit., p.7. 
124. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics", p.26l. 
125. Ibid. 
126. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psycho l ogy of Research", 
pp.20-l. 
127. op.cit., p.11. 
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therefore turns on the following: Popper argues that the "scientist 
should try at all times to be a critic and a proliferator of 
alternate theories". Kuhn argues "the desirability of an alternate 
strategy which reserves such behaviour for special occasions", 
. . . . . (128) 
that 1S a cr1S1S s1tuat1on. 
Popper has criticized the concept of "a normal scientist" as some-
one for whom one ought to be sorry, for such a scientist has been 
"badly taught", in "a dogmatic spirit", and is thus "a victim of 
. d . . ,,(129) S· P f· . 1n octr1nat1on . C1ence, as opper conce1ves 0 1t, 1S 
"essentially critical", and insofar as it consists of "bold 
conjectures" and is "controlled by criticism", it may be described 
. . ( l30) . d· h . as 1mmanently revolutIonary Popper 1S not eny1ng t e eX1st-
ence of normal science, but holds that it inhibits scientific 
progress. Kuhn, on the other hand, holds that success in ~roblem­
solving ' depends on the suspension of fundamental criticisms, a stance 
implied in the idea of a paradigm. 
It is not directly within the scope of this thesis to attempt to 
adjudicate on this debate with respect to science. However, having 
argued that science has taken "a hermeneutic turn", it is necessary 
to reassess the differences between the naturwissenschaften and the 
geisteswissenschaften. Furthermore the contributions of Popper 
and Kuhn . to the development of the idea of a hermeneutic of history 
must be elucidated. 
128. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics", p.243. 
129. Popper, "Normal Science and its Dangers" in Lakatos and 
Musgrave (eds), op.cit., p.S3. 
130. op.cit., p.SS. 
(v) Reassessing the relationship between the 
naturwissenschaften and the geisteswissenschaften 
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It will be remembered that Dilthey made a clear distinction between 
the naturwissenschaften and the geisteswissenschaften with regard 
to their respective objects of study and to the mode of investi-
gation in each case. History, as one of the latter types of 
science, has as its task the attempt to understand particular, 
unique and non-repeatable events, and not the formulation of general 
laws, as is the case within the natural sciences. Historians deal 
with a world which has already been interpreted as meaningful, and 
these meanings, which enter into the constitution or production of 
that world, must be part of any attempt to understand it. That 
attempt may involve the use of general statements, a point recog-
nised by Dilthey. However, the hermeneutic mandate, as conceived 
by Dilthey, has been extended. It has been argued that the task of 
making that event intelligible, does not end with that reconsti-
tution, for the meaning of an event is held to transcend its 
or~g~nary genes~s. A historian may explain an event using theories 
which may have been unknown or unfamiliar to the original prot ago-
n~sts, ut which are justified insofar as they succeed in making 
sense of the event in accordance with the idea of a fuller histori-
cal meaning embodied in the concept of the mediation of frames of 
mean~ng. As Giddens has observed, the theoretical generalizations 
used within a discipline like history, express causal relationships 
which refer to the outcomes of human doings, and not to the 
. (131) mechanical connections established ~n nature. The question, 
however, arises whether there is a radical difference in the logical 
structure of explanations employing theoretical generalizations ~n 
both the natural sc~ences and in history respectively. 
It has been pointed out that according to Popper, falsifiability ~s 
the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. 
131. Giddens, op.cit., pp.153-4. (Historians may, of course, also 
employ these latter kinds of generalization where relevant). 
So it is, I hold, the possibility of overthrowing it, 
on its falsifiability, that constitutes the possibility 
of testing it, and therefore the scientific character 
of a theory, and the fact that all tests of a theory 
are attempted falsifications of predictions derived 
with its help, furnishes the clue to scientific 
method. (132) 
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Thus the scientific method is to look out for facts which may 
refute the theory. As for scientific laws, they "retain forever a 
hypothetical character; they are assumptions •.. we can never 
rationally establish the truth of scientific laws, all we can do ~s 
d . . h f 1 " (133) to test them severely, an to el~m~nate tea se ones . 
In history, various kinds of general statements may be used in 
the hypothetico~deductive model of explanation. These include 
assumptions from common experience; others may be ad hoc theories 
postulated to try to account for a specific event; others may 
have been "imported" from the social sciences. But in each case, 
like scientific laws, these generalizations retain their character 
of being assumptions, which the self-reflective historian attempts 
to refute against the available evidence, that operation occurr~ng 
within the hermeneutic circle. Thus, in agreement with Nagel, it 
is held that there is no radical difference in the logical 
structure of the hypothetico-deductive model used in each case.(134) 
There are, however, differences with regard to the evidence used by 
the historian and scientist respectively. The evidence available 
to the historian is often fragmentary and incomplete, and, more-
over, relates to a non-repeatable past. Furthermore primary (and 
indeed secondary sources)are themselves interpretations from a point 
132. Popper, OS, p.260. 
133. op.cit.,-p.363. 
134. Ernest Nagel, "The Logic of Historical Analysis", ~n 
Meyerhoff, op.cit., p.206. 
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of view. (135) However, the contributions of the early hermeneutic 
tradition which attempted to devise rules for the interpretation of 
texts, that is for the placement of texts within various con-
texts, constitute the means of assessing reliability (provided that 
those texts have been proved authentic through various scientific 
tests). 
Drawing an analogy with Popper's characterisation of science as being 
in a state of immanent revolution, history is held to be essentially 
self-critical. Translated into hermeneutic terms, this means that 
the presuppositions the historian holds with respect to a particular 
event are constantly at stake within the hermeneutic circle. The 
content of these presuppositions, which is derived from the --
historian's immersion in the historical tradition surrounding the 
event and from relevant social sciences, depends on the historian's 
point of view constituted partly by the presuppositions as to the nature 
of the discipline. Thus these latter presuppositions are also 
ultimately at stake 1n the process of coming to understand the 
past. This inherently critical attitude is clearly expressed by 
Gadamer: 
••• what is reasonable is to know the limits of one's 
understanding and just through this fact to be capable 
of better understanding wherever it may come from. 
Indeed, that is such a universal requirement that it 
counts likewise for the reason of science, insofar 
as each investigator is constantly aware of his own 
surpassability But it is just this way that science 
maintains itself •.• Reason always cClnsists in not 
blindly insisting upon what is held to be true but 
in critically occupying oneself with it. Its activity 
135. It is true that the meanin~ of a text or te~t-analogue is not 
s:lf-e~iden~~ and that his~orical facts are established by 
h1stor1ans 1n accordance w1th the particular point of view they 
adopt. However, an analogous situation occurs in science as 
Popper .has,pointed out. The meani ng of an object falling'to 
earth 15 1nterpreted .. differently depending on whether one 
o~erates within a medieval paradigm or its successor. In the 
f1rst case, the object's fall is explained in terms of the 
attraction of like for like, (hence air rises), while in the 
second, the force of gravity provides the explanatory principle. 
remains rational explanation, but not the dogmatic 
certainty of a new rationality absolutely laid down, 
which knows everything better - reason is conceived 
as engaged in a continuous process of self-
enlightenment concerning itself and its own 
conditions. (136) 
Drawing on Popper's and Kuhn's analyses of objectivity, it is 
argued in this thesis that if one wants to know what counts as an 
objective historical account, one must examine the intellectual 
values held by professional historians, thereby discovering what 
is tolerated and what disdained. 
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The differences between the natural and social sciences, including 
history, ought not to be over-emphasised. The altered conception 
of science has undercut the dichotomy postulated between the 
naturwissenschaften and the gei steswissenschaften, a dichotomy 
which gave impetus to the development of hermeneutics as an attempt 
to understand the meaning of objectifications of geist. To put 
the point epigrammatically: while science has taken a hermeneutic 
turn, hermeneutics, in turn, is scientific. 
136. Gadamer, 'The Power of Reason', Man and World, 1970, 
pp.14-15. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING 
The two central and inter-related tasks which constitute the idea 
of a hermeneutic of history are firstly, to elucidate the process 
whereby the historian grasps the fuller historical meaning of 
historical texts or actions within the hermeneutic circle of 
understanding, and secondly, an analysis of the criteria in terms 
of which both the relevance and objectivity of historical accounts 
are judged. 
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As has been suggested, the first task demands an examination of 
the presuppositions an historian holds with respect to the partic-
". "" (1) f h " k f ular event he ~s ~nvest~gat~ng. Apart rom ~s stoc 0 common 
sense knowledge, the historian is also armed with presuppositions 
acquired from his reading of various secondary sources. These are 
tested in the movement towards understanding by the self-
reflecting historian. These presuppositions reflect a commitment 
to a particular point of view from which the past is approached. 
No such point of view can, however, be held uncritically; the 
idea of hermeneutic anarchy is thus rejected. A point of v~ew 
must be justified pragmatically - do the questions it generates 
succeed in opening the past to the historian's understanding? 
These issues-form the subject of this chapter. The second issue 
is discussed in the following chapter. 
1. Historical explanation, which is also part of the first task, 
may be treated as a self-contained topic, and is dealt with 
in Chapter Seven. 
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(i) Points of view 
(a) Kinds of history 
Hollinger has observed that historians "grant professional status 
to work controlled by a number of differeent ideologies and commit-
ments". (2) Thus there are many "kinds" of history, for example, 
political history, economic history, social history, intellectual 
history, local history and so on. Much has been written on the 
merits of one particular history over others. For example, Perkin 
in advancing the claims of social history, writes that social 
history is "the queen of the historical studies". (3) Bindoff, on the 
other hand, writes that "how men acquired, kept, or lost power in 
the past, what they attempted with it once gained, and above all 
how they met the problems inseparable from its possess~on, these 
matters are the core of political history. It is the only form of 
history in which we can at once diagnose a problem, observe its 
attempted solution, and weigh reasons for success or failure. Man, 
said Aristotle, is by nature a political animal. By the same 
token man's history is, in the last analysis, political". (4) 
History in the nineteenth century was primarily written as politi-
cal history. Expressing this succint1y, Seeley called history 
"past politics". Historians devoted their attention towards an 
attempt to understand the origins and nature of particular f.orms 
of government. In this century there has been a reaction against 
this kind of history which has been criticised as limited and 
narrow, and hence we have seen the pro l iferation of other 
histories. But Elton, for example, still characterises history as 




David A. Hollinger, "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and its 
Implications for History", American Historical Review, Vol. 
78, 1973, p.382. 
H.J. Perkin, 'S~cial History' in H.P.R. Finberg (ed), 
Approaches to H~story (1962), pp.8l-2. 
S.T. Bindoff, 'Political History' in Finberg, op.cit., p.15. 
reconstruction, and gradual moulding of a state - the history of 
a nation and its leaders in political action, and therefore the 
history of government in its widest sense". (5) Obviously, there-
fore, a political historian dealing with power struggles ~n 
seventeenth century Germany, for examp l e, would not deal with the 
witch-craze there unless that phenomenon had a bearing on the 
theme. (The development of social history in this century helps 
to account for the growing scholarship in the field of the 
European witch-craze). 
Social history has been characterised ~n a negative way by 
Trevelyan as "the history of a people with the politics left 
out". (6) Other writers have restricted social history to domestic 
and communal institutions, to popular attitudes, customs and past-
times. (7) Social historians would ask questions dealing with 
domestic service, the role of women in a society, with attitudes 
to sex and so on. 
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"Economic history", according to Court, "is the study of a partic-
ular class of historical events. These are theaventswhich ar~se 
out of economic choice, where men find themselves faced, as they 
daily do, with the need to make their resources go round among the 
ends which they set themselves". (8) North describes the econom~c 
historian's concern as dealing with "the overall growth of the 
economy and the determinants of that growth (or stagnation or 
decline) and the distribution of income within that economy in the 
course of its growth or decline". (9) An interesting development ~n 
economic history has been the use of counterfactuals in terms of 
which historians start with the premise that "we can understand 







Perkin, op.cit., p.5l. 
J. Jean Hecht, 'Social History', International Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences (1968), Vol. 6, p.455. -
W.H.B. Court, 'Economic History', in Finberg, op.cit., 
pp.44-5. 
Dougla$ C. North, 'Economic History', International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1968), Vol. 6, p.468. 
what might have happened, and go~ng on to quantify 'what might 
(10) . . have happened'" Thus an econom~c histor~an m~ght pose the 
question whether in the absence of certain governmental policies 
the income of the state would have been higher. 
According to Brinton, intellectual history 1n its widest sense, 
"may be said to have as its subject matter whatever record 1S left 
. .. f h h . d" (11) It t t t by the act1v1t1es 0 t e uman m1n . concen ra es on pas 
concepts and beliefs. The intellectual historian might question 
the origin of ideas and the role that they play in a society or 
in our era. (12) Within this broad field, the important role 
science plays in our society has stimulated a growing interest 
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in the history of science. The subject matter of this discipline 
includes "the study of the actual contents of the scientific 
record as revealed in publications, records of conversations, 
correspondence, laboratory or reading notebooks, journals, lecture 
notes ... annotated books, any manuscript materia1s ••• and finally -
where available - the actual artefacts of scientific work ..• ". (13) 
One possible kind of question a historian can ask is how the 




It is clear that no rigid lines can be drawn between various his-
tories. For example, as Bindoff points out, an economic historian 
investigating foreign trade must "master the nature and purpose of 
those records (relating to foreign trade) which the state did 






Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History (1970), quoting E.H. 
Hunt, p.1l8. 
Crane Brinton, 'Intellectual History', International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1968), Vol.6, p.462. 
Paul K. Conkin, 'Intellectual History', in Charles F. Delzell, 
The Future of History (1977). 
Bern~rd Cohen, 'The History of Science', in Delzell, op.cit.,p.69. 
op.CH., p.7S. 
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For such indispensable knowledge he must turn to political, 
" 'h' " (15) R ' th t constitutional, and adm~n~strat~ve ~story. ess wr~tes a 
"there is now a virtual consensus of opinion on the scope of 
economic history. It includes a study of the state of agriculture, 
industry, commerce and transport, together with an eludication of 
the more technical problem of currency, credit, and taxation. 
These subjects necessarily also involve an examination and descrip-
tion of social conditions. In fact the line between the economic 
, b' 1 d ,,(16) (W ld dd h and the soc~al cannot e str~ct y rawn. e cou a t at 
political and intellectual conditions must also similarly be taken 
into account). However, there is room for specialization because 
historians have different interests, they ask different kinds of 
questions, and in some cases as, for example, economic history, 
1 'f' h ' h 1 b' ,(17) a so use spec~ ~c tec n~ques suc as a ge ra~c equat~ons. 
Historians must, however, be aware of their bias with respect to 
their characterisation of the scope of their discipline, for theirs 
is simply a point of view, one way of directing a searchlight on 
the past. 
As an alternative to the proliferation of histories, Bloch and 
Febvre turned away from the traditional preoccupation with admin-
istrative institutions towards a broader history. The so-called 
AnnaZes school of history had as its ideal the idea of a "total" 
history, holding that socio-cultural contexts should be studied 
as totalities, including physical, ideational and normative 
millieus. "Total" history would both dominate and embrace all 
other studies of the human condition. (18) As Ladurie, who 
15. Bindoff, op.cit., p.14. 
16. Perkin, op.cit., p.Sl. 
17. Robert William Fogel, 'The Limits of Quantitative Methods 
in History', American Historical Review, Vol. 80, 1975, 
pp.338-34l. 
18. Michael Harsgor, 'Total History: The Annales School', 
Journal of Contemporary History., Vol.l3, 1978, p.2. 
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identifies with the school, writes, "history is the synthesis of all 
" (19) sciences of man turned towards the past . 
Another example of a "total" history is provided by the historical 
materialist point of view. One impulse for the adoption of a 
Marxist historiography stems from its reaction against positivism, 
against what Jones, for example, terms "the poverty of 
empiricism". (20) Acco.rding to the positivist thesis, historical 
facts, conceived of as being analogous to facts in the natural 
sciences, are "discrete, atomic and supremely indifferent to the 
., f h b ,,(21) Th k f h h' t . . t pos~t~on 0 teo server • etas 0 t e ~s or~an ~s 0 
collect these facts, the framing of hypotheses through induction 
following automatically, the successful completion of the task 
resulting ~n a universal history embodying "definitive truth". (22) 
Jones suggests that this is one reason why positivist-inspired 
history has tended to concentrate on great men, and on consti-
tutional issues, "facts" which are empirically verifiable unlike 
"non-sensible realities" like class or mode of production which 
cannot be uncovered simply through the study of documents. It ~s 
precisely these latter realities which provide the impetus for a 
Marxist radical perspective. Thus Engels wrote to Bloch: 
... according to the materialist conception of 
history, the ultimately determining element in 
history is the production and reproduction of 
real life ••• (24) 








Gareth Stedman Jones, "History: The Poverty of Empiricism" 
in R: Blackburn, (ed), Ideology in the Social Sciences (1972). 
op.c~t., p.97. 
E.J. Hobsbawm, "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography" in 
Blackburn, op.cit., p.266. 
Jones, op.cit., p.98. 
Friedrich Engels, "Letter to Joseph Bloch" in Lewis S. Feuer 
Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy 
(1959), p.397. 
..• more than this neither Marx nor I has ever 
asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying 
that the economic element is the onZy determining 
one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, 
abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation 
is the basis but the various elements of the super-
structure - political forms of the class structure, 
juridical forms, •.. philosophical theories, religious 
views - also exercise their influence on the course 
of the historical struggles. Otherwise the application 
of the theory to any period of history would be easier 
than the solution of a simple equation of the first 
degree. (25) 
However, neither Marx nor Engels explained in what sense the mode 
of production is the ultimately determining element in history. 
This has complicated the possibility of formulating clearly a 
Marxist point of view, especially when the above ~s contrasted 
with statements by Marx such as the following: 
It is a question of these laws themselves, of these 
tendencies winning their way through and working 
themselves out with iron necessity. (26) 
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Indeed, as Gouldner has pointed out, there is a fundamental contra-
d
· . . h ., (27) . 
~ct~on ~n erent ~n Marx~st thought. For, wh~le on the one 
hand, Marxism may be regarded as a science insofar as its concern 
is "the political economy of the laws of capitalism", it is also 
a philosophy of praxis, as suggested in Marx's dictum that "the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it". (28) Gouldner has therefore 






Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I, Preface to the First Edition 
(tr. by Ben Fowkes) (1976), p.9l. 
Alvin W. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and 
Anomalies in the Development of Theory (1980). 
Marx , "Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach" in Feuer, op.cit., p.245. 
"Scientific" Marxism which stresses lawful regularities, setting 
limits on human will, and "Critical" Marxism which is directed to-
.' .." (29) wards a "policy of act1ve 1ntervent10n1sm . 
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It 1S not within the scope of this thesis to exam1ne this debate. 
It is, however, clear that no resolution can be found simply 
through a close study of Marx's texts. The inherent contradictions 
within the corpus of Mar~'s work seem to preclude the possibility 
of universal agreement. Moreover, Gouldner himself, referring to -these texts, has made the hermeneutic point that "to critique a 
theory is a very active act; engaging the theory in dialogue, 
it inevitably interweaves commentary with exegesis, paying 
scrupulous attention to what the theorist's text says, while at 
the same time recognising that the meaning of any text (as of life) 
is never limited to its author's self-understanding. It must be 
interpreted, never merely recited". (30) 
Within the framework of a historical materialist point of V1ew, 
the idea of a hermeneutic of history endorses Thompson's defence 
of historical materialist practice against Althusser's a-historical 
theoreticism. The Poverty of Theory (1978), written in response 
to what Thompson has referred to as Althusser's "grand theory", 
1S a critique of the latter's idealism as radical anti-empiricism. 
Thompson argues that "Althusser's schema either show us how 
ideological illusions can reproduce themselves endlessly (or may 
29. 
30. 
Gouldner, op.cit., p.59. "Scientific" Marxists include 
Althusser. _Poulantzas, Godelier. "Critical" Marxists (called 
"Hunanist"Marxists by Bottomore), include Lukacs, Gramsci, 
Sartre. These rigid distinctions however are sometimes 
difficult to sustain. For a summary of the differences between 
these systems see Gouldner. op.cit., pp.58-60, and Bottomore 
Tom (ed), Modern Interpretations of Marx (1981), pp.1-2l. 
Gouldner, op.cit., p.9. 
evolve in aberrant or fortuitous ways); or it proposes (with 
Spinoza) that given theoretical procedures in t hemselves can re-
fine ideological impurities out of their given materials by no 
other means than the scientific discourse of the proof; or 
finally, it proposes some ever-pre-given immanent Marxist idea 
outside the material and social world (of which idea this world 
is an 'effect')" .(31) In short, Althusser is accused of con-
structing a theory of history within theory without any reference 
to existing historical problematics, and without taking cogn1sance 
of empirical evidence. Althusser's concepts are therefore de-
historicized, static and inter-related within a closed system. 
At the same time, Thompson has made the telling point that there 
is a confusion within Althusser's thought between "empiricism", 
(philosophical positivisms), and "the empirical mode of intellec-
. (32) 
tual pract1ce". "Grand theory" has replaced the open-ended 
and dialetical study during which concepts and theories used by 
historians are refined and redefined through concrete analysis 
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of empirical evidence. Indeed, Thompson's elucidation of 
"historical logic", that is "a logical method of enquiry appropriate 
to historical materials, designed as far as possible to test hypo-
theses as to structure causation, etc., and to eliminate self-
confirming procedures ('instances' , 'illustrations')", is in 
accord with the hermeneutic thesis. (33) (The fact that historical 
materialist historians use specific categories and concepts -
Thompson refers to them as "historical" categories - 1n no way 
affects the fundamental tenets of "historical logic" which 
characterises the practice of all written history. (34) 
31. E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (1978), p.203. 
32. op.cit., p.202. 
33. op.cit., pp.23l-242. 
34. op.cit., p.236. 
Bernstein has argued that despite the tremendous variations of 
interpretation and application of historical materialism, "a 
single but somewhat fZuid core can indeed be identified", a core 
which constitutes the minimal conceptual foundation of any 
, (35) ( , b k ' II ' Marx1st programme. Th1S core may e ta en as an 1 ustrat10n 
of Thompson's "historical" categories). Firstly, the "direction" 
and "velocity" of historical development is held to be determined 
b ' 1 f h' . d soc1'al forces.(36) y mater1a actors, t at 1S, econom1C an 
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Thus history is "the record of the advance of material life; its 
proper subject is productive activity analysed in terms of the productive 
forces and the social relations of production which correspond to 
, ,,(37) Wh h h b those burgeon1ng forces . et er or not t e ase-superstruct-
ure model of historical change and Marx's economic determinism 
constitute a mechanical economic determinism is the subject of 
, (d ') (38) Th much controversy amongst Marx1sts an non-Marx1sts . e 
35. Howard R. Bernstein, "Marxist Historiography and the Method-
ology of Research Programmes", in Studies in Marxist Historical 
Theory (1981), p.435. (Bernstein's first four concepts are 
accepted) (my italics). 
36. op.cit., p.445. 
37. op.cit., p.436. 
38. Althusser's concept of over-determination according to Geras, 
"is an attempt to elucidate the sense in which the mode of 
production is ultimately determining. By describing the 
mUltiple and complex relations between the mode of production 
and superstructure, the concept is intended to enable the 
historical materialists to account for variety on the level 
of superstructure while at the same time holding that this 
variety is ultimately determined by the mode of production". 
Posel argues that Althusser has, however, failed to eluci-
date what "ultimate determinacy" consists in, and suggests 
that the mode of production ultimately determines any in-
stance in the social formation by constituting its necessary 
conditions - that is, that structure without which that par-
ticular instance could not have become what it is. The 
superstructure is relatively autonomous within the field of 
possibilities set by the mode of production. 
Norman Geras, "Althusser's Marxism: An Assessment" in Western 
Marxism: A Critical Reader edited by New Left Review (1977). 
D. Posel, 'Radical Science - In the Last Analysis'. Unpub-
lished Paper delivered in Durban 20 August 1979. 
historians Thompson, Cohen and Hobsbawm reject what the latter 
refers to as "vulgar-Marxism".(39') Hobsbawm himself has attempted 
to delineate the reciprocal and dialectical interaction between 
the mode of production and superstructure. He writes that "the 
immense strength of Marx has always lain in his insistence on 
both the existence of social structure and its historicity, or 
. .. 1 d . f h ,,(40) Ma ' ~n other words ~ts ~nterna ynam~c 0 c ange • rx s 
characterisation of societies "as systems of relations between 
human beings", those relations entered into for the purpose of 
production and reproduction being considered as primary, implies 
an "analysis of the structure and functioning of these systems as 
entities maintaining themselves in their relations both with the 
outside environment - non-human and human - and in their internal 
relationship". (41) Marxism therefore provides a theoretical 
framework within which the historian can explain why and how 
societies change and transform themselves. (42) Admitting that 
this model needs to be made more explicit than it is in Marx's 
own writings, Hobsbawm regards it as the more fruitful perspective 
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. h· . h " h· ." . (45) w~t ~n wh~c t e ent~re span of human h~story may be expla~ned. 
These remarks lead to an elucidation of the other core concepts of 
Marxist historiography as proposed by Bernstein. A Marxist his to-
r~an ~s committed to the idea of "a specific epochal succession of 
social formations", the "emergence" and "replacement" of which are 
held to be dialectical in nature, the dialectical process being 
(44) 
exemplified in the notion of class struggle. Furthermore, 
Bernstein argues that, while it is not clear whether Marx and 







see Bernstein, op.cit., p.438; Jon S. Cohen, "The Achieve-
ments of Economic History: The Marxist School", Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 38, 1978, Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.270. 
Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.274. 
op . ci t ., p. 273 • 
op • ci t., p. 274 . 
op.cit., p.282. 
Bernstein, op.cit., p.445. 
history", that is to the success~on of social formations having 
a "unilinear, uniform velocity", nevertheless their periodization 
characterised by "a. sense of inner necessity", constitutes a 
. . f· (45) I . th necessary aspect of a Marx~st po~nt 0 v~ew. t ~s e 
"dialectic" which acts as the driving force of history through the 
resolution of contradictions and inconsistencies between produc-
. (46) 
tive forces and relations of product~on. Thus for a Marxist 
historiography class struggle is also a core concept. Social 
classes must therefore be analysed as well as revolutions, the 
impetus for the latter coming from those exploited classes who 
wish to control the means of production with the acquisition of 
. . . 1 (47) 
concom~tant pol~t~ca power. 
In accordance with historical materialist concepts, it ~s clear 
that historians who adopt a Marxist point of view will see the 
past ~n a qualitatively different way to those taking a non-
Marxist stance. For example, let us consider two analyses of 
the popular revolts in France in the seventeenth century. The 
. .. h (48) h . 
Marx~st h~stor~an, Pore nev, c aracter~ses these revolts as 
spontaneous, arguing that while they began as a protest against 
specific royal taxes and/or methods of collection, the popular 
elements generalized the revolt to one against the taxation 
system as a whole. Logically it should have become a struggle 
against feudalism and absolutism.(49) But leadership of these 
revolts was taken over by those members of the aristocracy who 
supported the uprisings only because royal taxation eroded the 
capacity of the peasants to fulfil feudal rents and dues. (50) 
45. op.cit., p.44l. 
46. op.cit., pp.44l-2. 
47. op.cit., pp.443-4. 
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48. Boris Porchnev, "Popular Uprising as Class War: The Revolt of 
the Nu-Pieds"in Isser Woloch, The Peasantry in the Old 
Regime: Conditions and Protests (1977). 
49. Porchnev, op.cit., p.48. 
50. op.cit., p.45. 
136 
Unlike 1789, the bourgeoisie failed to support the . popular classes, 
thereby betraying them in their struggle against the nobles. 
Porchnev argues that the abrogation by the bourgeoisie of its 
revolutionary role was effected in what he calls the "feuda1ization" 
of the bourgeoisie, that is effected politically through venal 
offices, socially through the aspirations of venal officers to live 
a noble life-style, and economically through the diversion of 
bourgeois capital from trade, commerce and industry into the 
. (51) 
f~nancesof the feudal state. Thus the absolutist state was, 
in the final analysis, a feudal state "in the Marxist sense that 
. f d· . 1 h b ·1· ,,(52) ~t was the tool 0 the om~nat~ng c ass, t e no ~ ~ty . 
Mousnier's analysis presents a qualitatively different picture of 
the revolts. He argues that even if these uprisings may have 
appeared spontaneous, the nobles took the initiative and provided 
the leadership. The idea of a class struggle in Porchnev's 
sense is not a tenable one, Mousnier maintains. Rather "gentlemen, 
officials, bourgeois, artisans and peasants" presented a united 
(53) 
front against a common enemy, the royal government. Agreeing 
with Porchnev, Mousnier recognises that excess royal taxation re-
stricted the ability of the peasants to fulfil their feudal 
obligations. However, Mousnier's position differs diametrically 
from that of Porchnev on the question of venality. Mousnier's 
argument is that venal offices led to the embourgeoisement of 
power at the expense of the nobles. The Bourbon kings are there-
fore seen as "revolutionary" and alienated from the noble class. 
Evidence of the growing obstructiveness of the bourgeoisie filling 




Robert Mandrou, "Porchnev, Mousnier and the Significance of 
Popular Uprising", in Wo10ch, op.cit., p.72; J.H.M. Salmon, 
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France", Past and Present, No. 37, 1967, p.24. 
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Uprising", in Wo1och, op.cit. 
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extensively by Louis XIV in order to re-establish royal authority 
over the realm. Thus Mousnier refuses to characterise the monarchy 
as an instrument of the landed, traditional feudal aristocracy. 
(b) Presuppositions about a particular event 
Within each point of view, the historian approaches a particular 
event with those presuppositions he possesses by virtue of his 
being a member of a particular historio-social world, as well as 
with presuppositions reflecting his professional commitment. All 
these presuppositions are therefore constitutive of that point of 
view. 
It has already been argued that transcendental presuppositions 
ensure the possibility of understanding; they are the transcend-
ental conditions of a meaningful world. These presuppositions are 
involved in our ordinary experience of the world and make it 
possible for us to speak and write about the world, ourselves and 
others, including those who lived in the past. They include the 
presuppositions that we can use language to speak about the world 
and to communicate, and that language is therefore meaningful; 
that there are particulars which we can pick out and describe; 
that other people behave as we do insofar as they can set purposes, 
intend to do or express something, work out means of achieving 
these goals, react emotionally and hence that people are "potential 
. .. ,,(54) partners ~n commun~cat~on . 
It is these kinds of presuppositions which make tradition in the 
broad sense possible, and it is tradition which ensure the trans-
m~ss~on of knowledge, beliefs, values, customs, roles and insti-
tutions from generation to generation. Shils defines a tradition 
54. Baumann, op.cit., p.lSl, p.2ll. 
as "the recurrence in approximately identical form of structures 
of conduct and patterns of belief over several generations of 
membership or over a long time within single societies ... and 
within corporate bodies as well as over regions which extend 
across several bounded territorial discrete societies which are 
unified to the extent of sharing in some measure a common 
culture". (55) The historian possesses what may be termed a 
stock of common sense knowledge derived from his historico-
existential confrontation within his world, a knowledge which 
includes generalizations and typifications, and which is brought 
. . f h" (56) C to bear on an ~nterpretat~on 0 t e past. ommon sense 
knowledge is not static, however, for new theories and discoveries 
within various disciplines gradually percolate into its canons 
with the aid of the various media, until these become part of 
what i s. taken for granted by members of that particular world. 
Apart from these presuppositions, there are also presuppositions 
which pertain to the particular event of which he is trying to 
make sense. It is clear that his conception of his discipline 
will affect the kind of topic chosen and the evidence selected. 
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For historical evidence is not given a priori - it depends, as 
Goldstein" says, on an historical attitude, a historical mode of 
inquiry, the recognition that something is relevant. (57) The 
historian's first task is, as has already been pointed out, to 
familiarise himself with the historical interpretative tradition 
found in relevant secondary material. This provides him with his 
pre-understanding of the event and its context. The presuppositions 
may well have to be amended if, in the process towards clarification, 
the historian discovers inaccuracies or misjudgments by other his-




Edward Shils, 'Tradition', Comparative Studies ~n Sociology and 
History, Vol. 13, 1971, p.123. 
The burden of proof that there is such a stock must lie with 
those who deny rather than those who accept it. 
Le~n J. Goldstein, 'Epistemic Attitudes and History', 
Ph~losophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 37, 1976/7, 
p.192. 
open to its otherness. Let us consider, for example, the problem 
of the interpretation of the . Renaissance, and show how through 
a dialogue with the past, a historian can come to look at that 
phenomenon 1n a qualitatively different way. 
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The idea of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
as the rebirth of art and letters after the "darkness" of the medie-
val period was first expressed by the Italian humanists themselves, 
by men like Boccacio, Bruni, Ficino and Vasari. Typical of their 
attitude is Ficino's eulogising description: 
If we are to call any age golden, it is beyond 
. doubt that age which brings forth golden talents 
in different places. That such is true of this 
our age he who wishes to consider the illustrious 
discoveries of thts century will hardly doubt. For 
this century, like a golden age, has restored to 
light the liberal arts, which were almost extinct: 
grammar, poetry, rhetoric, painting, sculpture, 
architecture, music, the ancient singing of songs 
to the orphic lyre, .and all this in Florence. (58) 
Undoubtedly the most influential historian in the subsequent histo-
riography of the Renaissance was Burckhardt. His stress on the 
Renaissance sense of individualism, its concern with secular 
matters, its preoccupation with politics and diplomacy, 
characteristics both inspired by the classical period and 1n 
dramatic contrast to the preceding Dark Ages, led Burckhardt to 
go on to claim that Renaissance Italy constituted the birthplace 
of the modern world. For in time, the ideas of the Renaissance were 
to spread beyond the Alps transforming medieval into modern 
Europe. 
(59) 
58. Marsilio Ficino, 'The Golden Age in Florence', in James Bruce 
Ross and Mary Martin McLaughlin (eds) , The Portable Renaissance 
Reader (1978), p.79. 
59. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy 
(1860). 
The idea of the Renaissance as a rebirth has been challenged by 
medievalists who argue, for example, that there were earlier 
Renaissances, the Carolingean in the eighth century, the Ottonian 
in the tenth century, and the Renaissance of the twelfth century. 
That th~ Renaissance was the birth place of the modern world has 
been denied by Ritter, amongst others, who writes: 
The cradle of the great modern powers of the 
modern national power-state, is not Italy but 
Western Europe. There, in contrast to Italy, 
it grew quite naturally out of the soil of 
late feudalism. (60) 
Clearly Ritter has chosen one element of our modern world in order 
to make his point, namely the existence today of power-states. Of 
course, one could argue that Machiavelli's analysis of power 
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set him apart from the idealised conceptions of the state as seen ~n 
Greek and medieval thought. Indeed the Machiavellian idea of 
raison d'etat, the view that the goal of the state is its political 
power, and that any means which further that goal are acceptable 
and even necessary, irrespective of the morality of such means, is 
one which is "modern". Thus, judgments by a historian as to the 
"modernity" of a period like the Renaissance, depend firstly on 
characteristics of his own and therefore modern society, and 
secondly, on what characteristics he singles out as being especially 
representative of that modernity. In this way the historian's 
own horizon contributes to the way he appropriates the past. But 
the Renaissance has also been chosen to illustrate how an openness 
to the past can lead the historian to adopt a view which will give 
him a qualitatively different picture of the past. 
Apart from the European renaissances mentioned above, was what 
occurred in Italy itself a rebirth? Can a qistorian accept the 
60. G. Ritter, 'Origins of the Modern State', in H. Lubasz (ed), 
The Development of the Modern State (1964), p.20. 
judgments of the Italian humanists themselves and the subsequent 
tradition uncritically? An investigation of Italy's history from 
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the fall of the Roman Empire until the dawn of the Renaissance byJ.K. 
Hyde makes the following points, which are summarised below. 
Firstly, feudal tenure in Italy during the period "never came to 
dominate all other types of land-holding in the way it did in 
parts of north-west Europe". 
(61) Secondly, as it was during 
antiquity, Italian society was "highly urbanised", members of the 
merchant classes filling a wide range of occupations such as 
commerce, banking, learning, the law, professional or part-time 
administration or soldiering. (62) Thirdly, a close relationship 
was maintained with her classical past. Not only were Italians 
surrounded by concrete reminders of antiquity, but the revival of 
classical Roman law through the study of Justinian's codification 
which began in the eleventh century was to continue "at a high 
level" for the next three centuries. (63) Thus as Hyde remarks, 
"the relics of antiquity were so imposing that they could arouse 
b h d · . d . . " (64) ot a m1rat10n an ant1pathy but they could never be 19nored • 
In any society there are various ideas and values, (which we may 
call its ideology), which are used both to explain and to justify 
the institutions of that society - the customs, the roles played 
by various people, the norms of behaviour and the like. The 
society of the northern and central Italian city states, which 
formed the nucleus of the Renaissance, was characterised by a 
predominantly secular ideology, which was appropriate to the 
competitive nature of its commercial and trading interests. What 
counted in a competitive society was being resourceful, individual-
ism being both necessary and encouraged. There was much evidence 
61. J.K. Hyde, Society and Politics 1n Medieval Italy (1973), p.S. 
62. op.cit., pp.6 7. 
63. op.cit., p.6. 
64. Ibid. 
of social mobility, of intermarriage between nobles and merchants, 
and status was measured in terms of personal achievement rather 
than birth. Clearly an ideology appropriate to a feudal, hier-
archial society based on manoralism would have been inappropriate 
lon Italy. But there was, as it were, a "ready made" framework 
of ideas and values for Italy contained in classical texts avail-
able, for example, in works by Aristotle and Cicero. For it 
must be remembered that classical civilization was itself a 
·secular one. Thus as Hyde says, "all Italian culture in the 
o 0 0 dO 0 h 0 0 ,,(65) Mloddle Ages was condlotlooned by the loalogue Wlot antloquloty. 
The Renaissance may therefore be redefined as "a new phase in a 
o 0 d b 0 f 0 ,,(66) H 0 conversatloon WhloCh ha een gOlong on or centurloes . aVlong 
reconstructed his point of view on that event, the historian will 
therefore pose different kinds of questions such as why did this 
o 0 of 0 0 ?(67) h dloalogue lontenslo y at that partlocular tlomeo Were t ere any 
65. Ibid. For example, Aristotle's Politics (in Latin) had been 
available since 1260. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Maland has argued that while the break with her past was 
'nowhere made with dramatic suddenness', the Renaissance 
was nevertheless a period of greater vigour and novelty. 
In attempting to explain why this explosion occurred, Maland 
isolates the 'urban environment of Northern Italy', in 
which 'the feudal and ecclesiastical elements which had 
been so powerful in formulating the standards of Europe 
in the Middle Ages were now superseded by the urban and 
secular forces developed in the city states'(p.116). But 
I have argued that Italian society in the northern and 
central areas had always been urbanised, and that it was 
not the case that only during the Renaissance did the 
merchant, recognising that the city state lay outside the 
world of feudal and ecclesiastical hierarchy, 'decide to 
adopt a scale of values which the medieval world as yet 
refused to acknowledge' ,(p.119). D. Maland, 'The Italian 
Renaissance - A Problem of Interpretation', History, 
Vol. 44, 1959. . 
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novel features during that intensification and if so, why? It is 
therefore also clear that we understand the Renaissance differently 
to the way it was characterised by the humanists; indeed perhaps 
we understand the period better. 
Amongst other presuppositions which are brought to bear on a 
particular event are definitions which, as Weber has suggested, may 
be said to contribute ideal types. These are not representative 
of reality, but rather each ideal type represents an idealisation, 
a "utopia" which is useful for research. One of the historian's 
tasks, for exaple, is to discover the gap between an ideal type 
and the actual ins tance, in order to enh~nce his understanding of 
. . (68) Th' b '11 t d that part1cular, concrete 1nstance. 1S may e 1 ustra e 
by a consideration of the absolutism of Louis XIV. 
An absolute monarchy has been defined as a system of government in 
which monarchs tried to centralise authority in their own person, 
and hence free themselves from the restraints on their power 
provided by groups and institutions such as the nobles, the church 
and popular assemblies. Louis XlV's reign is generally character-
ised as absolute because firstly, during his rule the Estates-
General did not meet; secondly, the Parlements were ordered in 
1673 to restrict their functions to judicial matters and the auto-
matic registration of edicts. They were allowed to present remon-
straces thereafter, but once only. In practice none were offered. 
Thirdly, the Declaration of Four Articles (1682), proclaimed that 
the Pope's authority in France was limited by the Councils and by 
custom. (The Pope, Innocent Xl, had threatened to excommunicate 
Louis when in 1673, faced by the exingencies of war, the king 
extended the Crown's right to collect revenue from all sees in 
France. Had that excommunication taken place, Louis' subjects would 
have been absolved from their oath of allegiance, and the way would 
have been prepared for the king to be deposed by the Estates-General). 
68. Stern, op.cit., pp.74-5. 
Papal infallibility was rejected, and the Pope's decisions, even 
with respect to religious issues, were subject to the approval of 
the French Church. 
However a close examination of Louis' re~gn reveals that there were 
both theoretical and practical limitations on his power. The 
current ideology of the period justifying absolutism was that of 
Divine Right in accordance with which a king was bound to obey 
the laws of God and nature, and was expected to obey the laws of 
the land. Louis' respect for the principles of Divine Right is 
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shown by the fact that he asked the Law Faculty of the Sorbonne 
University in 1710 if he might legally impose a new tax, the dixieme 
in wartime. The tax was repealed after the war ended. That respect 
may explain why Louis did not feel free to reform the tax system in 
toto although advised to do so by his more radical ministers like 
Boisguilbert and Vauban. The sales of offices, with their attendant 
privileges, was also widely interpreted by contemporaries as a 
guarantee against the possibility of royal despotism. But the 
French monarchy was becoming a prisoner of the system of privilege 
it had created - by the end of the seventeenth century, it is esti-
mated that there were nearly 46,000 office holders in France. (69) 
Furthermore, while the Parlements were unable to impose any consti-
tutional checks on the crown, Louis "could not compel them to enforce 
his laws. He could not overcome their numbing bureaucratic 
. ." (70) d . 
Lnert~a • In or er to have hLS laws enforced by the privileged, 
Louis had often to resort to bribes. And finally the poor communi-
cations in France at the time also counted against the king exercising 
unrestrained power at all times. Thus an uncritical application of 
"absolute" in the sense of unrestrained power to the reign of Louis 
69. J.S. Morrill, 'French Absolutism as Limited Monarchy'. 
(Review Article) The Historical Journal, Vol. 21, no. 4, 
1978, p.972. 
70. op.cit., p.966. 
XIV will lead a historian to misunderstand the nature of the Sun 
King's power. 
145 
Theories provide the historian with further presuppositions. But 
these too may have to be amended or rejected insofar as they are 
put forward as hypotheses to be tested (refuted) against evidence 
available. Burke, for example, has advocated a close rapprochement 
between history and sociology, arguing that sociological theories 
will give historians an acute sense of structure, while sociologists 
. d· h f h (71) H h are prov1de w1th a s arp sense 0 c ange. owever, t ere are 
historians who refuse to use theories "borrowed" from outside the 
period being studied. Elton, for example, calls history a craft 
with its own unique disciplines and skills. The historian must 
therefore use his own intuitive perception which has been histori-
cally trained and bring this to bear on his sources, aiming at an 
"intuitive understanding of an age from the outside". Elton goes 
on to claim that "all the possible positions were worked out 
quite early, to be repeated in resounding counter-part through 





He therefore rejects any contemporary theories of develop-
social change, or urbanization and the like as being 
for history, and is against a comparative approach. Barzun, 
too, argues that historians may not use technical terms (for 
example, terms from psycho-analysis) to explain the past until these 
terms have become part of ordinary language. (73) In terms of the 
idea of a mediation of frames of meaning, it is held that the views 
of Elton and Barzun are hermeneutically unacceptable. If contemporary 




Peter Burke, Sociology and History (1980). 
S.G. Checkland, 'The Historian as M:uel Builder', The 
Philosophical Journal, Vol. 6, 1969, pp.38-40. 
Jacques Barzun, 'History: The Muse and her Doctors' American .. . ' 
H1stor1cal Rev1ew, Vol. 77, no. 1, 1972. 
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can be no objection to their use. 
The usefulness of social theory in historical scholarship, is, for 
example, explicitly recognised by Barber. Drawing on the theory 
of social stratification (as expressed by Talcott Parsons and Robert 
K. Merton) she argues that that theory "gives uS ..• new insights 
, , , d f '1' bl" (74) B b into fam~l~ar mater~a1s an am~ ~ar pro ems • ar er uses 
that theory to throw light on an aspect of the French Revolution of 
1789, namely why it was that the bourgeoisie became self-consciously 
revolutionary at that time. The need for such an explanation is 
particularly relevant if one accepts the kind of analysis given by 
Porchnev in terms of which the bourgeoisie in the period of the 
Ancien Regime are interpreted as being "feudalized". 
According to theory, social classes, that is groups of families who 
" , (75) 
treat each other as equals, operate as a system of strat~f~cat~on. 
The system has as its function the integration of the evaluations 
made by people ~n a society, and therefore "it provides the regularity 
and stability of expectation that is essential to all social 
action". (76) For there must be widespread consensus about the stand-
ards according to which people are evaluated, and the categories used 
in these evaluations are related to the functional needs of the society. 
Societies do, however, vary in the emphasis given to functional needs 
as criteria of evaluation, and therefore, in the extent to which class 
lines are rigidly enforced. In a continuum which expresses attitudes 
to social mobility, the extremes are the caste and the open class 
system respectively. In the former, the status of the individual 
remains fixed throughout his life, and there exists too a strong 
moral disapproval of social mobility. The opposite is the case in 
the open class system where social mobility is institutionalised and 
, b' , (77) 
~s su Ject to moral approbat~on. 
74. Elinor G. Barber, The Bourgeoisie ~n Eighteenth Century France 
(1955), pp.vii-viii. 
75. op.cit., p.4. 
76. op.cit., p.3. 
77. op.cit., pp.4-5. 
Barber argues that during the eighteenth century, prior to about 
. (78) 
1780, French society represents a m1xture of both systems. 
In short there were therefore two contradictory sets of norms, 
namely one which approved of, and one which disapproved of, 
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social mobility. The latter was a heritage of the medieval feudal 
tradition which institutionalised a caste system in terms of which 
the status of an individual depended on his birth. On the other 
hand, there were two ways for the bourgeoisie to enter into the 
noble class and achieve enhanced social prestige. Marriage, 
evidence of having attained a noble lifestyle, and gaining 
social recognition on the basis of one's intellectual abilities 
constituted the informal path. The formal way was through the 
purchase of offices which either conferred nobility or enhanced 
social prestige, or both. The social mobility of the roturiers 
and especially the wealthy bourgeoisie, was sanctioned because it 
was felt that the financial success of the bourgeoisie should 
be justly rewarded by society. This was thought essential because 
commerce was not held in high esteem in eighteenth century 
(79 
France. Members of the bourgeoisie therefore tended not to 
reinvest money 1n commerce and industry, rather using their 
profits to buy offi~es or provide themselves with a lifestyle 
. (80) appropr1ately noble. 
Barber goes on to argue that as the monarchy grew weaker after Louis 
XIV, and the power of the nobles grew correspondingly stronger, 
the latter were able to close the gates to ennoblement and enhanced 
social prestige. This was manifested in the so-called Aristocratic 
Reaction. Thus by 1788 there was not a single roturier in the govern-
ment (apart from Necker), nor amongst the high ranking officers of 
the army, nor at the head of any of the dioceses. (81) 
78. op.cit., p.5. Of course social mobility was restricted to the 
wealthier bourgeoisie, and excluded peasants, artisans and 
labourers. 
79. op.cit., p.6l. 
80. This attacks the notion of the bourgeoisie as a self-conscious 
capitalist prior to 1780. 
81. op.cit., p.143. 
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The large discrepancy between bourgeois expectations of social 
mobility and the actuality of the Aristocratic Reaction initially 
provoked moral indignation. As the financial situation of the 
crown worsened, the bourgeoisie translated its discontent into a 
criticism of the political, economic and social bases of the 
Ancien Regime, and there was a growing call for the bourgeoisie 
to have political power commensurate with its economic power and 
the ability of members of its class. Thus the rigidification of 
the class system of theAncienRegime precipitated the alienation 
from that system of those bourgeoisie affected by the closure of 
opportunity for acquiring social prestige and for ennoblement. (82) 
The use of a sociological theory, applied in accordance with the 
notion of the double hermeneutic, has thus provided an explanation 
for the revolutionizing by 1789 of those wealthier bourgeoisie 
who had previously been prepared and able to fulfil their 
ambitions within the structures of the Ancien Regime. 
Enlarging on this argument, Lucas has suggested that the decision by 
the Parlement of Paris that the Estates-General be constituted as 
it was in 1614, and demanding far more stringent conditions for 
entry into the second estate than previously, suddenly and arti-
ficially reimposed the frontier between noble and non-noble in a 
(83) 
rlramatic way. For these bourgeoisie, many whom had been recently 
ennobled and whose life-style duplicated that of nobles, now found 
themselves identified "not merely with the trading classes but also 
with the manual labourers and the vile and abject poor". (84) Lucas 
proposes that Le Chapelier for example, "discovered his revolutionary 





Colin Lucas, 'Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French 
Revolution', Past and Present, no. 60, 1973, p.120. 
op.cit., p.12l. 
. . ,,(85) 
the electoral assembly of the Breton nob1l1ty. 
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Returning to the notion of a point of V1ew, it is clear that the 
selection of any such point of view from which certain kinds of 
questions are directed at the past does, in one sense, limit the 
historian's V1S10n. Yet, 1n another sense, it provides the 
opportunity to view the past from that point of view with a 
breadth of vision. Indeed historians need not feel apologetic 
in that they necessarily adopt a relative point of view, for that 
relativity is a necessary condition for opening up the past in 
different ways to the historian's understanding. To illustrate 
these points two approaches to the Reformation will be dealt 
with briefly, namely the historical materialist and psycho-
historical points of view. 
According to the historical materialist V1ew the Reformation and 
the Peasant War together constitute "an early, still immature form 
of bourgeois revolution .•• the early bourgeois revolution in 
(86) . 
Germany". As such they form part of the "bourge01s-
revolutionary transition from feudalism to capitalism". (87) In 
the final analysis the origins and nature of the Reformation and 
Peasant War were not religious but were rooted in a revolutionary 
opposition to feudalism. But because of the dominant role played 
by the Catholic Church in feudal society, all revolutionary 
political and social doctrines were always also heretical 
doctrines. (88) 
85. Ibid. 
86. Rainier Wohlfeil, "The Peasant War in Germany" by Friedrich 
Engels - 125 years after ' , Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 
3, no. 1, 1975, p. 98. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Friedrich Engels, 'The Marxist Interpretation of Luther', 1n 
The Peasant War in Germany, in H.G. Koenigsberger (ed). 
Luther: A Profile (1973), pp.98-99. 
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Critics have questioned the sense Ln which the Reformation and Peasant 
, (89) 
War can be justified as an early bourgeois revolutLon. The 
historical materialist argue·s that tension between employers and 
workers, between landlord and tenant, was becoming more intense 
in the sixteenth century. This conflict arose because of structural 
changes in production and the organisation of labour, changes 
associated with the beginnings of the capitalist mode of production 
, (90) 
in industry and agr1culture. The contradictions arising from 
the conjunction of the feudal mode of production and the beginnings 
of elements of capitalist production produced the first signs of 
class conflict which demanded a revolutionary solution. But the 
subjective and objective conditions for a bourgeois revolution were 
immature, and it is not yet possible to speak of a self-conscious 
bourgeois class; rather Marxist historians refer to the capitalist 
h ' d . h b ,,(91) burgher class w 1ch was to evelop Lnto t e ourgeoLs1e. 
The Marxist characterisation of the Reformation and Peasant war 
(sic) is also justified on the grounds that both were anti-feudal. 
In order to ensure the expansion of capitalism and the development and 
growth of the bourgeoisie, those institutions which limited that 
progress in both urban and rural areas had to be altered or elimin-
ated. In particular the growing economic power of the burgher class 
needed to be expressed in terms of political power. This required 
that the power of the feudal sector and spiritual territorial 
authorities be broken. The attack by the reformers on corruption 
within the Catholic Church was an attack on one of the fundamental 
pillars of feudal society. Not only was the Church an important 
89. Wohlfeil, op.cit., p.102. 
90. Eugene F. Rice (Jr). The Foundations of Early Modern Europe 
1460-1559 (1970), Chapter 2. 
91. Gunt:r Vogler, 'The Peasant War in Germany', Journal of Peasant 
StudLes, Vol. 3, no. 1, 1975, p.lll. 
land-owner, but it also possessed political influence. Moreover 
theology dominated intellectual activity, this being "an 
inevitable consequence of the fact that the Church was the all-
embracing synthesis and the most general sanction of the existing 
. . ,,(92) 
feudal dom1nat10n . 
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The programme of the reformers, including the dissolution of 
monasteries, the abolition of the special privileges of the clergy 
and the end of the tithe was, furthermore, one which was ultimately 
in the interests of the urban burghers, and directly or indirectly 
. (93) 
contributed to the grow1ng power of that class. The demands of 
the most famous of all peasant programmes, namely The Twelve 
Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasantry, clearly challenged the 
. (94) 
bases of feudal soc1ety. These articles show a connection 
with the development of capitalism in the countryside, a process 
which had begun 1n the fourteenth century, resulting in a disappear-
ance of serfdom 1n much of Western Europe. In the sixteenth century, 
faced with a price rise, landlords had begun to put pressure on 
peasants, enforcing feudal dues and rights previously abandoned, 
(95) 
and appropriating the commons and woods for themselves alone. 
Luther's preachings enabled the peasants to voice long-standing 
complaints in evangelical terms, justified by the Scriptures. 
Of course the struggle against the Church, where successful, was not 
enough to overcome the contradictions within feudalism. Neverthe-
less, in the final analysis, the Reformation and Peasant War must be 
seen as the first in a series of revolutionary processes leading to 
the epoch of bourgeois revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
92. Engels, op.cit., p.98. 
93. Vogler, op.cit., p.114. 
94. Peter Blickle, 'The Economic, Social and Political Background 
of the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants of 1525' , 
Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 3, no. 1, 1975 
95. Rice, op.cit., pp.58-65. -See also E.K. Hunt, Property and 
Prophets: The Evolution of Economic Institutions and 
Ideologies (1978), pp.16-l7 . 
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centuries. The historical materialist interpretation of the Reform-
ation and Peasant War does not ignore factors such as the corruption 
in the church, the struggle between the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
Papacy, the roles of Luther, Calvin and others. But it seeks to 
determine what ultimately were the parameters within which these 
factors were to prove decisive. 
Erikson's study of Luther has focussed on the specific religious 
crises which initiated the course of events known as the Reformation. 
ConcentratingonLuther's own writings, Erikson does not mention the 
social and economic conditions of the period. His study of Luther 
attempts to elucidate the nature and course of Luther's revelatory 
experience making use of psycho-analytic insights. Drawing on his 
close examination of Luther's writings during that period of his 
life, Erikson writes that his intention is "to demonstrate that 
Luther's redefinition of man's condition - while part and parcel of 
his theology - has striking configurational parallels with inner 
dynamic shifts like those which clinicians recognise in the recovery 
of individuals from psychic distress. In brief, I will try to indi-
cate that Luther, in laying the foundation for a 'religiosity for the 
adult man', displayed the attributes of his own hard won adulthood; 
his renaissance of faith portrays a vigorous recovery of his own 
. .. . ,,( 96) . , . 
ego-~n~t~at~ve . Er~kson s analyses lead h~m to make the claim 
that "the characteristics of Luther's theological advance can be com-
pared to certain steps in psychological maturation, which every man 
must take: the internalisation of the father-son relationship; 
the concomitant crystallisation of consc~ence; the safe establish-
ment of an identity as a worker and man; and the concomitant 
96. E.H. Erikson, 'The Search for Identity', in Koenigsberger, 
op. cit., pp.112-3. 
. . b' " (97) 
reaff~rmat~on of as~c trust . 
(ii) Questions, dialectic and self-understanding 
It follows from the discussion above that there are, as Gadamer 
terms them, both "productive" prejudices that make understanding 
possible, and those that "hinder" understanding or promote mis-
. (98) 
understand~ng. But the latter cannot be known in advance; 
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they are uncovered in the act of understanding, that is in a self-
reflective act of understanding, which is open to the otherness of 
the obj ect so ·:that the text "as other's meaning can be isolated 
and valued on its own". (99) This act of understanding, in which 
the horizon of the historian merges with that of the object, involves 
d "'.. , " (100) I what Ga amer calls effect~ve h~stor~cal consc~ousness . t 
seeks to be aware of its prejudgments, to control its preunderstand-
ing in its openness to the past. It recognises the historicality 
of both historian and event, and the relationship between them as a 
merging of horizons . . Yet it retains the "otherness" of the past, 
. . "'" (101) respect~ng ~ts autonomy to speak for ~tself. 
The openness of effective historical consciousness has, as Gadamer 
argues, the structure of a question. Indeed the structure of a 
question is implicit in the presence of str'angeness or unfamiliarity 
. d' ,(102) , , 
~n our or ~nary exper~ence. . Recall~ng Popper s image of a 
searchlight, Gadamer writes that it is the question which places 
what is being investigated into perspective. But the openness of a 
question cannot be unbounded, being limited by the historian's 
horizon as well as by the horizon of the past event. (103) Further-
more, bringing to mind Popper's characterisation of science as 
progressing by trial and error, Gadamer writes that knowing what 
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• • 11 
for "presuppos~t~on • 
There is no such thing as a method of learning to 
ask questions, of learning to see what needs to 
be questioned. (104) , 
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Some questions are generated by the historical tradition surrounding 
the event; others by the event itself; others are only apparent 
after a prolonged dialogue with the past. Questions may originate 
"outside" the event in that the historian, inspired by recent 
developments in the social sciences, for example, may seek to explore 
new and different points of view on the event. Gadamer also speaks 
of the role of the imagination in stimulating questions. 
"Imagination" he argues, "naturally has a hermeneutic function ..• it 
serves the ability to expose real, productive questions, something 
in which generally speaking, only he who masters all the methods of 
his science succeeds". (105) There are also "sudden ideas" which, 
h 
.. . (106). h says Gadamer, open t e s1tuat10n for the 1nterpreter. H1rsc 
also suggests that guesses play an important role in the production 
. (107) of quest1ons. Criticising any notion that a reliable method-
ology of interpretation can be built on a set of canons, Hirsch 
says that "no possible set of rules or rites of preparation can 
generate ' or compel an insight into what an author means". (108) He 
therefore proposes that the act of understanding is, at first, a 
guess but "there are no methods for making •.• guesses, no rules for 
generating insights". But he goes on to say that "the methodolog-
ical activity of interpretation commences when we begin to test and 
. . . " (109) cr1t1c1se our guesses • However, as has been argued, the 
activity of understanding and interpretation begins when the his-
torian proceeds to read primary and secondary sources, when in his 
preliminary identification and characterisation of an event, he begins 
the filling out of the fore-structure of his understanding. This 






Gadamer, PH, p.12. 
Gadame~ TM, p.329. 




preunderstanding precedes and generates the guesses which have a 
bearing on the event in question. 
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Thus, as was the case with presuppositions, Gadamer speaks of two 
kinds of questions: firstly those which, in his words, "inhibit" 
the state of openness, for the past is unable to answer them, and 
secondly, the genuinely productive questions which open up POSS1-
bilities of further questioning and hence help to render the past 
intelligible. (110) Many questions will only become apparent if 
the historian persists in his openness, or as Gadamer would have 
it, in the exercise of the Socratic dialectic: 
Dialectic, as the art of asking questions proves 
itself only because the person who knows how to 
ask questions is able to persist in his question-
ing, which involves being able to preserve his 
orientation towards openness. (111) 
Dialectic is thus "the art of conducting a conversation" and this 
implies listening to what the other says. (112) Lawrence, 1n the 
same context, speaks of partners in the "human historical conver-
sation". (113) As has been argued, this dialectic may be regarded 
as an attempt to recreate the speech situation, to understand the 
event in its own terms. But it has relevance with regard to in-
terpretations of the fuller meaning of an event. Gadamer writes: 
The understanding of a text has not begun at all as 
long as the text remains mute. But a text can begin 
to speak ... when it does begin to speak, however, it 
110. Gadamer, TM, p.327. 
111. op.cit., ~330. 
112. op.cit., p.33. 
113. Fred Lawrence, 'Responses to "Hermeneutics and Social 
Science"', Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 2, 1975, p.32l. E.P. 
Thompson's "historical logic" is also characterised above 
all by the dialogue conducted between the historian and 
evidence. (Thompson, op.cit., p.23l, p.235). 
does not simply speak its word, always the same, 
in lifeless rigidity" but gives ever new answers 
to the person who questions it and poses ever new 
questions to him who answers it. (114) 
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To illustrate the above, consideration will be given to an aspect 
of the European witch-craze of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 
An essential component of that craze was the belief in the witch's 
flight to secret sabbats, during which rituals were performed which 
. f h" h' (115) Th . were a del~berate travesty 0 C r1st1an wors ~p. e ~mage 
of witches on their broomsticks was widespread and persistent through-
out the witch hunts. Until the fifteenth century the Catholic 
Church officially disclaimed belief in the power of witches to fly 
through the air. This denial was expressed in the Canon Episcopi 
issued about AD 900. It reads: 
.•. It is also not to be omitted t4at some wicked 
women perverted by the devil, seduced by illusions 
and phantasms of devils, believe and profess 
themselves, in the hours of night, to ride upon 
certain beasts with Diana, the goddess of pagans, 
and an innumerable multitude of women, and in the 
silence of the dead of night to traverse great spaces 
of earth, and to obey her commands as of their 
mistress, and to be summoned to her service on 
certain nights. (116) 
Nevertheless, in the fourteenth century the reality of the witch's 
flight was accepted at some sorcery trials. Lea, reporting on one 




Gadamer, PH, p.57. 
For d~scriptionsof those proceedings see Montague Summers, 
The H~story of Witch-craft (1974) Chapter 4, Ben-Yehuda 
Nachman, 'The European Witch-craze of the Fourteenth to 
Seve~teenth Centuries: A Sociologist's Perspective', 
Amer~can Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, no. 1, 1980, pp.5-6. 
Henry Charles Lea, Materials Towards a History of Witchcraft, 
Vol. 1, (1957), pp.178-9. 
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who "under torture confessed that many years ago a tall, dark man 
with fiery eyes and clothed in ' skins appeared while she was 
washing and asked if she would give herself to him, to which she 
assented. He breathed in her ear and the next Saturday, by the 
. bb ,,(117) 
mere effort of her w~ll, she was transported to Sa at • 
By the fifteenth century, night flying on a broomstick was firmly 
accepted as evidence in the witchcraft trials, as well as in the 
treatises on the subject during that period. The belief was, of 
course, necessary in order to explain the ability of witches to 
cover great distances ~n a short time to attend sabbats, during 
which the Devil would issue instructions for the performance of 
ma~eficiwn. (118) In a treatise by the inquisitor Sylvestor 
Prierias written in 1504, the Canon Episcopi is reinterpreted as 
follows: 
I say therefore that the Cap. Episcopi seems 
to prohibit the belief that witches are really 
carried to the Sabbat, because, although it does 
not speak of witches, but of a different sect, 
as has been proved, still it seems to speak of 
them in so much as concerns that disbelief in 
real transport. But I say that, though it says 
those things are done in dreams, because almost 
always they are done in dream and rarely in the 
body, yet it does not prohibit belief in the 
real bodily transport as regards motion and 
space, but as regards all that occurs, 
especially the sight of the goddess without 
deception. (119). 
At a trial in Annency in Savoy in 1477 the accused Antoine testi-
fied that "a dark man" gave her a stick eighteen inches long and 
a pot of ointment. When she had annointed that stick with the 
ointment, she was to place it between her legs, saying, "Go, ~n 
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The importance of the change in attitude to the idea of witch 
flights has been pointed out by Cohn. Thus witch hunting was able 
to reach massive proportions only once "the authorities themselves 
accepted the reality of the nocturnal journeying". (121) For 
massive killings occurred "only when supposed witches were forced 
(122) 
by torture to denounce others whom they had seen at the sabbat". 
Midelfort reiterates this point writing that "torture led 
invariably to denunciation, which in turn led to further trials. 
. d d h h .. 1 d d ,,(123) It ~s easy to un erstan ow t ese pan~c tr~a s ••• expan e •..• 
Historians have come to terms with the evidence which testifies to 
these flights. For example, in a tract written by Paulus Grilland 
in 1525, he describes an incident which occurred in a village near 
Rome; 
I gave an example occurr~ng about twenty years ago. 
when a peasant in a village near Rome had a wife of 
the Express Profession. He repeatedly asked her 
if she were, which she earnestly denied; but suspecting 
her he kept watch and one night when she was summoned 
he pretended sleep and watched her and saw her take 
from a chest a small pot of ointment, strip herself, 
anoint herself and fly from the house. (124) 
In a series of trials held in Franche-Comte during the summer of 
1598, this kind of evidence is typical: 
120. op.cit., p.239. 
121. Cohn, op.cit., p.224. 
122. op.cit., p.254. 
123. H.C. Erik Midelfort, Witch Hunting ~n South-Western Germany 
1562-1684 (1972), p.97. 
124. Lea, op.cit., p.403. 
Francoise Secretain avowed that in order to go to 
the Sabbat she placed a white stick between her 
legs and then uttered certain words and then she 
was borne through the air to the •.. assembly. (125) 
Trevor-Roper's outright rejection of the phenomenon of flying is 
reflected clearly in this passage: 
Every night these ill-advised ladies were annointing 
themselves with 'devil's grease', made out of the fat 
of murdered infants, and, thus lubricated, were 
slipping through cracks and keyholes and up chimneys, 
mounting on broomsticks or spindles or airborne goats, 
and flying off on a long and inexpressibly wearisome 
aerial journey to a diabolical rendezvous, the 
witches' sabbat. (126) 
But can one, like Trevor-Roper, simply dismiss this widespread 
belief in witches' flight as a consequence of the creation and 
perpetuation of a stereotype "by social fear out of popular 
.. .. • ?" (127) 
superst1t1on w1th1n an 1ntellectually approved cosmology. 
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As an interesting contrast to Trevor-Roper, Summers accepts that there 
were indeed witches. He writes: 
There were some great superstitions; there were 
some unbridled imaginations; there was deception 
there was legerdemain; there was phantasy; there 
was fraud; ••• yet when every allowance has been 
made, every possible explanation exhausted, there 
persists a congeries of solid proven fact which 
cannot be ignored •.. (128) 
125. Summers, op.cit., p.122. 
126. H.R. Trevor-Roper, The European Witch-craze of the 16th and 
17th Centuries (1969), p.15. 
127. op.cit., p.120. 
128. Summers, op.cit., p.4. 
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Moreover Summers argues that punishment of witches was justified, for 
"witchcraft blazed forth with unexampled virulence and ferocity, 
that it threatened the peace, nay in some degree, the salvation of 
mankind". (129) But even Summers is unable to accept uncritically 
the phenomenon of witches' flight. True he does accept that levi-
tation occurs but this phenomenon "is only for a height of a foot 
or some eighteen inches, and even this occurs seldom save at moments 
, , , ,,(l30) S ' of great solemn~ty and psych~c concentrat~on . ummers 
v~ew is that witches go to the Sabbat "on foot, or horseback, or by 
some other means ••• " for he denies the existence of the broomstick 
, (l31) 
"mode of aer~al transport". 
But the fact ~s that historically, flying was an integral part of the 
witch-craze. Recently a theory, which seems to provide historians 
with an answer to the meaning of that phenomenon, has been suggested 
by investigations by anthropologists on the use of hallucinogenic 
drugs to achieve trance states. As Harner points out, "one of the 
most typical aspects of the shamanistic experience is the change 
into another state of consciousness, often called a trance, with the 
h f l ' h h' k' , ,,(l32) ( s aman ee ~ng t at e ~s ta ~ng a Journey . And, as Harner 
observes, the phrase "taking a trip" in current usage is no 
"d ) (l33) , , 
co~nc~ ence • As ~s clear from accounts quoted earl~er des-
cribing the witches' flight, European witches rubbed their bodies 
, h ' (l34) " 
w~t an o~ntment. From rec~pes wh~ch have survived we know 
129. op.cit., pp.124-127. 
130. op.cit., p.129. 
131. op.cit., p.122. 
132. Michael J. Harner, 'The Role of Hallucinogenic Plants in 
European Witchcraft', in Harner (ed), Hallucinogens and 
Shamanism (1973), p.xii. 
l33. Ibid. 
134. In his work The Golden Ass, Apu1eius (born c.A.Dl14) also 
described how the witch Pampi1e turned into an owl by smear-
ing her naked body with an ointment. 
Apu1eius, The Golden Ass (1950), p.88. 
161 
that these "flying" ointments contained ingredients such as belladonna, 
datura and henbane - in short, drugs which are known to have 
hallucinogenic properties. (I'35) One of the features of belladonna 
(atropine) is that it can be absorbed through the skin. The image 
of the witch mounted on her broomstick must not therefore, as Harner 
has pointed out, be seen simply as a phallic symbol. For the broom-
stick served as an applicator for applying the concoction to the sen-
s~t~ve vaginal membranes, the fatty base facilitating the absorption 
. (136) 
of the drugs through the sk~n. Corroboration that the ointment 
135. Harner, op.cit., p.l29. See also Venetia Newall, The Encylo-
paedia of Witchcraft and Magic (1974), p.84. 
Murray has given examples of formulae for "flying" ointment. 
One such formula reads: 
Baby's fat 
Juice of Water Parsnip 
Aconite 
Cinquefoil 
Dead1~ nightshade (belladonna) 
Soot 
M.A. Murray, The Witch-Cult in Western Europe: A study ~n 
Anthropology (1921), p.279. 
Allen has also suggested that witches may have used the skins 
of toads which contain an hallucinogen, called bufotenin. 
The traditional association between witches and toads, as seen 
in pictures and accounts of witchcraft at that time, is we11-
known. 
Andrew Allen, 'Toads: The Biochemistry of the Witches' 
Cauldron: History Today, Vol. 29, 1979, p.267. 
136. Harner, op.cit., p.131. 
Burland, on the other hand, has stressed the sexual symbolism 
of the broomstick: 
The broom was an instrument which swept away dirt. It was 
a symbol of purification, and in particular purification 
through sex. The broom was an image of pubic hair, and 
its handle was the erect penis. It was ridden astride like 
a hobby horse and became an excitant, almost performing a 
masturbatory function. It was imagined that the witches 
sped through the air on their magical errands riding the 
broomsticks. This has provided the world of art with many 
beautiful pictures of pulchritudinous girls learning the 
art of broom riding from a group of early hags. There was 
little truth in it, but not much, and if there was any 
levitation it was under very special conditions rather like 
those of a seance room. 
C.A. Burland, Echoes of Magic (1972), p.125. 
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does indeed induce the sensation of f l ying has been provided by 
Professor Will-Erich Peukert of Gottingen who made such a 
"flying" ointment according to a seventeenth century formula. 
Reporting on his experience, Peukert described that he and some of 
his colleagues rubbed the ointment on their foreheads and armpits 
after which they slept for twenty-four hours. During this time 
"they dreamed of wild rides, frenz i ed dancing, and other weird 
. . . " (137) 
adventures of the type connected w1th med1eval org1es • 
Hence, as Harner says, "once the use and effects of these natural 
hallucinogens are understood the major features of past beliefs 
and practices (of the witch-craze) suddenly seem quite logical and 
consistent". (138) 
Interestingly there is evidence showing that there were some con-
temporaries who understood the hallucinogenic properties of the 
witches ointment . 
137. 
138. 
•.. Nider relates that his preceptor told him of a 
Dominican who, on reaching a village, found a "feminam 
dementatem" - so demented t hat she imagined herself 
to fly by night with Diana. He sought to disabuse 
her and she promised to show him. On an appointed 
night he came with trustworthy witnesses, she placed 
herself in a pannier and rubbed herself with ointment 
while muttering spells, and fell asleep, with dreams 
of Domina Venus and other superstitons so vivid that 
she moved and fell to the f loor, injuring her head 
but still laying in stupor. When she awoke he asked. 
Harner, op.cit., p.139. Of course, given the circumstances, 
they may well have expected to experience that type of 
dream. Harner gives further evidence, however, quoting 
Schenk's experiences after inhal ing the smoke of burning 
henbane; he also quotes Castenada's account of his 
experiences after applying da t ura ointment to his body. 
Harner, op.cit., p.138. 
Anticipating Harner's argument (and not ment ioned by him) 
Dr. Ludwig Mejer in his work Die Periode der Hexenprocesse 
(1882) also claimed that t he visions and dreams caused by 
the drugs used by the witches were so impressive that witches, 
once sober, believed these t o be t r ue. Lea, op.cit .• 1076. 
her if she had been with Diana, when he had witnessed 
that she had not left the pl ace, and with wholesome 
exhortations he led her to detest her error. Joh. 
Nider, Formicarius 1. ii, c.4 (ed. Argentinae, 1517, 
fol. 25), (139) 
Nevertheless, as the sources collected by Lea suggest, this was 
not the view which prevailed when the craze was as its height. 
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Harner's theory, which is also an example of the double hermeneutic, 
therefore helps to open an aspect of the past for the historian's 
understanding of the fuller historical meaning of the phenomenon 
in question. 
Insofar as "understanding consists in the working out of a 
projection which is certainly constantly revised by what results 
" " h "" (140) d d"" from further penetrat~on ~nto t e mean~ng , un erstan ~ng ~s 
also, therefore, always self-understanding. Thus as Gadamer says, 
"To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a kind of 
dialogue". (141) Expressing this idea more fully Gadamer writes: 
Only through hermeneutic reflection am I no longer 
unfree over and against myself, but rather can deem 
freely what in my preunderstanding may be justified 
and what unjustifiable. And also only in this 
manner do I learn to gain a new understanding of 
what I have seen through eyes conditioned by preju-
dice. But this implies, too, that the prejudgments 
that lead my preunderstanding are also constantly 
at stake, right up to the moment of their surrender, 
which surrender could also be called a transformation. 
(l42) . 
Midelfort is an example. of a histor i an who is explicitly self-
reflective. His concern was to account for the witch hunts ~n 
south western Germany, and having familiarised himself with the 
historical tradition surrounding the interpretation of the witch-
139. Lea, op.cit., p.l?7. 
140. Gadamer, TM, p.25 2 . 
141. Gadamer, PH, p.57. 
142. op.cit., P:38. 
craze phenomenon, he introduced his own study with an evaluation 
of various points of view. He has argued that these cannot be 
accepted uncritically without conducting a dialogue with the 
events in question. Thus he writes for example: 
•.• the defenders of psychological history have on 
occasion concluded that certain mental aberrations 
evident in such famous witchcraft manuals as the 
Malleus Maleficarum can explain all subsequent witch 
hunts. According to these theories, the celibate 
inquisitors projected their own feelings of guilt 
and deprivation onto women, who of course consti-
tuted for them acute. temptation. (143) 
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Midelfort goes on to point out that examination of source material 
reveals that in Germany the courts of inquisition during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were "composed of laymen 
with wives and families". (144) He therefore adds that this kind 
of generalised psychological approach is inadequate to the study 
of witchcraft. However Midelfort's own conclusion may be somewhat 
sweeping for inquisitors were supposedly celibate. The methods of 
establishing the guilt of a witch, which included stripping her, 
shaving off her body hair and searching her skin minutely for the 
. , d ., (145) . d ..{!. • Dev1l s mark an the W1tch s mark, prov1 e pr1-ma J ac'te eV1dence 
for further attempts to test that theory for its explanatory value 
in the example above. 
143. Midelfort, op.cit., p.5. 
144. Ibid. 
145. The Devil's mark was an insensitive spot on the witch's body 
where the Devil had marked her as a sign of their covenant. 
These marks were detected by pricking with a sharp pin to 
reveal the insensitivity of the spot (Hence the emergence 
of the profession of 'prickers', see Summers, op.cit., p.74). 
The Witch's mark was a supernumerary teat from which 
f~iliars might suck. Jeffrey B. Russell, A History of 
W1thcraft, Sorcerers, and Pagans (1980), pp.80-8l. 
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The hermeneutic circle of understanding, as has been argued, also 
involves the operation of a "sub-circle", the wholes-part circle. 
Thus movement towards understanding involves the transformation of 
partial understanding through the mediation of frames of meaning, 
but this depends on the perpetual movement by the historian from 
the particular to the totality and back; hence what was previously 
obscure, unfamiliar and unintelligible is rendered more clear, more 
familiar and more intelligible, so that there is a coherence of 
parts and whole within a particular context. It ought to be noted, 
that while it might seem that the idea of a hermeneutic of history, 
insofar as it includes the notion of a double hermeneutic, implies 
that understanding proceeds in a linear sequence, this may not 
necessarily be the case. The path towards an increasingly trans-
parent understanding of the past, as it occurs within the hermeneutic 
circle, is often haphazard, messy and confused. 
To conclude the discussion in this chapter, it 1S clear that there 
are many possible points of view which have been and may be taken 
with respect to the past. Present concerns, reflecting what the 
past means to the historian and the acquisition of new evidence, 
will continue to be influential 1n directing historical focus. 
Thus Thompson, for example, writes as follows: 
Each age, or each practitioner, may propose new 
questions to the historical evidence, or may bring 
new levels of evidence to light. In this case 
"h· " ( h . 1story w en cons1dered as the products of 
historical enquiry) will change, and ought to 
change, with the pre-occupations of each gene-
ration, or, as it may be, each sex, each nation, 
each social class. But this by no means implies 
that the past events themselves change with each 
questioner, or that the evidence is indeterminate. 
Disagreements between historians may be of many 
kin~s, but they remain as mere exchanges of 
.att~tude, or exercises of ideology, unless it is 
agreed that they are conducted within a common 
discipline, whose pursuit is objective knowledge. 
(146) 
146. Thompson, op.cit., pp.232-3. 
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Interpretative variety ~s endorsed in this thesis. Different pre-
suppositions may be compared to a grid; the historian's visions 
of the past, operating as a search light pass~ng through that grid, 
provide "pictures" of particular phenomena which may be quali-
tatively different, even although there may be some features 
shared by all pictures. However, each point of view must be justi-
fied pragmaticaZZy. The ultimate justification for any point of 
view adopted in accordance with the particular choice of the 
historian, becomes evident insofar as it leads him toward under-
standing in his encounter with the past, effected within the herm-
eneutic circle. At stake thus, is the richness of that point of 
view's conceptual framework, its ability to generate new theories, 
the way it focusses attention on hitherto unexplained areas of 
research, and hence also its success in the stimulation of 
h d 1 ' 11' , (147) met 0 0 og~ca y ~nnovat~ve research programmes. Assessments 
as to the merits of respective points of view cannot therefore be 
made a pr~or~. It is furthermore argued in this thesis that the 
notion of an ideal rational community, as suggested in .Habermas' 
concept of an idealized dialogue, may provide the medium for 
adjudication on that appropriateness and merit by any group of 
f ' 1 h' , (148) pro ess~ona ~stor~ans. 
147. These criteria are derived from Bernstein, op.cit., p.448. 
148. Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MORAL JUDGMENTS AND OBJECTIVITY 
(i) Moral judgments 
The self-critical historian reflecting on the nature of history, ~s 
bound also to question the relevance of that discipline. There 
are, it seems. fundamentally two answers to this question. 
Firstly, there are historians who identify with what Connell-
Smith calls the "professional" or "antiquarian" approach, insist-
ing that "the past must be studied for its own sake regardless of 
. f· h ,,(1) Th .. . d ~ts relevance or us ~n t e present... • e past ~s ~nvest~gate 
"from within", "on its own terms", problems being seen as the people 
involved saw them. (2) It is clear that this is hermeneutically 
unacceptable, for the approach ignores the importance of what is 
future to an event as a constitutive part of the meaning of the 
event, including the contribution made by the historian from his 
own perspective to that meaning. Each historian has what Troeltsch, 
like Gatterer, calls a standort , that is the historical, social, 
cultural and philosophical locus he occupies. (3) Furthermore, the 
standor t is also futural. Thus Stern writes: 
As in the physical sciences every calculation of a 
motion depends on the position of the observer, thus 
in history every standard i s irremedially determined 
by the spot where one is located, and at which it 
or~g~nates. It originates always as a living con-
nection with the formation of the future. (4) 
1. G. Connell-Smith and H.A. Ll oyd, The Relevance of History 
(1972), p. 44 . 
2. op.cit . , p.35. 
3. Alfred Stern, Philosophy of History and the Problem of Values 
(1962) , p.98. 
4. Stern, op.cit., p.22 . (Gatterer , who also e l ucidated the idea 
of a s tandort, ignored its f utural element). 
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As has already been pointed out, Dilthey's analysis of life 
revealed its essential temporality, so that past, present and 
future are all inextricably moments in understanding. Insofar as 
the historian is concerned with meaning, this includes both 
meaning of the past, as well as the present and future, the fuller 
historical mean~ng lying in the mediation of frames of meaning. 
Gadamer has argued that the interpreter does not try to disregard 
himself and his particular situation when attempting to under-
o 0 of h -;. 
stand the past; he relates the text to that s~tuat~on ~ e 
wants to understand at all. Understanding is therefore also 
always self-understanding. In short, "our present situation and 
our projects regarding the future influence our interpretations 
(5) 
of the historical past". Hence agreement is expressed with 
Connell-Smith who holds that society may reasonably demand that 
a professional historian not only satisfy its curiosity about the 
past, but that he also provide some guidance on present 
(6) 
problems. Hobsbawm makes the same kind of point arguing that 
"at all events the shape of the future is discerned by searching 
the process of past development for clues, so that paradoxically, 
the more we expect innovation, the more history becomes essential 
to discover what it will be like. This procedure may range from 
the very na~ve - the view of the future as a bigger and better 
present, or a bigger and worse present so characteristic of techno-
logical extrapolations or pessimistic social anti-utopias - to 
the intellectually very complex and high-powered; but essentially 
history remains the basis of both". (7) 
5. Ibid. 
6. Connell-Smith and Lloyd, op.cit., p.48. 
7. E.J. Hobsbawm, "The Social Function of the Past", Past and 
Present, no. 55, 1972. 
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It has already been argued that points of v~ew reflect present con-
cerns. Thus, for example, the development of herstory ~s a 
result of increasing interest in the role women have played ~n the 
past, an interest which is relevant to debates on the status and 
role of women in contemporary society. But, the question arises 
as to whether the concept of relevance also includes the pass~ng 
of moral judgments on the past. In other words, ought a historian 
to blame or praise the intentions of individuals and the foresee-
able consequence of their actions,(8) as well as institutions which 
allow or encourage behaviour judged to be evil or good. and in so 
doing act as moral educator? 
The role of moral judgments in the writing of history is a contentious 
one. Some historians, for example Butterfield. argue that the 
historian's task excludes the making of those kinds of ;udgments. 
for historians know too little to be ~n a position to judge. 
Stressing the need for humility on the part of the historian, (for 
only God is omniscient), and for the extension of charity to all men, 
Butterfield writes uncompromisingly: 
..• moral judgments on human beings are by their 
nature irrelevant to the enquiry and alien to 
the intellectual realm of scientific history. (9) 
Butterfield goes on to add that moral judgments may be a hindrance, 
and insofar as historians may use them for polemical purposes, these 
kinds of judgments can play "a great part in the generation of the 
. 1 . .. . ,,(10) 
nat~ona an~mos~t~es of our t~me . 
Commager;also writes that moral judgments are "arrogant" and 
"futile", and that readers do not require "moral instruction" 
8. Clearly to make such judgments about individuals presupposes 
that they knew what they were doing , and that they could 
have chosen to act differently. 
9. Herbert Butterfield, 'Moral Judgments in History', in Meyer-
hoff, op.cit., p.230. (Butterfield would have Hitler's mother 
write an intimate account of her son, for she "did not hate 
him too much"). 
10. op.cit., p.243. 
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" " (11) from a h~stor~an. 
The discussion so far has. however, begged the question as to 
whether it is LogicaLLY possible to write a neutral history. Dray 
has pointed out that "if the historians' value judgments are a 
consequence of the nature of their enquiry, it would make no sense 
for them ever to try to be 'neutral mirrors''', for the elimination 
" "b (12) B " of value judgments would not be log~cally poss~ Ie. ut, ~t 
may be asked, if the first part of Dray's proposition is true, does 
this entail that histories are subjective (personal) and arbitrary? 
Positivist philosophers, such as Nagel, ~n insisting on a clear dis-
tinction between fact and value, and on the methodological unity of 
all disciplines, argue that value judgments are not a necessary 
part of the writing of history. Nagel writes: 
Many writers maintain ••• that the selectivity of 
history is peculiar in that the historian is 
inescapably concerned with 'value-impregnated' 
subject matter ••• there appears to be no warrant 
for any of the various claims that the occurrences 
studied by historians are distinguished by some 
inherent differentiating feature from those that 
are not. Moreover, even when a historian is con-
cerned with admittedly value-impregnated subject 
matter or with occurrences manifesting various 
passions, it by no means follows that he must 
himself share or judge those values or passions. 
(13) 
Nagel has clarified the scope of the issue of moral judgments in 
history. Firstlv, is the historian's subject matter value-neutral? 
11. quoted by Wright, op.cit., p.6. 
12. Willi~ Dray, 'History and Value Judgments', Encyclopaedia 
of Ph~losophy (1967), Vol. 4, p.26. 
13. Ernest Nag~l, 'The Logic of Historical Analysis', in Meyer-
Hoff, op.c~t., pp.208-9. 
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If this is not the case, then secondly, does it follow that moral 
value judgments must necessarily (logically) enter in the writing 
of history? If not, then thirdly, is the idea of a morally-
committed history desirable? And finally, how do answers to these 
questions affect the question of objectivity in history? 
In accordance with their insistence on a clear distinction between 
fact and value, the positivists argue that we must first know some-
thing objectively before we evaluate it. While there may be certain 
linguistic difficulties in interpreting the facts objectively, 
because ordinary language, unlike that of science, is often vague 
and imprecise. this is not a question of principle: it is rather 
a practical problem and it is up to the historian to refine the 
(14) language he uses. But this argument has been challenged by Berlin, 
amongst others. Ordinary language, he argues, is not totally value-
free, and this is the language used by historians. While agreeing 
with Butterfield that "censoriousness, recrimination, moral or 
emotional blindness to the ways of life and outlooks of others, 
intellectual or ethical fanaticism, are VLces in the writing of 
history as in life", Berlin argues that moral value judgments 
. (15) 
are nevertheless a necessary part of the writing of hLstory. 
For facts are value-charged; historians use few if any concepts 
or categories peculiar to their discipline, (employing those of 
ordinary speech), and moreover they explain and elucidate as we do 
Ln ordinary life using "the same rich, scarcely analysable mixture 
of physiological and psychological, economic and biographical, 
aesthetic and ethical, causal and purposive concepts". (16) Hence, 
writes Berlin, "the invocation to historians to suppress even that 
minimal degree of moral psychological evaluation which is necessarily 
involved in viewing human beings as creatures with purposes and 
14. Dray,op.cit., p.27. 
15. Berlin, op.cit., p.263. 
16. op.cit., p.270. 
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and motive ..• seems to me to rest on a confusion of the aims and 
d · . h h f 1 sCl.·ence". (17) methods of the human stu l.es Wl.t t ose 0 natura 
Is Berlin correct? 
It has already been shown that hermeneutic thinkers have argued that 
it is a fact of our experl.ence that life is always interpreted as 
meaningful; thus what happens is always evaluated by individuals 
and groups in terms of certain criteria. Consider, therefore, a 
historian investigating Hitler's Third Reich, writing about the 
concentration camps set up by that regime. One of the uses to which 
such camps were put, was to offer inmates as the raw material for 
medical experiments to be conducted by S.S. doctors. In listing the 
kinds of experiments performed, Bullock describes how prisoners 
were subjected "to intense air pressure and intense cold until the 
'patient's' lungs burst or froze to d.eath; the infliction of gas 
gangarene wounds; injection with typhUS and jaundice; experiments 
with bone grafting; and a large number of investigations of steri-
lisation (for 'racial hygiene'), including castration and 
abortion". (18) Bullock quite properly calls these experiments 
" d 1" d k f h " ff . "f h . . (19) or ea s an spea sot e su erl.ngs 0 t e Vl.ctl.ms. 
For indeed this is what the experiments meant to the Jews. Further-
more, the terms "ordeals" and "sufferings" imply an attitude of 
moral disapprobation; they have negative connotations and convey 
the way the victims felt about the experiments. When therefore, a 
historian uses such terms, he is, l.n the first instance, indicating 
what the events meant to the Jews in question. Of course, an event 
will not always mean the same to all its contemporaries. For 
example, a bomb planted in a public plac~ may be interpreted by some 
as an act of courage by freedom fighters; to others it symbolises 
the viciousness of urban terrorism. Clearly, the moral connotations 
disclosed by each description are different. But the point is that 
17. op.cit., p.27l. 
18. Allan Bullock, Hitler: A Study l.n Tyranny (1962), p.700. 
19. Ibid. 
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insofar as the historian is concerned with what events meant to 
contemporaries, the language available for the elucidation of 
that meaning ~s not, and cannot be, neutral. As Atkinson has 
observed, "a consistently value-neutral terminology is simply not 
available for the discussion of human affairs. Absolute value-
neutrality would make it impossible to enga~e with the subject 
. (20) matter of h~story". However, it must be stressed that the 
fact that a historian uses terms like "ordeals", "sufferings" and 
"terrorist", does not LogicaUy imply that the historian himself 
disapproves of those events, although, of course, he may well do 
so in practice. But at this stage, what is being stressed is 
that moral value judgments necessarily enter into the structure 
of historical inquiry, but onLy in the sense that they are an 
integral constituent of the description of an event. It is there-
fore argued that it is possible in principle to write a neutral, 
morally-uncommitted history, albeit in language which is not 
value-neutral. (21) 
However, as Wright has pointed out, it appears to be difficult for 
. (22) 
some historians to maintain that neutrality in pract~ce. Ex-
pressing the same view, Tapp writes that "interpretations of history 
20. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p.19l. 
21. It might appear, at this stage, that some discussion is required 
on the Is/Ought question, a central concern of moral philosophy. 
That debate is premised on the assumed separation of statements 
of fact and statements of value, a separation which therefore 
poses the central question of the nature of their relationship. 
As Hudson puts it, "How is what i s the case related to what ought 
to be the case - statements of fact to moral judgments?" (p.ll). 
However, in this thesis, that relationship is being dealt with 
within different theoretical assumptions. In hermeneutic terms, 
facts and values are held to be interpenetrated, and the central 
question for historians is, therefore, how are facts and values 
mutually constitutive of historical statements? W.D. Hudson . (ed), 
The Is/Ought Question (1969). 
22. Gordon Wright, 'History as Moral Science', American Historical 
Review, Vol. 81, no. 1, 1976, p.7. 
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which profess to exclude ethics may well be suspected of smuggling 
in uncritical moral judgments". (23) For example, bearing in mind 
Butterfield's arguments presented earlier, the following extract 
from one of his books arguably shows him to be "guilty" of what 
is presumably a careless slip. While it is true that Napoleon was 
considered by many of his contemporaries to be a tyrant, it seems 
that Butterfield's language indicates that he may here be judged 
to have been hoisted with his own petard: 
Where Napoleon carried his dominion he produced or 
he precipitated what we might call a geological 
subsidence; and if we say that he only hastened 
historical processes that were bound in any case to 
have their effects in the course of time, still it 
was the running ahead of time that was the evil -
there are things which can only be good provided they 
do not come too quickly. Liberalism and nationalism 
may be wise and enriching if they have blossomed 
naturally without the generation of great pressure; 
but we have learned now not to be happy, as our 
forefathers were, when sometimes these things have 
appeared too hurriedly and too soon. If Napoleon 
may claim to have carried something of the results 
of the French Revolution throughout Europe, if 
it may be said that his tyranny provoked amongst 
the nations movements more portentious still, we 
may hesitate before we count it to him as virtue 
that he tore his way into the ancient fabric of 
the European states, and so mangled the processes 
of historical change. (24) 
The fact that some historians fail to write in a consistently value-
free way, (if this is their conception of history in accordance 
with an antiquarian approach), does not mean that that ideal is 
unattainable. Rather what would be required in that case is 
23. E.J. Tapp, 'Values in History', Journal of World History, 
Vol. 11, 1968, p.37l. 
24. Herbert Butterfield, Napoleon (1962), p.96. 
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greater vigilance and care. However, is a neutral history the 
only alternative, or can a case be put forward for accounts in 
which the historian's own moral evaluation of the past has been 
imposed in an explicit, self-conscious way? Thus, for example, 
apart from describing the "ordeals" and "sufferings" of the Jews, 
ought the historian also to claim as Arendt for example, does, that 
" ' 'h'?" (25) A W 'h h the Holocaust was a cr1me aga1nst uman1ty, • s r1g t as 
pointed out, historians may find it hard to restrain some expression 
of righteous indignation when dealing, for example, with "the 
h ' 1'" (26) I h l' h more brutal aspects of t e H1tler or Sta 1n era • n t e 19 t 
of arguments developed in this thesis, agreement is expressed 
with Wright denying the need for that restraint; rather the idea 
of a hermeneutic of history embodies the concept of morally-
committed interpretations of the past as part of the concept of 
the mediation of frames of mean1ng. Obviously unlike the situation 
within ordinary experience where the purpose of moral judgments 
may not be simply to indicate approval or disapproval but also to 
affect the behaviour of those being judged, judgments of praise or 
blame by a historian cannot affect the attitudes or actions of 
those 1n the past. Nevertheless, the behaviour of living persons 
may well be influenced. Indeed the engagement in a dialogue with 
the past provides both the individual historian and readers of 
morally-committed historical accounts with an opportunity for self-
conscious examination and evaluation of their moral values. Thus, 
as Oldfield has observed, moral appraisal is a form of moral 
education. (27) 
25. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality 
of Evil (1965), p.268. 
26. Wright, op.cit., p.9. 
27. Adrian Oldfield, "Moral Judgments in History", History and 
Theory, Vol. 20, no. 3, 1981, p.273. 
• 
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The question arises as to whether there are universal moral 
values valid for all time, and to which all will subscribe. 
Strawson, for example, has argued that "because certain human 
needs and interests are as fundamental and general as they are, 
we shall find correspondingly general types of virtue and obli-
gation acknowledged in some form and in some degee in almost any 
. " (28) . d bl' . conceLvable moral system • These vLrtues an 0 LgatLons 
include "the abstract virtue of justice, some form of obligation 
to mutual aid and to mutual abstention from injury, and, in some 
. h ' f h " (29) form and Ln some degree, t e vLrtue 0 onesty. However, 
insofar as hermeneutic philosophy recognises the ontological 
historicality of man as expressed in the concept of historicism, 
the belief in absolute moral values cannot be sustained. Stern 
has described historicism as the view that truth, right, customs, 
ethics, that is all ideas and values, are products of a given 
historical epoch or civilization or national and regional collect-
ivity. Hence these ideas and values are valid for those epochs, 
civilizations or collectivities which produced them. Putting 
this epigrammatically, Stern states: veritas fiZia temporis, 
virtus fiZia temporis - truth is a daughter of time, value is a 
daughter of time. (30) Linge writes that historicism is the view 
th t f b d h · b . . (31) a any re erence eyon Lstory to a solutes LS not possLble. 






The completely new thing in historical thinking 
consists in the fact that it relativises all 
historical things as 'merely historical'. What 
earlier ages thought of as man and the world 
has to be understoodhistorically, but for that 
reason also its validity is historically limited. 
(32) • 
F.P. Strawson, 
in Freedom and 
op.cit., p.38. 
'Social Morality and the Individual Ideal', 
Resentment and Other Essays (1974), p.39. 
Stern, op.cit., p.138. 
Linge, 'Dilthey and Gadamer: Two Theories of Historical 
Understanding', p.537. 
quoted in Linge, op.cit., p.539. 
Stern has suggested that there are values which are generally 
subscribed to by a particular group of, people in a particular 
historical period. He calls these values "universal", an 
unfortunate choice, although he does clarify the sense ~n which 
he uses the word: 
For example, in the Middle Ages, the religious 
values of the Catholic Church were universal in 
the sense that, according to our definition, they 
were affirmed independently of the individual 
peculiarities of the appreciating subjects and 
of the collective peculiarities of the appreciating 
groups. (33) 
Stern argues that "while realising that they are relative to our 
historical epoch and to our civilization, we believe in our 
177 
values and truths for the simple reason that they are daughters of 
our time, and that they, therefore, represent the axiological 
and epistemological consciousness and conscience of our 
epoch". (34) Of course, Stern is obliged to qualify his claims by 
pointing out that "we may judge other epochs and civilizations by 
virtue of our own standards of value as long as we recognise the 
relativity of our standards to our epoch and civilization, and 
that we recognise the right of future and foreign civilizations 
to judge of our standards by virtue of theirs". (35) 
Clearly, therefore, Stern's choice of "universal" is misleading. 
It would be doubly misleading if used to characterise contemporary 
society, for there is by no means the same degree of conformity 
in the Western World with regard to moral values as there may have 
been in the Medieval era. Amongst contemporary historians in the 
33. Stern, op.cit., p.136. 
34. op.cit., p.189. 
35. op.cit., p.186. 
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West, at least, it is arguable that two sets of values predominate 
at present, namely those falling within the Western tradition of 
liberal morality, and the revolutionary Marxist ethic. The 
commitment to such values should not, however, be the "product of 
irrational prejudice", to use Wal sh's phrase, (although he LS 
speaking of religious beliefs). Rather these values ought to be 
" . , , ,,(36) d . l' held as a matter of ratLonal convLctLon an theLr app L-
cation to the past within the hermeneutic circle helps us to ensure 
a critical examination of their tenability. Indeed, as Oldfield 
points out, moral judgments (like all other judgments) must 
never be made "too soon and without sufficient attention to 
evidence which is relevant'!. (37) 
Amongst historians who subscribe to the idea of a morally-
committed history, the following examples are cited, examples 
illustrating both the liberal and revolutionary Marxist ethic 
respectively. 
Bullock's evaluation of Hitler is made in terms of explicitly 
stated liberal values. 
The great revolutions of the past, whatever their 
ultimate fate, have been identified with the 
release of certain powerful ideas, individual 
conscience, liberty, equality, national freedom, 
social justice. National Socialism produced 
nothing. Hitler constantly exalted force over 
the power of ideas and delighted to prove that 
men were governed by cupidity, fear, and their 
baser passions. The sole theme of the Nazi 
Revolution was domination, dressed up as the doc-
trine of race, and, failing that, a vindictive 
destructiveness, Rauschni g 's Revolution des 
Ni hilismus. 
36. Walsh, op.cit., p.10l. 
37. Oldfield, op.cit., p.263. 
It is this emptiness, this lack of anything to 
justify the suffering he caused rather than his 
own monstrous and ungovernable will which makes 
Hitler both so repellent and so barren a 
figure. Hitler will have his place in history, 
but it will be alongside Attila the Hun, the 
barbarian king who was surnamed, not 'the Great', 
but 'the scourge of God ••• ' (38) 
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In his discussion on the Reign of Terror, Roberts' commitment to 
liberal values ~s clearly evident in the moral disapprobation he 
expresses: 
Many people died: over 100,000 rebels, it seems 
in the fighting or the repression which followed. 
Many others suffered maltreatment, assault, the 
seizure of their property, imprisonment. This 
was not unremarked by contemporaries, nor has 
it been by historians, though perhaps we are now 
in danger of somewhat under-rating such horrors 
because of the callousing our imaginations have 
undergone under the impact of much larger-scale 
brutalities. (39) 
In his reflection on the persecution of witches, Russell's liberal 
stance is manifested as follows: 
Some contemporaries recognised the injustice. In 
1563, Johann Weyer wrote a treatise On Magic, which 
argued that witches are really harmless old women 
suffering from mental disorders and that most alleged 
cases of witchcraft are really susceptible of 
natural explanations. But Jean Bodin and other 
intellectual ieaders hastened to refute this voice 
of moderation, accusing Weyer himself of being a 
witch, and arguing that the similarity of the 
confessions proved the fact that the sabbat was 
always and everywhere identical. A little later, 
38. Bullock, op.cit., pp.804-S. 
39. J.M. Roberts, The French Revolution (1978), pp.62-3. 
in 1602, Henri Boquet wrote in his Discourse 
des sorciers that he wished that all witches 
should be 'united in one single body, so that 
they might all be burned at once in a single 
fire'. This mania, this eagerness to torture 
and kill human beings, persisted for centuries. 
Perhaps we put the wrong question when we ask 
how this could be. The past half-century has 
witnessed the Holocaust, the Gulag Archipelago, 
The Cambodian genocide, and secret tortures 
and executions beyond number. The real question 
is why periods of relative sanity, such as those 
from 700 to 1000 and from 1700 to 1900, 
occur. (40) 
Stojanovic has pointed out that "a Marxist ethics, at least one 
(41) 
worthy of Marx's name, has yet to be constructed". The idea 
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of "two systems" of Marxism has already been mentioned, and it is 
clear that if one takes Marx's statements as being deterministic 
in the strict sense, then socialism is an historical inevitability. 
A Marxist ethics would therefore not make sense unless the indi-
vidual could influence the course of history. Thus such an 
ethics depends on what Stojanovic calls "a milder variant of 
d o 0 ,,(42) h d d 0 0 0 d eterm1n1sm • If t e mo e of pro uct10n 1S 1nterprete as 
being ultimately determining in a non-deterministic sense, then 
particular historical situations do contain more than one possi-
bility, even though these possibilities are not unlimited, the 
parameters for effective action having been set, in the final 
analysis, by the mode of production. A Marxist ethics is one 
which would "morally stimulate and obligate people to struggle 
f 0 1
0 ,,(43) b °b 0 h 0 or SOC1a 1sm , y contr1 ut1ng to t e awaken1ng of the 
k
o l' 0 0 0 (44) wor 1ng c ass s conSC10usness of 1tS own eth1cs . 
40. Russell, op.cit., p.84. 
41. Svetozar Stojanovic, "The Ethical Potential of Marx's 
Thought", in Bottomore, op.cit., p.170. 
42. op.cit., p.180. 
43. op.cit., p.18l. 
44. op.cit., p.176. 
Engels' moral commitment to that struggle is clear from this 
analysis of the 1848 Revolution in Germany: 
The working class entered upon this insurrection as 
they would have done upon any other which promised 
either to remove some obstacles in their progress 
towards political dominion and social revolution, or, 
at least, to tie the more influential but less 
courageous classes of society to a more decided 
revolutionary course than they had followed hither-
to. The working class took up arms with full 
knowledge that this was, in the direct bearings of 
the case, no quarrel of its own; but it followed 
up its only true policy, to allow no class that has 
risen on its shoulders (as the bourgeoisie had done 
in 1848) to fortify its class-government, without 
opening, at least, a fair field to the working 
classes for the struggle for its own interests, and, 
in any case, to bring matters to a crisis, by which 
either the nation was fairly and irresistibly 
launched in the revolutionary career, or else the 
status quo before the Revolution restored as nearly 
as possible, and, thereby, a new revolution rendered 
unavoidable. In both cases the working classes repre-
sented the real and well-understood interest of the 
nation at large, in hastening as much as possible that 
revolutionary course which for the old societies of 
civilised Europe has now become a historical 
necessity, before any of them can again aspire to 
a more quiet and regular development of their 
resources. (45) 
In concluding her study on Chinese women, the Marxist feminist, 
Rowbotham makes her moral commitment explicit: 
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45. Frederick Engels, Germany, Revolution and Counter Revolution 
(1969), pp.103-4. --~~~~~~~~~~==~~~~~~ 
In considering this extremely fundamental relation-
ship of women with our past, and ultimately of all 
human beings with all history as part of the scope 
of continuing revolution, the Chinese ask a 
question we can't afford to ignore - why do we 
cling to subjecticn? To say there are still 
definite limits to the liberation of women after 
the Chinese Revolution is not to dismiss what has 
been achieved. Indeed, the attempt to understand 
historically the point from which women emerged 
helps us not only to ap~reciate what has happened 
in real terms, but also prevents us from lifting 
their experience mechanically onto ours. We come 
from different pasts, and the kind of socialism 
and liberation that we can conceive and create 
differs greatly. The emphasis on the work situation, 
the puritanism in sexual matters which appear in the 
emancipation of Chinese women, is not some formula 
for western capitalism, or the other socialist 
countries for that matter, but should be understood 
as part of a particular process of development. But 
while we make our own liberation the experience of 
other revolutions shows how from the most wretched 
of beginnings the impossible can happen. (46) 
To sum up the discussion, Thompson's justification of his own 
practice of offering value judgments on the past seems 
particularly apt. He writes: 
Only we, who are now living, can give a "meaning" 
to the past. But that past has always been, among 
other things, the result of an argument about 
values. In recovering that process, in showing 
how causation actually eventuated, we must insofar 
as the discipline can enforce, hold our own values 
in abeyance. But once this history has been 
recovered, we are at liberty to offer our judgment 
upon it. 
Such judgment must itself be under historical controls. 
The judgment must be appropriate to the materials. 
It is pointless to complain that the bourgeoisie 
have not been communitarians, or that the Levellers 
did not introduce an anarcho-syrrdicalist society. 
46. Sheila Rowbotham, Women, Resistance and Revolution (1974), 
pp.98-9. 
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What we may do, rather, is identify wi tl. certain 
values which past actors upheld, and reject others. 
We may give our vote for Winstanley and for Swift; 
we may vote against Walpole and Sir Edwin 
Chadwick. 
Our vote will change nothing. And yet, in another 
sense, it may change everythiilg. Fc·r Y;'€ are saying 
that these values, and not those other values, are 
the ones which make the history meaningful to US~ 
and that these are the values which we intend to 
enlarge and sustain in our own present. If we 
succeed, then we reach back into history and endow 
it with our own meanings: we shake Swift by the hand. 
We endorse in our present the values of Winstanley, 
and ensure that the low and ruthless kind of 
op,portunism which distinguished the politics of 
Walpole is abhorred. 
In the end we also will be dead, and our own lives 
will lie inert within the finished process, our 
intentions assimilated within a past event which 
we never intended. What we may hope is that the 
men and women of the future will reach back to us, 
will affirm and renew our meanings, and make our 
history intelligible within their own present tense. 
They alone will have the power to select from the 
many meanings offered by our quarreling present, 
and to transmute some part of our process into 
their progress. (47) 
(ii) Objectivity 
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Does the explicit inclusion of moral values into an interpretation 
imply the abrogation of history as an academic discipline? Does 
the rejection of a morally-neutral history necessarily entail that 
the works produced count simply as propaganda? These conclusions 
are rejected. In agreement with Thompson, it is argued that a 
clear distinction must be made between history at the level of 
interpretation and history at the level of moral judgment. In 
order that an account of the past, subscribing to the thesis that 
moral judgments are necessary, may count as written history, certain 
47. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, p.234. 
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basic requirements must be met, (the word "necessary" being used 
here in the sense of desirable and not in the sense of 
logical necessity). Firstly, the historian must indicate his 
adherence to that thesis and clarify the actual values used 
in his judgments, if these are not obvious. Secondly, the 
objectivity of his interpretation from a particular point of 
view must be established. For the concept of a morally-
committed history in no way excludes the possibility that the 
interpretation, which has been subjected to moral approbation or 
disapprobation, may also be judged to be objective. Bullock's 
assessment of Hitler as "barbaric" does not necessarily imply 
that his work as a whole is simply an exerc~se in propaganda. 
Moreover, historians may agree that an account is objective 
without supporting the moral stance taken by the interpreter. 
Popper's argument that "it is a mistake to assume that the 
objectivity of a science depends upon the objectivity of the 
. . ,,(48) 1· . 11 b sc~ent~st app ~es to h~story as we • It has een shown 
that the self-critical historian tries to discount or eliminate 
"merely personal factors in the operation by which a conclusion 
. h d" D f 1 h·· (49) ~s reac e , as ewey, or examp e, puts t ~s po~nt. 
Hampson has also written that "to the extent to which he is 
influenced, the historian's work may be subjective but it cannot 
be purely personal or arbitrary". (50) However, critical self-
reflection alone, without submitting one's conclusions to the 
scrutiny of the relevant professional body, cannot guarantee 




Popper, "Logic of the Social Sciences", op.cit., p.95. 
(I would include "solely", thus •.. the objectivity of a 
science depends. solely upon the objectivity of the 
scientist). 
Quoted by Christopher Blake, "Can History be Objective" ~n 
P. Gardiner (ed), Theories of History (1965), p.335. 
Norman Hampson, "~u~jectivity and Objectivity in History", 
Journal of the Br~t~sh Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 7, 
no. 3, 1976, p.188. 
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Objectivity presupposes conformity to the critical methodological 
tradition shared by any professional group. Thus if we wish to 
know what counts as an objective historical .account within a 
point of view, we need to elucidate the professional and intellectual 
values to which historians subscribe and which provide the 
basis for adjudication of such accounts. Indeed any and every 
group of professional historians must hold and ensure the trans-
mission of such values if the status of history as an academic 
discipline is to be guaranteed. 
AZZ historians, irrespective of their point of view, are bound by 
what Edmiston calls the value of rationality, that is "the shared 
standard to which appeal is made in all methodological criticism, 
embodying as it does an entire vocabulary of evaluations, right, 
wrong, correct, false, erroneous, fallacious, circular, tautolog-
ical, (il)logical, (in) consistent , un(sound), (in)coherent and 
so on". (51) As Atkinson has noted, while these criteria are 
obviously not specific to history, a person who shows little or 
no regard for them would not be a historian at all. (52) 
Furthermore, these criteria also imply that "history has this in 
common with every other science, that the historian is not allowed 
to claim any single piece of knowledge, except where he can justify 
his claim by exhibiting the grounds on which it is based". (53) All 
historians share certain professional standards including those for 
determining the accuracy of sources by means of relevant scientific 
(54) d fbI·· . .. tests, an or esta ~sh~ng the~r rel~ab~lity. The philological 





James Edmiston, 'Methodology Considered as a System of Ethics', 
The Human Context, Vol. 7, 1975, p.450. (This standard 
presupposes adherence to rational rules of thought). 
Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p.194. 
Collingwood, op.cit., p.252. 
Arthur Marwick, Primary Sources Humanities Foundation Course 
Unit 6, 1970. 
early hermeneutic tradition, are indispensible in this latter 
regard. Furthermore, the need for lIaccurate and full reporting 
of sources so that other historians can follow the tracks 11 is 
subscribed to by all historians. (55) In short, IImeticulous 
(56) research ll , to use Marino's phrase, is a sine qua non for 
written history. 
Three further criteria 1n terms of which accounts are judged, 
namely coherence, in a hermeneutic sense, comprehensiveness and 
plausibility are postulated in this thesis. The content given 
to these concepts depends on the point of view taken, that 1S on 
the ontological and methodological assumptions held. Thus 
specific communities of historians will agree on what their 
field of research is, how its domain may be extended, what 




It has already been argued that the attempt to understand the 
historical meaning of an event from a specific point of view does 
not follow a linear course. For misleading presuppositions may 
be altered in the light of the understanding of a part, which 
itself may then illuminate the colligated whole, leading in 
turn to a deeper understanding of another part, thereby suggesting 
different questions based on altered presuppos.itions, and so on. 
Thus it is clear that a coherence involving parts and whole must 
be sought. Firstly, in the text itself, there must be a coherence 
of words and sentences; secondly, a coherence between particular 




Atkinson, op.cit., p.82. 
John A. Marino, "Matrices of Materialist Historiography", 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, 1979, p.99. 
cf. Bernstein, op.cit., p.433. 
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~n the context of the author's output, or the agent's character 
and his life history; and finally between the event in its 
narrower historical context and in the wider colligated context-
ual whole, that is in accordance with the rules postulated by the 
early hermeneutic thinkers. 
Clearly this coherence presupposes a comprehensive study of the 
event and period in question. Indeed, it would be impossible to 
achieve coherence without the historian being familiar with the 
primary and secondary sources which go towards constituting the 
relevant historical point of v~ew. However, while a comprehensive 
account will include what is relevant, it will also omit what 
is irrelevant, in terms of the question being asked. 
The account will be plausible to the extent that it does succeed 
in answering the historian's questions, that is, it resolves the 
questioner's puzzlement. Passmore has suggested that any good 
explanation must satisfy these requirements - it must be 
, l' 'b d d (58)" , ~nte l~g~ Ie, a equate an correct. An ~ntell~g~ble 
explanation is one which "refers to modes of connection which 
have come to be familiar to us". (59) In the main, historians tend 
to use ordinary standards of intelligibility, but it has been 
argued in this thesis that in terms of the double hermeneutic, 
historians may make use of theories postulated in related disci-
plines. If those theories, and the questions which prompted 
their use, may be seen as being "in some way continuous with 
existing history"; if they "connect at some point(s) with that 
multi-faceted thing that history at any time is", then they extend 
the boundaries of explanation in history insofar as they are 
'd b' (60) recogn~se to e genu~nely explanatory. 
58. Passmore, op.cit., p.lli. 
59. op.cit., p.112. 
60. Atkinson, op.cit., pp.135-6. 
188 
An explanation is adequate "if it refers to conditions of which we 
know that they will in many circumstances produce the given 
effect, unless we have some positive reason for believing that the 
, (61) 
circumstances were pecuh.ar", Passmore argues that historians, 
like ordinary men,accept as adequate any explanation which refers 
" ., , d ff" ,,(62) to cond1t1ons that are not str1ctly necessary an su 1C1ent . 
In the case, for example, of an explanation which makes use of the 
singular hypothetical in order to explain why an individual did 
what he did, adequacy will depend on the extent to which the 
historian has elucidated the individual's character; his beliefs, 
his aims, his particular situation and so on. In the case ofa 
narrative explanation, adequacy depends on whether events have been 
linked sequentially 1n such a way that they follow each other 
without the feeling that something was left out, or that some of 
the connections between those events remained puzzling. 
Passmore writes that if an explanation is intelligible and 
adequate it is usually taken to be correct in ordinary exper1ence, 
1 h b
' , ,(63) , 
un ess we ave reason to e SUSp1C10US of 1t. A plaus1ble 
account is therefore based on evidence; it makes true statements 
and these "truths must be relatable in publicly checkable ways 
to evidence". (64) 
The maintenance and transmission of these intellectual and pro-
fessional values is ensured by teaching bodies as well as by 
professional institutions such as scholarly journals, books and 
congresses. These provide the opportunity for the friendly-
hostile co-operation of all historians, and hence the forums for 
assessing the objectivity and relevance of particular explanations 
61. Passmore, op.cit., p.113. 
62. op.cit., p.122. (Thompson makes the same point, op.cit., p.230). 
63. op.cit., pp.113-4. 
64. Atkinson, op.cit., p.l32. 
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offered for adjudication in the spirit of Popperean falsifiability 
by the self-critical historian. It is important to stress that 
this social aspect of historical research ought to include the 
participation of all historians, irrespective of their subscription 
to a particular point of view. The hermeneutic thesis has argued 
that location within any point of view, constituted by specific 
presuppositions and theories, leads a historian to focus on certain 
sources, determining what count as facts and how these are to be 
explained, sometimes resulting in interpretations which may present 
qualitatively different pictures of past events. Nevertheless it 
is held that it is possible to postulate conditions within which all 
historians may communicate, thereby understanding and evaluating 
the contributions of their colleagues. Without that communication, 
it is clear that the fields of history would grow increasingly 
isolated from each other, initially breeding incest, but finally 
becoming sterile. Indeed, any evaluation not only of an interpre-
0" 
tat ion from a point of view, but of the merits of the point of 
view itself, that is the richness, flexibility and fruitfulness of 
respective historical frameworks, requires a comparison with other 
points of view. 
It is suggested in this thesis that Habermas' concept of an idealized 
dialogue (or Apel's notion of the ideal speech situation) delineate 
"a model of perfect mutual comprehension" for historians. (65) It 
has already" been argued that our common access to a shared language, 
itself not value-free, provides us with the possibility of under-
standing each other, even though the analysis of the speech act has 
revealed the difficulties of achieving transparently clear communi-
cation in practice. Within a model of perfect mutual comprehension, 
the communicative symmetry between partners consists in the attain-
ment of consensus reached by a rational examination of arguments, 
65. The phrase ~s Giddens', op.cit., p.66. 
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the complete and joint understanding of each other, and the shared 
recognition of the authentic right of the other to take the role 
(66) 
he does in the dialogue as a full and equal partner. Thus 
judgments of objectivity and critical evaluations of various points 
of view may be effected within the parameters of such a model by 
a linguistic community of historians bound by the ideal of rational 
discourse. Obviously, a further prerequisite is that the dialogue 
... 1· · 1 . (67) be conducted w~th~n a soc~ety free of po ~t~ca restra~nts. 
The ideal of a rational community of historians may well be diffi-
cult to realize in practice. However that ideal ought not to be 
abandoned. As Bauman has observed, the projection of an ideal on 
actual practices acts as an incentive to improvement, and as a 
standard for evaluation. The gap between the ideal and the actual 
is made more explicit, and guidance is provided as to how to make 
discourse more rational. (68) In its own terms, the idea of a 
hermeneutic of history is committed to the pursuit of rationality 
in the sense above. Paralleling the dialogue between interpreter 
and the past within the hermeneutic circle of understanding, 
historians within different points of view ought to strive, through 
the practice of the Socratic dialogue, towards mutual understanding, 
ensuring the constant evaluation of the merits (and demerits) of a 
particular point of view. In so doing, the vitality of the discipline 
of history as a whole will be ensured. 
66. Ibid. 
67. The postulation of this ideal also provides us with a possible 
answer to Hoy's question which is of fundamental importance to 
hermeneutics in general: 
Is it possible for philosophy itself to stay within the 
hermeneutical circle of understanding, and within the limitations 
imposed by its own historical conditions, yet legitimately posit 
rational principles as conditions for the possible validity or 
truth of particular acts of understanding? 
Hoy, op.cit., p.118. 
68. Bauman, op.cit., p.243. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 
It is clear from the historical survey given 1n this thesis, that 
hermeneutic philosophers have devoted virtually no attention to 
specific historical problems. Dilthey, it is true, dealt with 
the idea of a hermeneutic method, but gave no formal illustrations 
of the way a historical event would be interpreted hermeneutically. 
Thus a central issue in this thesis is to analyse the idea of a 
formal hermeneutic explanation. 
An innnediate objection pres.ents itself, for surely the word 
'explanation' is inapplicable in a hermeneutic context? Dilthey, 
after all,had said that nature we explain, while man we must under-
stand (although,as we have seen, Dilthey did not exclude the use of 
scientific explanations in the hermeneutic practice). There are 
philosophers who restrict the use of "explain" to describe the 
activity of giving causes in the form of the hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation. Morgenbesser says that "not every way of 
1 . 1 ." (1) h remov1ng perp eX1ty can count as an exp anata1.on . On t e 
other hand, Passmore for example, has isolated nine different ways 
in which the word 'explanation' can be used. He writes that 
"explaining .•• is a particular way of using a form of argument; 
. h l' 1 f . . ,,(2) Wh . 1t as no og1ca orm pecu11ar to 1t • at 1S connnon to all 
forms of explanation is the puzzlement of the questioner and his 
consequent desire to clarify or to eliminate that puzzlement. 
1. Sydney Morgenbesser, "Scientific Explanation", 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1968), 
Vol. 14, p.1l7. 
2. Passmore, "Explanation in Everyday Life, in Science and in 
History", History and Theory, Vol. 2, 1962, p.109. 
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"Being puzzled", says Passmore, "is a special sort of not knowing". 
For it is not-knowing in the sense of "not knowing what to make 
of a situation". And this "puzzling situation presents character-
istics which are, from our point of view, unexpected; it inter-
d ' , h h ld" (3) rupts the smoothness of our ea11ngs W1t t e wor • 
(Heidegger made a similar kind of point when he argued that it is 
only when something in our everyday taken-for-granted world 1S 
revealed as missing, broken or perhaps unsuitable, that the world 
is revealed as an object of contemp~ation. possibilities are 
revealed to man and it is this revelation which makes theoretical 
knowledge possible. Understanding chooses from possibilities against 
, f ' , ) (4) Th k' d f I ' a background of what 1S aml11ar. e 1n 0 exp anat10n 
given depends on the question asked. Hull writes that "from an 
ordinary point of view it seem implausible that a term like 
'explanation' should refer to a single process". (5) 
Weingartner has pointed out that philosophers are divided between 
those who wish to provide an account of what historians ought to 
be doing and those who wish to provide an account of what they 
actually do. (6) We may therefore ask the question whether philo-
sophy of history should be prescriptive? Thus if formal models of 
explanation proposed by philosophers bear little resemblance to what 
historians do, then so much the worse for history; historians must 
strive to implement such models. For example, writers have argued 
that the covering-law method of explanation ought to be the mode 
of explanation in history, and while historians may have the right 
to "indulge in imaginative reconstruction" or to give narratives 






Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.104-l07. 
David L. Hull, 'Central Subjects and Historical Narratives', 
History and Theory, Vol. 14, no. 3, p.273. 
Rudolph H. Weingartner, 'The Quarrel About Historical 
Explanation', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 58, 1961. 
they are not scientific explanations. (7) Or is philosophy of 
history descriptive; does it take as its starting point how 
historians go about making the past intelligible, and then 
express these techniques formally, possibly making helpful 
suggestions to historians in the interests of greater intelli-
gibility and clarity? The idea of a hermeneutic of history 
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which is grounded in an analysis of the historicality of under-
standing, insists that the fruits of this analysis be incorporated 
into the practice of history as an attempt to understand the 
past, while at the same time examining that practice in order to 
fill out a formal characterisation of such a hermeneutic. 
In this chapter, explanatory techniques used by historians will 
be discussed in conjunction with a philosophical analysis of 
. d . h· h h (8) explanat~on an ~n the context of ermeneut~c t oug t. 
The various senses of the word "explain" elucidated by Passmore 
may be grouped into three basic senses applicable to historio-
graphy, namely, explain "what", explain "how", explain "why". 
(i) Explain "what" 
We can ask the question: what does X mean? where X is a word, a 
text, or an event, for example. In each case this is a demand 
for an elucidation, for putting something into a context. This 
kind of question is, of course, the traditional hermeneutic 
one, for the appropriation of meaning is the goal of hermeneutics. 




M. Brodbeck. in T,OU': s 0 Mi-k. 'The Autonomy of Historical 
Understanding', History and Theory, Vol. 5, 1966, p.27. 
The discussion which follows applies to explanations given 
within any point of view. Examples from Marxist historio-
graphy will be cited to illustrate this claim, and are 
included in Appendix B. 
A historian asks, for example, what did the calling of the 
Estates-General mean to the French bourgeoisie? 
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In his attempt to clarify the distinction between the meanLng of 
history and meaning in history, Walsh has argued that the former 
falls within the ambit of speculative philosphies of history, while 
. . (9) E 
the latter represents the goal of the hLstorLan. very 
historian, says Walsh, assumes that history is meaningful; that 
it is intelligible in principle in the light of explanatory 
principles we bring to bear on it. 
To explain is to render intelligible; it is 
to find meaning and point in material initially 
not seen to have meaning and point. (10) 
The phrase "initially not seen to have meanLng and point" is not 
wholly acceptable to hermeneutics. As Heidegger has argued, we 
always have a preunderstanding of an event, and while this may 
be unclear or imprecise, clarity and precision are achieved 
Ln the process of coming to a fuller understanding, through the 
hermeneutic circle of understanding. 
Finding "meaning and point" involves the concept of colligation, 
and although Walsh is unfamiliar with hermeneutics, that concept 
may be said to be a way of stating the hermeneutic whole-parts 
thesis of the intelligibility of events. Colligation is that 
explanatory activity which has as its goal the tracing out of the 
ramifications of a particular event in a specific historical 
context. 
9. W.H. Walsh, "'Meaning" in History', Ln P. Gardiner, (ed), 
Theories of History, pp.296-307. 
10. op.cit., p.299. 
To make a sense of a given piece of history, 
what has to be done is to see the connections 
between different historical events, to show 
how one action, or happening led to another, 
to show perhaps how certain forces or factors 
were continuously realized or striven for in 
the period under consideration. (11) 
The idea of colligation therefore restates the important hermen-
eutic point that all historical explanations must always be 
contextual. Dilthey, in his later thought, used verstehen to 
describe the way the interpreter grasps the reciprocal relation 
of parts and whole within a specific context. As has already 
been pointed out,he also suggested that the subject matter of 
history be conceived as a dynamic system which may be regarded 
as analogous to Walsh's colligated whole. 
However, what is still needed is to flesh out the question: 
What does a specific event mean? If we return to the question: 
What did the calling of the Estates-General mean to the French 
bourgeoisie?, we can isolate the following kinds of questions, 
questions which every competent historian on the period will 
try to answer even if he is not explicitly conscious that this 
constitutes part of a hermeneutic undertaking. 
(i) What was the bourgeois class? How had it originated? 
What was its situation in France at the time with 
respect to political, social and economic 
institutions? What was its philosophical outlook? 
(ii) What did the actions of the bourgeoisie in the 
Estates-General mean in the context of that situation? 
How, in other words, did they interpret that particular 
situation, or why did they choose to break away from 
the Estates-General? 
11. op.cit., p.296. 
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(iii) How did their actions influence the king and first 
two estates? In other words, what did their actions 
mean to the kings and those estates? 
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This is obviously not an exhaustive list of the kinds of questions 
which are subsumed in the broad question given as the illustration 
of a "what" question. But they suffice to make two points. 
Firstly, it is clear that the historian 1S concerned both with 
what the actions of the bourgeoisie meant to them including what 
they intended 1n the context of their situation, as well as how 
these action,s affected others. It must be stressed that the 
historian is not a mirror reflecting the past. He has immersed 
himself in the interpretative tradition surrounding the event 
and he knows, as the bourgeoisie in the Estates-General did not, 
what occurred in the future. This has become part of the histori-
cal tradition in which he stands. The way he appropriates the 
past must always be from a point of view, and the appropriation will 
involve a mediation of frames of meaning so that explicitly or 
implicitly his answer to the question will also reflect his 
understanding of what those events mean to him in his situation~12) 
Secondly, g1v1ng answers which a1m to make the event intelligible 
must involve giving narrative explanations, that 1S, explaining 
how events came about; for example, how did the Estates-General 
come to be called? Furthermore, causal explanations are also 
required, for example, why did the bourgeoisie swear the Tennis 
Court Oath? 
Ricoeur has listed the following considerations which a hermeneutic 
account will take into account, including the idea that human 
agents are authors of events; they interpret their actions 1n terms 
12. cf. Giddens, op.cit., pp.63-4 . 
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of motives; the way the action of one agent affects another; how 
norms and institutions regulate projects; how institutions are 
(13) 
founded and maintained, broken or renewed. Implicitly, there-
fore, he is also acknowledging that a hermeneutic interpretation 
will involve the assignment of causes as well as the need for a 
narrative. 
"What" questions therefore provide the hermeneutic framework within 
which other kinds of questions are asked and answered in order to 
render the event in question intelligible. This then leads to an 
examination of the other two ways "explain" is used. 
(ii) Explain "how" 
We can ask the question, how did you get here? and in reply we 
would expect an explanation giving a sequential linking of events, 
in short, giving a narrative. Historians ask, for example, how 
did Hitler come to be chancellor of Germany in 1933? 
There are some philosophers of history who argue that a narrative 
explanation is the only appropriate mode of explanation in 
history. Because history is concerned with an explanation of 
change, "properly detailed narrative is explanatory. Explaining 
in history is simply giving a sufficiently full account of 
change". (14) As Gilliam expresses this: 
13. 
14. 
If the purpose of history is taken to be the des-
cription of changes undergone by an entity from 
one time to another then the language of 
Paul Ricoeur, 'History and Hermeneutics', Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 73, no. 19, 1976, p.688. 
R.F. Atkinson, 'Explanation in History'. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelean Society, Vol. 62, 1972, p.255. 
narrative which ••• gives legitimacy to the idea 
of change becomes the only appropriate vehicle. 
(15) 
. (16) . (17) Ren~er and Gall~e hold that narratives are explanatory 
without involving the use of law-type explanations for, insofar 
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as history ~s essentially story-telling, narrative implies 
references to causes, motives, effects and results. But as 
Atkinson has pointed out, the claim that narratives are 
explanatory in themselves need not preclude the inclusion of 
law-type explanations, or explanations which are expressed ~n terms 
of the intentions of the agents. But the latter are regarded as 
being neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the 
narrative being explanatory. The inclusion of these other kinds 
of explanation depends simply on the extent to which they aid the 
. (18) 
narrat~ve. 
If we consider the question of how it was that Hitler came to 
be chancellor in 1933, it is clear that part of the answer will 
lie in a recounting of events in sequence including the formation 
of the German National Socialist Party, the abortive putsch of 
1923, the elections of 1930, Hitler's decision to run against Von 
Hindenberg, Von Papen's intrigue, amongst other events. But 
however detailed that narrative, it will still be necessary (if 
that question is to be answered fully) to analyse what the 
situation meant to Hitler; that is an elucidation of the context 
within which he was able to make his bid for power. Furthermore, 
an attempt must be made to clarify the appeal of the Nazi Party, 
what it meant to those Germans who supported Hitler (and those 
15. Harriet Gilliam, 'The Dialectics of Realism and Idealism in 
Modern Historiographic Theory', History and Theory, Vol.15, 
no. 3, 1976, p.257. 
16. G.J. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method (1950). 
17. W.B: Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, (1954) 
18. Atk~nson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p.128. 
who did not). Thus answering "how" questions also requires that 
"what" questions be dealt with as well. "How" questions are also 
dependent on "why" questions. For a historian wants to know why 
the putsch failed, for example - in short he will also be giving 
cau~al explanations. 
In terms of hermeneutic thought, historians may also use theories 
which would not necessarily have been familiar to the protagonists 
of the time as hypotheses in the giving of causal explanations (in 
other word~ tho la~guage of these theories is not part of the form 
of life of which the event was a constituent). Thus, based on a 
comparative study of Fascist regimes in Europe at that particular 
time, a historian may formulate an hypothesis which he tests 
( ) 0 0d (19) Th 0 Of ° 0 attempts to refute aga1nst the eV1 ence. e JUSt1 1cat10n 
for using such theories lies in the extent to which they do 
resolve the puzzlement of the questioner. Another possibility is 
that the historian consults studies conducted by psychologists and 
sociologists concerned with an exploration of the origins, growth 
and outcome of social movements, using hypotheses postulated 
h · °bl 1 d 0 (20) t ere1n as POSS1 e exp anatory eV1ces. 
19. For example, the phenomenon of Fascism has been explained 
as a movement which tried to mobilise the masses for rapid 
industrialization in countries where economic development was 
delayed. Examples of so-called modernisation theories to 
account for Fascism include James A. Gregor, The Ideology 
of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism (1969), A.F.K 
Organski, 'Fascism and Modernisation', in S.J. Woolf (ed), 
The Nature of Fascism (1960). The explanatory value of some 
of these theories has been challenged. G. Allardyce, 'What 
Fascism is Not: Some Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept', 
American Historical Review, Vol. 84, no. 2. 1979. 
20. For example, Kedward deals with two .theories which attempt to 
~ive psychological explanations for outbursts of "group 
aggression, conformity and subservience between the wars". 
H.R. Kedward, Fascism in Western Europe 1900-1Q45 (1969), 
pp.19l-l95. 
To illustrate the way narratives are informed by analyses and 
elucidations of meaning, as well as being complemented by 
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causal explanations, reference is made to an extract from Russell's 
.. . (21) 
A H~story of W~tchcraft , Sorcerers, Heret~cs and Pagans. 
His concern in that passage is to try to account for the occurrence 
of the witch-craze phenomenon through an examination of some of 
the laws pertaining to paganism, sorcery and herpsy passed during 
the course of the eight, ninth and tenth centuries. The sequential 
linking of events is clearly evident, from the 'List of Super-
stitions', to a revised baptismal formula, the efforts of the Synod 
of Rome in 743 and of the Synod of Paris in 829, and finally to 
the Canon Episcopi~ c.900. But Russell is not content simply to 
furnish a narrative; he also provides detailed elucidations of 
the meaning of these measures. For example, the Canon Episcopi's 
ambiguity is clearly spelt out. For while its intention was to 
deny the actual existence of witches, it came . ~_Q, b.e __ r_e_i.nterpreted 
during the witch-craze. With Diana identified as Satan, the idea 
of the witches's sabbat could find its justification in that docu-
ment. Russell also offers an hypothesis (implicit rather than 
explicit) in an attempt to account for the gradual decline of 
pagan beliefs. The hypothesis is something of the sort, "the 
institution of severe punishments for certain practices is bound· 
to reduce and eventually eradicate such practices". 
The idea of a hermeneutic of history makes the following ooints 
~ith reeard to the issue of narratives. Firstly, it denies that 
history is intrinsically and solely narrati,re. Tt agrees with 
Mandelbaum that to view history as solely narrative is to set 
d 1 f h · t· h" h· h . .. ." (22) up a mo e or 1S or1ograp y w 1C 1S far too s1mp11st1c • 
21. Appendix A. 
22. Maurice Mandelbaum, 'A Note on History as Narrative', 
History and Theory, Vol. 6, 1967, p.4l9. 
But it disagrees with McCullagh, for example, who denies that 
narratives are genuinely explanatory because they contaIn no 
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. (23) un1versa1 statements. This is to have a monolithic conception 
of explanation restrictin~ the term to the giving of law 
explanations. 
Secondly, it rejects the alternative which holds that history 1S 
only analysis, as implied for example in Acton's dictum that 
. (24) 
history must deal with problems rather than per10ds. For it 
is difficult to see how one could analyse a particular period 
for example, Germany post-Versailles to 1933, without giving some 
Mrrative. As Atkinson says, "there must be a chronological 
guiding thread of some sort". (25) But history is not merely 
narrative: 
A consistent chronology . .• is •. a considerable 
step in the direction of explanation, though 
doubtless it will leave a great deal 
unexplained. (26) 
Hence the idea of a hermeneutic of history agrees that narrative 
is essential to history while denying that history is essentially 
. (27) 
or really only narrat1ve. 
Thirdly, it holds that the kind of explanation g1ven depends on 
the question being asked; it will be influenced "as much by the 
nature of a particular period or what is known about it as by an 
historian's personal preferences", as Atkinson notes. (28) In 







C.B. McCullagh, 'Narrative and Explanation in History', 
Mind, Vol. 78, 1969. 
-in Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p.19. 
op.cit., p.22. 
op . cit., p. 13 3. 
Gilliam, op.cit., p.254. 
Atkinson Knowl edge and_E_x~p..::1..::a..::n:..:a:...;t:..:i:...;o:.:n::........:1:..:n=-H:.:=.i=.s-=t-=o-=r.:Ly, p. 21. 
of the particular phenomena under consideration as well as the 
. h.. ,,(29) 
~nterests of the ~stor~an. 
Fourthly, it agrees with Mandelbaum, who, rejecting the v~ew that 
historical inquiry and writing is essentially a question of con-
structing narratives, adds that it is false to "assume that all 
of the relationships which historians seek to establish amongst 
. . d . 1· h " (30) the events w~th wh~ch they eal are sequent~a ~n c aracter . 
History is an activity which is not best represented by the model 
of story-telling. Rather, in the analysis of complex patterns 
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of change, the relationship which is fundamental to historiography 
is that of part and whole; in short, this states the hermeneutic 
.. (31) Th 1· 1 . d . pos~t~on. us, u t~mate y, events are ~ntegrate ~nto an 
. (32) 
"organ~sed whole". 
It has been argued that answering "what" questions involves "how" 
questions, and that these are bound up with "why" questions. 
"How" questions similarly, are closely and inextricably inter-
linked with "what" and "why" questions. In practice, historians 
do not separate out these kinds of questions; this is being done 
simply for the sake of methodological clarity. 
(iii) Explain "why" 
We can ask, why did he do something? why did X happen? and this 
represents a demand for the cause or causes of an event. The 
historian will ask, for example, why was there a counter-revolution 
in the Vendee? As Walsh has remarked, the notion of causation is 
29. op.cit., p.20. 
30. Mandelbaum, op.cit., p.4l4. 
31. op.cit., pp.4l7-8. 
32. Hull, op.cit., p.274. 
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a complex one and "statements of radically different types are 
. , '" (33) brought together under the general rubr1c causal statement . 
In contemporary historiography, this kind of question has been 
. . ' b' (34) dealt w1th 1n two aS1C ways. 
Firstly, there is the V1ew that a genu1ne explanation in history, 
as 1n any other discipline, consists in subsuming the event to be 
explained under a law or laws. \ secOndlY, reacting against this 
claim in favour of the methodolJ gical unity of all disciplines, 
it has been argued that history 1S sui generis, concerned with 
unique, particular events, with its own way of dealing with "why" 
questions through the practice of imaginative rethinking 1n order 
to grasp the intention of the historical agents involved in 
particular events. This is, of course, the traditional hermeneutic 
concern. Vico, as we have seen,spoke of recovering and recapturing 
forms of thought through the use of the imagination. Gatterer too 
held that to rethink or to reexperience imaginatively events 
constituted the highest form of historical understanding, providing 
a form of intuitive knowledge in terms of which the past was made 
present. Dilthey elucidated various categories of verstehenCin the 
psychologistic sense), variations of that process whereby signs 
given to our senses are interpreted in order to grasp their 
"psychic reality". (35) 
The hermeneutic tradition would therefore pose the question above 
as, what did X mean to him? and thus by-pass the demand for a 
causal answer, dealing with the question through the technique of 
verstehen. But it is argued in this thesis that while verstehen 
is useful in generating hypotheses, it does fiot, in its psycho-
33. Walsh, op.cit., p.297. 
34. The issue of functional explanation which 1S a type of causal 
explanation, is dealt with in Appendix B. 
35. Chapters Two and Three. 
logistic sense, constitute a formal explanation. Thus we will 
discuss the issue as a "why" question, why did he do so-and-so?, 
and show that this question in turn is dependent upon, and inter-
linked with, "what" and "how" questions. 
Beer has pointed out that the idea of imaginative reenactment has 
" ' , ,,(36) A k' 11 been defended as rat10nal explanat10n • t 1nson ca s 
rational explanations those which deal with "an agent's 
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" b l' f d d" (37) B t b f d l' 1ntent1ons, purposes, e 1e s, stan ar s • u e ore ea 1ng 
with these kinds of explanations, the issue of causal explanation 
in general in history will be examined. 
(a) The hypothetico-deductive model of explanation 
In putting forward his theory of causal explanation Popper 
writes as follows: 
I suggest that to give a causal explanation of 
a certain specific event means deducing a 
statement describing this event from two kinds 
of premises; from some universal Laws, 
and from some similar or specific statements 
which we may call the specific i nitial conditions. 
(38) 
(It is important to note that Popper made no claim that this 
theory was one of explanation in general - he was concerned 
, . (39) 
specifically with causal explanat10ns). Popper holds that 
there are two conditions which universal laws must satisfy; they 
must be strictly universal insofar as they are statements which 
are true for any place and time until they have been falsified, 
d dl h b "11 f 1 'f' bl (40) an secon y t ey must e emp1r ca y a S1 1a e. 
36. Samuel H. Beer, 'Causal Explanation and Imaginative Re-
enactment', History and Theory, Vol. 3, 1964, p.23. 
37. Atkinson, 'Explanation in History', p.24l. 
38. Popper, POH, p.122. 
39. A point made by Donagan. Alan Donagan, 'The Popper-Hempel 
Theory Reconsidered', History and Theory, Vol. 4, no. 1, 
1964, pp.127-8. 
40. Karl K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1968), 
pp.68-70. Popper, OS, p.262. 
Popper made a distinction between the generalizing sc~ences, 
subdivided into theoretical and applied sciences, and the 
historical sciences. In the case of the latter, historians 
are not concerned with discovering laws, as ~n the theoretical 
sciences, nor do they deal with prediction and control, the 
. h l' d' (41) Wh'l d' h object of t e app ~e sc~ences. ~ e not eny~ng t at 
history is concerned with the "actual singular or specific 
event", (42) Popper nevertheless advocates the methodological 
unity of all disciplines: 
... 1 am go~ng to propose a doctrine of the unity 
of method; that is to say, the view that all 
theoretical or generalizing sciences make use 
of the same method, whether they are natural or 
social science .•. I do not intend to assert that 
there are no differences whatever between the 
methods of the theoretical sciences of nature 
and of society; such differences clearly exist, 
even between the various natural sciences 
themselves, as well as between the various 
social sciences ••• But ... the methods in the two 
fields are fundamentally the same •.. The methods 
always consist in offering deductive causal 
explanations, and in testing them. (43) 
But Popper goes on to make an extremely important point, which, 
as will be argued later, seems to have been ignored by his 
critics ~n the field of historiography. 
This has sometimes been called the hypothetico-
deductive method_~ or more often the method of 
hypothesis, for it does not achieve absolute 
certainty for any of the scientific statements 
which it tests; rather, these statements 
41. Popper, POR, p.143., Popper OS, p.263. 
42. Popper, POR, p.143. 
43. op.cit., pp.130-1. 
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aLways retain the character of tentative hypotheses, 
even though their character of tentativeness may 
cease to be obvious after they have passed a great 
number of severe tests. (44) 
Hempel, in his first formulation of the method, writes that a 
scientific explanation of an event in question consists of: 
(1) a set of statements asserting the occurrence 
of certain events C
l
",C2 at certain times 
and places. 
(2) a set of universal hypotheses, such that 
(a) the statements of both groups are 
reasonably well confirmed by empirical 
evidence. 
(b) from the two groups of statements the 
sentence asserting the occurrence of 
event E can be logically deduced. (45) 
But even in this initial formulation, Hempel acknowledged (in his 
measles example) that "it can hardly be said to be a general law 
to the effect that any person who has not had the measles before 
will get them without fail if he stays in the company of some-
body else who has the measles; that a contagion will occur 
can be a~serted only with a high probability". (46) 
In a later paper Hempel distinguished between two basic types of 
scientific explanation, both explaining an event in terms of 
some antecedents and relying on the use of relevant generali-
zations. The first is the deductive-nomological mode of 
explanation which Hempel defines as "the deductive subsumption 




·op.cit., .. p.13l. (my italics). I would add that . _~ _ . 
these hypotheses are then regarded as "universal 
Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in 
laws". 
History' , 
in P. Gardiner (ed), Theories of History, p.345. 
op.cit., p.350. 
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of general laws". (47) These laws "connect the explanandum event 
with the particular conditions cited in the explanans, and this 
is what confers upon the latter the status of explanatory (and 
in some cases causal) factors in regard to the phenomenon being 
o (48) expla1ned". The second type of scientific explanation is the 
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probabilistic explanation which is an "assertion to the effect that 
if certain specified conditions are realised, then the occurrence 
of such and such a kind of event will come about with such and such 
o 0 b bOlo ,,(49) H 1 h h O 1 to a stat1st1cal pro a 1 1ty • empe says t at t 1S exp ana 10n 
is "nomological in that it presupposes general laws, but because 
these laws are of statistical rather than of strictly universal 
form, the resulting explanatory arguments are inductive rather than 
deductive in character". (50) History, according to Hempel, tends 
hOd 1 0 (51) to use t 1S secon type of exp anat10n. 
It must be pointed out that Hempel called these two types of 
explanation "models"; hence they must be seen as serving to 
remind us that they "constitute ideal types or theoretical ideal-
isations and are not intended to reflect the manner in which 
working scientists actually formulate their explanatory 
(52) 
accounts". Rather scientists often use elliptic or partial 
explanations which he characterises as "explanation sketches". (53) 
But they are useful as models because, amongst other points, they 
reveal logical connections between steps followed in explanations, 
• 0 (54) and provide standards for critical appraisal of such explanat10ns. 
In the case of history, Hempel seems unsure as to whether these 
explanation sketches could be filled in fully. For the generali-
zations needed to complete the explanations may be common 
47. Carl G. Hempel, "Explanation in Science and in History", 1n 
Nash) op.cit., p.81. 
48. op.cit., p.84. 
49. Ibid. 
50. op.cit., pp.85-6. 
51. op.cit., p.9l. 





knowledge and may be difficult to express prec~sely. While, 
as Atkinson has observed, this may be a "harsh exposure of the 
".. . 1 (56) standards of explanatory cogency ~n h~story ~n Hempe ean terms, 
what is at stake is the status of law explanations in history. 
Most critics of the Popper-Hempel v~ew, sometimes referred to as 
the covering-law method of explanation, justify their criticism 
firstly by an appeal to the way historians actually go about 
writing history. The inescapable conclusion is that thus far 
no such universaL Laws have been discovered and that it is 
unlikely that they will. Taylor, for example, asking the 
question: Why did Henry VIII dissolve the monasteries? proposes 
three possible "universal generalizations" each of which he 
shows to be untenable. The universal "Whenever a king is in need 
of money to finance his administration he seizes monasteries" is 
plainly false. Attempting to widen the scope of such a general-
ization, Taylor's next suggestion is also shown to be open to 
counter examples, "Whenever the supreme political authority needs 
finance it seizes that property the seizure of which is least likely 
to arouse either strong retaliation by the owners or widespread 
popular revolt". But when Taylor narrows the scope of the 
generalization, he ends up with one which applies only to the 
question at stake - "When a king exactly like Henry VIII in 
tl h .. ,,(57) ( . .. exac y t e Same s~tuat~on etc., etc. . Interest~ngly th~s ~s 
the way Donagan formulates the singular hypothetical in accounting 
for why an individual did what he did, as will be discussed below). 
Taylor's criticisms are, however, contingent upon the "universals" 
of the hypothetico-deductive model being conceived of as universal 
55. op.cit., pp.9l-4. 
56. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p.108. 
57. Daniel M. Taylor, Explanation and Meaning (1970), 
pp.74-76. 
and absolute. 
Other criticisms are directed at the examples of laws g~ven by 
Popper and Hempel. The latter has given as an example of a 
universal statement "populations will tend to migrate to regions 
which offer better living conditions", while admitting that it 
is difficult to state this hypothesis accurately in the form of 
209 
a general law which is "reasonably well confirmed by all the 
relevant evidence available".(58) Donagan observes that "it 1S 
aZways difficult and it has never been done". (59) Criticisms of 
Hempel must, however, take into account the points he stressed, 
namely that historians use the probabilistic model and that their 
attempts must be regarded as explanation sketches. 
Criticisms of Popper, however, can be attacked in a fundamental 
sense, for it may be argued that they are misconceived. Popper 
has given numerous examples of universal statements, including 
the "trivial universal laws" which we take for granted, such as 
"if of two armies which are about equally well-armed and led, 
one has a tremendous superiority in men, then the other never 
. ,,(60) H l' 1 f . 1 . W1ns • e a so c~tes examp es 0 soc~o oglcal laws 
or hypotheses such as "you cannot introduce agricultural 
tariffs and at the same time reduce the cost of living"; "you 
cannot, in an industrial society, organise consumers' pressure 
groups as effectively as you can organise certain producers' 
pressure groups"; 'you cannot make a revolution without causing a 
reaction", and so on. 
(61) 
58. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws ~n History', pp.349-50. 
59. Donagan, op.cit., p.143. 
60. Popper, OS, p.264. 
61. Popper, POH, p.62. 
The fact that Popper uses the word "trivial" to describe these 
"laws" has contributed to the criticism levelled at him. How-
ever, it must be pointed out that, specifically in the case of 
Popper, historiography on the subject of the covering-law model 
has been silent on his conception of science, his principle of 
falsifiability, and the importance of these with reference to 
his model of causal explanation. For Popper's universal laws 
are conceived of as hypotheses or conjectures, and the criterion 
of the scientific status of such hypotheses or conjectures ~s 
their falsifiability. The force of a particular universal law, 
or series of laws, is the degree of confirmation enjoyed at a 
particular time, within a particular paradigm. The various 
sociological laws above, (and it is to be noted that Popper 
adds "or hypotheses"), are analogous to the laws or hypotheses 
of the natural sciences. (62) The point is that the historian 
(like the scientist) deduces testable propositions from an hypo-
thesis and tries to refute the hypothesis by examining the 
relevant historical material. 
Agreement ••• is taken as corroboration, 
though not as final proof; clear disagree-
ment is considered as refutation or 
falsification. (63) 
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As an example illustrating Popper's argument consider this passage: 
Perhaps the last liberty to be promoted by the 
Reformation in the sixteenth century was that 
of the mind. Movements of missionary passion 
are not given to tolerance and scepticism, nor 
do they provoke such reaction in those they 
62. Ibid. 
63. op.cit., p.133 (my italics). 
attack; among the first victims of this new 
age of religious controversy were the spirit 
of free enquiry and the patience extended to 
the conformist. Luther could be highly ob-
scurantist at the expense of intellectuals 
of Erasmus's type; the fate of the so-called 
Catholic reformers of Italy shows how under 
the pressure of the great heresies toleration 
of reasonable diversity changed into fierce 
hostility; Thomas More developed from the 
speculative humanist of Utopia (1516) into the 
persecuting lord chancellor of 1530. (64) 
The hypothesis is clearly stated namely, "Movements of m~ss~onary 
pass~on are not given to tolerance and scpeticism, nor do they 
provide such reaction ~n those they attack". This is tested 
successfully by Elton through examination of the attitudes and 
actions of Luther, the Catholic Reformers of Italy, and Thomas 
More. 
As to the way such hypotheses are obtained, Popper's position ~s 
that we always start with "something ~n the nature of a theory, 
such as a hypothesis, or a prejudice or a problem ••• which in some 
way guides our observations, and helps us to select from the 
innumerable objects of observation those which may be of 
. " (65) . . 
~nterest • In hermeneut~c terms the ~nterpretative and 
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historical traditions in which the historian stands, contribute to 
his fore-structure, to his point of view on the event being studied. 
Consider now Beer's criticism of Popper's position. Popper is 
accused of "bad generalizing", of being guilty of the "vice" of 
64. 
65. 
G.R. Elton, 'Introduction' to The New Cambridge Modern 
History, Volume II: The Reformation (1958), p.3. 
Popper, POH, p.134. 
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II . 1· 11(66) the dogma of un1versa 1ty . Thus when Beer says that the 
generalizations used by Tilly lIare not universal 1n form but 
are relative to a certain context or contexts ll , and his explanat-
ions are therefore IIrelativell, being neither IIperfect ll nor IIcom-
pletell , he is in fact not refuting Popper. On the contrary, he is 
confirming the Popperean V1ew. This may be expressed in another 
way - Beer's criticisms, like all others of Popper's explana-
tory thesis, are not hermeneutic, since they fail to place the 
hypothetico-deductive model in the whole corpus of Popper's 
thoughts on the philosophy of science. 
The var10US so-called IIrevisions ll of the covering-law model as 
. d b bl . d II .. II (67) d1scusse y Dray, are, argua y, m1sname as reV1S10ns. 
For example, Scriven's so-called IInormic ll generalizations or 
truisms which he postulates against the hypothetico-deductive 
model (admittedly as a criticism of Hempel), remind one of 
Popper's examples. Scriven characterises normic generalizations 
as being less-than-universal laws which are neither univers.al nor 
statistical(!), and examples cited include lIa reasonable man with 
better reasons for doing something than he had when he previously 
did it, will do it againll, and IIpreventing attack is a good reason 
for invasion when victory is certain without too much fighting 
and moral considerations are not too highly regarded ll . (68) 
Similarly Popper would surely not disagree with Rescher and Helmer 
who have postulated IIlimited" or "restricted" generalizations which 
hold within a limited period of time or in a limited geographical 
(69) 





Beer, op.cit., p.S. 
William H. Dray, Philosophy of History (1964), p.15ff. 
Michael Scriven, 'Truisms as the Grounds for Historical 
Explanations', in Gardiner P. (ed), op.cit., p.467. 
quoted in Dray, op.cit., p.16. 
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limited generalizations relating to a particularsta~e of techno-
logy and to the institutional practices of a certain place and 
. (70) 
t1me. 
Neither would Popper quarrel with Checkland who advocates the 
use of models ("elaborated hypotheses") in order to try to answer, 
for example, questions about the conditions which have governed 
. . 1 . (71) S h the growth of output per head 1n a part1cu ar soc1ety. uc 
hypotheses, says Checkland in Popperean spirit, must be tested 
.. . h h· . (72) Cl 1 1n relat10n to the data ava1lable to t e 1stor1an. ear y 
the value of an hypothesis depends on its success in elucidating 
the problem under consideration. As Fogel says: 
For the historian .•. the tool (hypothesis) that 
fits is the one most appropriate to the 
historical reality that is being analysed and 
that will yield the most information from the 
available data. (73) 
Beer g1ves a good example of the workings of the covering-law 
model in terms which would be acceptable to Popper (despite Beer's 
criticism already noted). The example chosen is Tilly's paper 
h 1 . . h d' (74) . . on t e counter-revo ut10n 1n t eVen ee. Draw1ng f1rstly on 
his detailed study of the Vendee, and on a systematic compar1son 
of the various localities in that area which were counter-
revolutionary, as well as on those which were not; and secondly, 
inspired by generalizations from sociology such as theories on 
urbanisation, Tilly postulated his hypothesis, "In the Vendee in 
1793, counter-revolution occurred where there was a juction of 







C.B. Joynt and N. Rescher, 'The Problem of Uniqueness in 
History', History and Theory, Vol. 1, no. 2, 1961, pp.155-l58. 
S.G. Checkland, 'The Historian as Model Builder' The , 
Philosophical Journal, Vol. 6, 1969, pp.42-45. 
Ibid. 
Robert William Fogel, "The Limits of Quantitative Methods in 
History", American Historical Review, Vol. 80, 1975, p.34l. 
Beer, op.cit., pp.lO-20. 
op.cit., p.ll. 
methodology, goes on to write: 
All this is common place of methodology: 
students of society, like natural scientists, do 
not just study brute facts (or evidence about 
them). They also bring to that study certain 
ideas, vague or precise, which selectively focus 
attention and suggest possible connections •.• Tilly 
clearly does not treat ••• general statements as 
universal laws ••• he takes them rather as 
suggestions of what might be the case rather 
than hypotheses of what wouZd be the case. (76) 
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Furthermore, Beer stresses that Tilly is "systematically select-
ive, his selection being guided in part by theory", while also 
taking note of the evidence. His explanation, which is a relative 
one, ~s based on hypotheses "limited in their validity to a 
. (or contexts)". (77) . h certa~n context Ne~ther Popper nor a ermen-
eutic historian would quarrel with these judgments of 
approbation. 
The witch-craze phenomenon offers an interesting opportunity to 
study examples of Popperean theory in practice. For it is an 
event which has only recently become the focus of historical 
investigation, and is far from being fully understood. It there-
fore offers an example of what might be called "history ~n the 
raw" with historians groping to find explanatory frameworks which 
will illuminate those events. As Nachman has pointed out, that 
investigation involves three main questions: firstly, why was 
there specifically a witch-craze? In other words, why were 
witches singled out for persecution? Secondly, what was the 
significance of the timing of the craze? Thirdly, why were 
most of the victims women?(78) (This third question illustrates 
76. op.cit., pp.12-3. 
77. op.cit., pp.14-5. 
78. Nachman, op.cit. 
2lS 
the hermeneutic point that the historian's present influences 
the way he approaches the past, and in this case, the 
specific topic chosen. Recent interest in witchcraft owes 
something to the feminist movement, which has led to a greater 
interest in the role of women in history, or herstory. Of course, 
however, studies of the witch-craze are also the result of the 
growth of social history and the closer cooperation between anthro-
pologists and sociologists, on the one hand, and historians on 
the other). One attempt to answer the third question will be 
examined briefly. 
Discussing the social and spiritual inferiority accorded to women 
during the medieval period, Anderson and Gordon postulate the 
following hypothesis in order to try to explain why most of those 
persecuted as witches during the witch-craze were women: 
The scapegoating of women as witches was possible 
and became effective only because there still 
existed in late medieval and post-Reformation 
Europe a powerful framework of denigrating beliefs 
relating to women which those who constructed the 
stereo-type witch and initiated the moral pan1cs 
could draw upon in credible way. (79) 
In their efforts to test that hypothesis, Anderson and Gordon ask 
whether, where the status of women was higher, "there was a 
cor~espondingly lower level of witch mania and witch persecu-
. ,,(80) " . t10ns . Factual eV1dence 1nd1cates that one country where 
this did OCClJ,r was England, __ and therefore Anderson and Gordon have 
tried to isolate the differences between. the persecution of 
witches in England and elsewhere. They show that the laws relating 
to witchcraft were less elaborate and that there was less differ-
entiation in the way witches were treated by the English legal 
79. 
80. 
Alan Anderson and Raymond Gordon, 'Witchcraft and the Status 
of Women - the Case of England', British Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 29, no. 2, 1978, p.174. 
op.cit., p.17S. 
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system. (81) Furthermore while there were less recorded executions 
in Britain during this period, sentences were also generally 
more lenient. And finally, English witchcraft was less dependent 
. ... h h D ·1 (82) A· 1 . on ~ts assoc~at~on w~t t e ev~. ttempt~ng to exp a~n 
this distinctiveness they have brought forward evidence which 
demonstrates that English women "had a status and independence which 
( . d)" (83) found no parallel elsewhere except perhaps ~n Hollan • 
Although also concluding that no claim is being made for understand-
ing English witchcraft by referring to the status of women alone, 
they make the point that to focus on the position of women "is 
to draw attention to a long neglected dimension of English witch-
craft". (84) And, as they conclude, the debate as to why primarily 
women were singled out will undoubtedly continue, (85) with the 
various hypotheses postulated being tested by in-depth studies of 
the various examples of that phenomenon in attempts at falsifi-
cation. 
81. op.cit., p.176. 
82 • . op.cit., p.177. 
83. Ibid. To the best of my knowledge Holland escaped the witch-
craze. 
84. op.cit., p.182. 
85. Ibid. Another new perspective from a feminist point of view 
has recently been suggested although I am not aware if it 
has been followed up. Walters proposes that "witchcraft is 
one form of cultural protest", and that "witches defended 
female crafts and medical skills against . encroaching male 
professionalism and a violently patriarchal church". Juliet 
Mitchell, 'Women and Equality', in Juliet Mitchell and Ann 
Oakley (eds), The Rights and Wrongs of Women (1976). 
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(b) Rational explanations 
As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter the idea that 
"why" questions can be answered by verstehen as imaginative 
rethinking is one to which some writers in the field of historio-
graphy still subscribe. For example, Beer quotes Walzer's defence 
of the method of "sympathetic understanding" in which the latter 
claims that when scientific explanation fails, the historian must 
resort to "that intuition which comes, above all, from the 
, (86) 
practice of h1story". It has been argued that Dilthey 
himself was aware of the charge of scepticism to which a purely 
psychologistic conception of verstehen, as the recovery of in-
tention, was vulnerable, and in his later thought, his emphasis 
was on verstehen as interpretation of forms of life through 
, , b' 1 'b (87) h h f language wh1ch 1S pu l1c y acceSS1 le. T us w en Farr, or 
example,speaking of verstehen, says that in contemporary thought 
it has taken a linguistic turn, being concerned with "public, 
shared meaning, paradigmatically communicated through language" ,(88) 
he reveals his unfamiliarity with the hermeneutic tradition as a 
whole. Even Walzer himself makes it clear that sympathetic under-
standing cannot function without an understanding of the social 
and economic conditions and the prevalent ideas of the period 1n 
, (89) 
quest10n. But at this point our concern is with "why" 
questions and the recovery of intention in order to explain a 
certain event. What was missing in Dilthey's thought, and indeed 
other early hermeneutic thinkers, was a formal expression of 
verstehen as the recovery of intention. An attempt will there-





Beer, op.cit., p.20. 
Chapter Two. 
James Farr, 'Hume, Hermeneutics and History: A "Sympathetic 
Account', History and Theory, Vol. 17, no. 3, 1978, p.309. 
Beer, op.cit., p.2l. 
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Abel has rejected the v~ew that verstehen is a method by means of 
which intentional human behaviour is explained. According to him, 
"the operation of verstehen is based upon the application of 
personal experience to observed behaviour. We 'understand' an 
observed or assumed connection if we are able to parallel either one 
with something we know through self-observation does happen. 
Furthermore, since the operation consists of the application of 
knowledge we already possess, it cannot serve as a means of 
. . f" h 1 d k ,,(90) d~scovery. At best ~t can only con ~rm w at we a rea y now. 
Its importance is that it provides the historian with hunches 
" " "" "h h b h b h" (91) wh~ch ass~st h~m ~n formulat~ng ypot eses a out uman e av~our. 
Nagel makes the point that it is essential to distinguish between 
verstehen as a way of generating "suggestive hypotheses" and 
h " '1 "ria " " ,,(92) verste en as a way of va~~ t~ng proposed explanat~ons . He 
argues that verstehen in the first sense does function usefully 
as "a source of fertile ideas", but that as a method, verstehen 
does not "supply any criteria for the validity of conjectures and 
hypotheses concerning the springs of human action". (93) 
Attempts to express verstehen formally are grouped under the label 
"rational explanation", as has already been pointed out. What is 
the status of such explanations? Are they sui generis or can they 
be considered as being, in principle, forms of the Popperean hypo-
thetico-deductive model of explanation? 
Dray's version defends the former v~ew. According to Dray, a 





Theodore Abel, 'The Operation called verstehen', American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, no. 3, 1948, p.2l6. 
op.cit., p.2l7. 
Ernest Nagel, 'On the Method of verstehen as the Sole Method 
of Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, 1953, p.156. 
Ibid. 
was done", in that it is a "reconstruction of the agent's cal-
culation of ~he means to be adopted towards his chosen end in 
. f h . . h· h he found h~mself".(94) the l~ght 0 t e c~rcumstances ~n w ~c ~ 
Dray's argument is that the object of a rational explanation 
~s to show that something was the appropriate thing to have done 
~n a situation rather than to show that the thing was done in 
accordance with certain laws. Hence a rational explanation 
contains an element of appraisal which is missing in covering 
law explanations, and which is required in giving a rational 
explanation. 
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Hempel has argued that Dray's formulation is non-explanatory because 
it does not explain why the individual did in fact do what he 
did. (95) Whereas Dray's formulation is as follows: 
A was in a situation of type C. In a situation 
of type C, the appropriate thing to do is X. (96) 
Hempel's reformulation reads: 
A was in a situation of type C. A was disposed 
to act rationally. Any person who is disposed 
to act rationally will, when in a situation of 
type C, invariably (with a high probability) 
do X. (97) 
This, Hempel says, is a 'nomological explanation', in which the 
normative principles have been replaced by statements of dis-
positions, that is, statements connecting dispositions with 
(98) manifestations of their presence. Thus Hempel is able to 
claim: 
94. William H. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (1957) 
Ch 5. ' apter 
95. Hempel, 'Explanation in Science and History', p.100. 
96. Ibid. 
97. op.cit., p.10l. 
98. op.cit., p.102. 
.•. the nature of understanding, in the sense in 
which explanation is meant to give us an under-
standing of empirical phenomena, is basically 
the same in all areas of scientific inquiry; 
and •.• the deductive and probabilistic model of 
nomological explanation accommodates vastly more 
than just the explanatory arguments of say 
classical mechanics; in particular they accord 
well with the character of explanations that deal 
with the influence of rational deliberation, of 
conscious and subconscious motives, and of ideas 
and ideals on the shaping of historical events. 
In so doing, our schemata exhibit, I think, 
one important aspect of the methodological unity 
of all empirical science. (99) 
The Hempelean formulation as one form of explanation used by 
historians is accepted 1n this thesis. For example, in the 
following extract, the September Massacres are explained partly 
in terms of a statement of dispositions to the effect that 1n a 
situation of counter-revolution and invasion, people will 
invariably act in a way which expresses their panic and fear: 
In the wake of the revolution of 10 August 1792 
followed the grisly episode known as the 
September Massacres, when the prisons were 
entered by armed bands, who set up hastily 
improvised "people's" tribunals and executed 
some 1,100 to 1,400 of their inmates -
priests and political prisoners among them, but 
mainly common-law offenders: thieves, prosti-
tute~, forgers and vagrants. It was a mysterious 
episode, defying exact analysis; yet it seems to 
have been largely the product of a panic-fear 
engendered by the threat of counter-revolution 
and invasion; Verdun, a bare 200 miles from the 
capital, had just fallen to the Prussians; and 
able-bodied Parisians, responding to the summons 
of Danton, the new Minister of Justice were . , 
flock1ng to enrol for service at the front thus 
leaving the city more exposed. (100) , 
99. op.cit., p.l06. 
100. George Rude, Revolutionary Europe 1783-1815 (1964), p.13l. 
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Two further points must, however, be made on the subject of rational 
explanations. Firstly, does Hempel's formulation allow for free-
dom of choice? Does it cover the i dea of an explanation which 
involves the agent's intention? Secondly, Hempel has made reference 
to "subconscious motives". How do historians account for irrational 
actions? 
Donagan has argued that "most historians would be sceptical of a 
proferred explanation in which it was assumed that all agents of the 
same psychological type, or in the same sociological position, when 
confronted with a situation of the same kind, will act in a certain 
kind of way". (101) The "methodological scepticism", Donagan con-
tinues, may be formulated as "the presupposition of individual 
choice", which is an affirmation of the traditional doctrine of free 
will, "that man ultimately has an unconditional power to choose how 
h 'II ttl (102) AD" h ' h ' e W1 ac. s onagan goes on to say, t ere 1S muc 1n any 
man that he cannot alter", habits are unlikely to be changed except 
by "vigilant effort", and his "emotional dispositions are no more 
(103) a matter of choice than the kind of body he has". Furthermore, 
while an individual does operate within certain institutionally-
determined limits, so that the possibilities from which he can choose 
are circumscribed, nevertheless he has the ability to have chosen 
otherwise and the opportunity to have acted otherwise. While 
historians may not affirm the doctrine of free will overtly, they 
proceed as if it were true when giving explanations concerned with 
individual actions. Berlin writes: 
101. Donagan, op.cit., p.148. 
102. op.cit., p.149. 
103. Ibid. 
••• all the discussions of historians about whether a 
given policy could or could not have been prevented, 
and what view should therefore be taken of acts and 
characters of the actors, are intelligible only on 
the assumption of the reality of human choices ••• I 
do not wish here to say that determinism is necessarily 
false, only that we neither speak nor think as if it 
could be true, and that it is difficult, and perhaps 
impossible to concei~e what our picture of the world 
would be if we seriously believed it ••• (104) 
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Pachter concurs, stating that "for practical purposes ••. the historian 
deals with individuals as if their decisions were free". (105) 
Donagan's formal model of explanation, which is an implicit 
affirmation of free will, will be put forward to account for indi-
vidual choices and actions. The question is, as a causal explana-
tion, 1S it antithetical to the idea of the hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation in Popperean terms? 
Popper's notion of the "logic of the situation" may arguably be re-
d d . 1·· k d f h·d f f ·11 (106) gar e as an 1mp 1C1t ac nowle gement 0 t e 1 ea 0 ree W1 • 
Wilkins says of situational logic that it constitues the 
historians' attempt to "assess or evaluate the rational adequacy 
of the acts of historical agents, given what they know about the 
, . . d h· b 1· f b . . ." ( 1 09) agent s s1tuat10n an 1S e 1e s a out h1s s1tuat10n • 
According to Wallace this indicates that Popper recognises that 
there is a fundamental difference between the methodology of the 
historian and that of the natural scientist, because the former 
deals with intentional actions. Thus, she says, "the distinguishing 
characteristics of history cannot be the discovery of objective 
universal laws from which particular events necessarily follow". (108) 
Clearly Wallace has misinterpreted Popper who never made such a claim. 
Moreover, as will be argued, the idea of situation logic 1S not 
104. Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Historical Inevitability', reprinted in 
Meyerhoff (ed), op.cit., pp.25 1-2. 
105. Pachter, op.cit., p.463. 
106. Popper, OS, p.97, Popper, POH, p.149. 
107. In Carol-Wallace, 'Review Essay on Popper', History and Theory, 
Vol. 18, no. 3, 1979, p.426. 
108. Ibid. 
antithetical to Popper's hypothetico-deductive model of explana-
tion. 
Explaining what he means by situational logic Popper writes: 
... our actions are to a very large extent explicable 
in terms of the situation in which they occur. Of 
course, they are never fully explicable in terms of 
the situation alone; an explanation of the way in 
which a man, when crossing a street, dodges the 
cars which move in it may go beyond the situation 
and may refer to his motives, to an "instinct" of 
self-preservation, or to his wish to avoid pain 
etc. But this psychological part of the explanation 
is very often trivial as compared with the detailed 
determination of his action by what we may call the 
logic of the situati on. (109) 
Donagan has attempted to use Popper's views as a springboard for 
his own formulation of an explanation which takes the doctrine 
of free choice into account. Donagan argues firstly that what a 
man does depends on the way he conceives of a situation rather 
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than the way it is, (the latter, according to Donagan, being 
suggested by Popper). Secondly, while Popper calls the 
"psychological part" of the explanation "trivial", Donagan stresses 
that "trivial", must be interpreted as "obvious" rather than as 
"unimportant". These "criticisms" cannot, however, be taken 
seriously as they do not challenge the fundamental thesis. Nor, 
it is suggested, would Popper disagree with Donagan on these points. 
Thirdly, Donagan says that "Popper has neglected to draw attention 
to the fact that what he calls the 'psychological part' of such an 
l · . ." (110) . . exp anat~on conta~ns no cover~ng law. But, to re~terate, 
Donagan has misunderstood the way Popper uses "universal law", and 
hence, while Donagan postulates his model of explanation to account 
for individual choice as being antithetical to Popper, it may be 
shown rather to be in accordance with the latter's position. 
109. Popper, OS, p.97. 
110. Donagan,-op.cit., p.147. 
Taking as his example an attempt to explain why Brutus decided to 
join the conspiracy led by Cassius, Donagan gives the answer: 
Brutus resolved to preserve the Republic at all costs, and judged 
that the logic of his situation was that only by joining Cassius 
(uI) 
could the Republic be preserved. Expressing the explanation 
formally, it entails: 
(i) a singular hypothesis (in this case - if Brutus 
judged that to preserve the Republic it was 
necessary to perform a certain act, he would 
perform that act). 
(ii) the statement of initial conditions (in this 
case, Brutus judged that to preserve the 
Republic, it would be necessary to join 
Cassius' conspiracy). 
(iii)from this we deduce the explanandum, Brutus 
joined the conspiracy of Cassius. (112) 
Donagan goes on to say that such an explanation may need to be 
filled out, by reconstructing the agent's process of inference 
f h·· . d' h' .. f h . . (U3) rom 1S 1ntent1on an 1S apprec1at10n 0 t e s1tuat10n. 
Clearly this involves the use of a "what" question - what did 
the situation mean to Brutus? Thus the event must make sense 
1n its historical context. A narrative of events prior 
to Brutus' decision, in order to throw light on that meaning, 
would also be necessary. It would require the use of verstehen 
as the sympathetic rethinking of Brutus' intentions, given the 
historian's familiarity with the protagonists and the period as 
a whole, providing him with possible hypotheses to test against 
Ill. op~cit.~ p.150. 
112. I would add to the explanans as follows: 
(i) If Brutus judged that to preserve the Republic it was 
necessary to perform a certain act, he would perform 
that act, if he did want to preserve the Republic. 
(ii) Brutus judged that to preserve the R~public, it would 
be necessary to join Cassius' conspiracy, and he did 
want to preserve the Republic. 
113. op.cit., p.lSl. 
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the evidence (as Abel argued). Donagan himself remarks in connec-
tion with his model that "the only way in which an hypothesis 
about an historical agent's intention can be corroborated is to 
deduce falsifiable 'statements from it, and to investigate whether 
. f f 1 ·f· d" (114) they are, ~n act, a s~ ~e . 
Thus an answer to the question, why did someone do something? 
(assuming that action to have been freely chosen within certain 
historically-circumscribed possibilities) ~8 g~ven within the 
broad framework of the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation 
conceived of in Popperean terms. In order to arrive at the 
premises of the explanans, answers to "what" and "how" questions 
are also required. To illustrate this latter point let us look 
briefly at the following extract which attempts to account for the 
Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 24 August 1572. 
The third civil war (1568-70) left the Huguenots more 
powerful than ever. They preserved the right to 
exercise their religion (a right which they rarely 
allowed to Catholics in those regions which they 
dominated) and were granted the further right to 
garrison four towns in southern France (Edict of 
Pacification of St. Germain, 8 August 1570). Once 
more Catherine tried to solve all the kingdom's 
problems on a personal level. Her daughter Margaret 
was to marry the young Huguenot leader Henry of 
Navarre, the son of Anthony de Bourbon. Coligny 
came to court and joined the king's council. His 
plan was to unite France by a war against Spain. 
The Revolt of the Netherlands presented a unique 
opportunity. 
Coligny was in touch with Louis of Nassau and the Sea 
Beggars. Charles IX, under the influence of 
Coligny's charismatic personality, ardently supported 
these plans. But they were flawed from the outset. 
Coligny underestimated the religious and partisans 
passions generated by ten years of hate campaigns, 
mutual terror and civil wars. He was vastly over-
optimistic about the ability of an exhausted France 
114. Ibid. 
to face the duke of Alva's formidable tepcios, 
the fanous Spanish infantry regiments. This 
prospect terrified the queen mother, and the 
military experts in the king's council agreed 
with her. But Coligny persisted. His 
followers talked of changing the king's council 
to make it amenable to their plans. What the 
Huguenots had never even hoped for in three civil 
wars, they seemed now on the verge of achieving 
peaceably: the capture of the king's government. 
Everything seemed to hinge on Coligny. Catherine 
therefore determined to have him murdered. But the 
plot misfired; Coligny was only wounded. The 
Huguenots breathed vengeance; the king promised an 
investigation. Catherine was desperate, but she 
managed to persuade the unstable young king that 
the Huguenots were now planning a coup. 'Then 
kill them all', he is reported to have shouted. 
This does not seem to have been Catherine's 
intention. She seems to have wanted to do away 
with some dozen Huguenot leaders. But once more 
and, one may think, again inevitably, events escaped 
from her control. On the sultry summer's night of 
24 August 1572, St. Bartholomew's Day, Catherine's 
son, the duke of Anjou (later Henry III), the Guises, 
the municipal authorities of Paris and, above all, the 
Paris mob transformed the selective killings into a 
general massacre of the Huguenots (and anyone else 
they disliked) in Paris and in the prov~nces. This 
time Coligny did not escape. (115) 
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The massacre was ordered by Catherine de Medici. Following Donagan, 
the formal explanation of that event entails: 
(i) a singular hypothesis - if Catherine judged that to 
prevent a coup it was necesary to do away with Huguenot 
leaders, she would order that act, if she wanted 
to prevent a coup. 
(ii) The statement of initial conditions - she judged it 
so, and she wanted to prevent the coup. In order to 
arrive at this understanding, the account contains 
115. H.G. Koenigsberger and George L. Mosse, Europe ~n the 16th 
Century (1968), pp.252-3. 
(iii) 
a narrative of events preceding the decision (only 
events from 1570 onwards have been included, although 
strictly speaking one requires knowledge of events 
from at least 1562, the date generally accepted as 
marking the beginning of the French Wars of 
Religion). The account also tries to elucidate 
what these events meant to the Huguenots in general, 
to Coligny, to Charles IX and, of course, to 
Catherine herself. In short the contexts against 
which the decision was taken are clarified. 
the explanandum - she ordered the act. 
(c) Explanations of irrational actions 
Historians may come across actions which they might find diffi-
cult to class as rational. It may of course be the case that the 
historian has been incorrect in the end he has attributed to the 
agent, and hence he has mistakenly seen the act as irrational. 
But where the historian is not thus misinformed it 1S, as 
Izenberg has suggested, necessary that he be able to provide 
certain criteria for identifying what counts as an irrational 
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act. (116) Attempting to isolate criteria for judgments of the 
inappropriateness of an action, Izenberg speaks of cases "in which 
the behaviour in question is unsuitable or inadequate as a means 
for accomplishing the agent's self-proclaimed purposes. This 
disparity between means and end makes 1.l.l? ,_s.qapect that the agent is 
not correctly, or at least not fu l ly, describing his own purposes 
d 
. . ,,(ll?) . 
an mot1vat1ons . Of course, as Izenberg p01nts out, 
the agent may not have had adequate information, as was said above, 
but, if this is not the case, and if also we are not questioning 
his "intellectual capacity", then actions which turn out different-
ly from what we would expect, given his acknowledged intention might 
116. Gerald Izenberg, 'Psychohistory and Intellectual History', 
Hist?ry and Theory, Vol. 14 , no. 2, 1975. 
117. Op.C1t., p.142. 
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lead us to believe that there were other intentions besides the 
declared ones. A person may act in a way which is inappropriate to 
the norms of the society in question, but provided he is aware of 
his own norms and standards, and acts consistently in accordance 
with them, his actions cannot be called inappropriate. It is only 
when his actions are inconsistent and contradictory in terms of 
their own norms, that the historian may look for explanations 
beyond those given by the agent, that is ~n terms of his declared 
purposes. Having then classed an action as irrational, the 
historian may apply psycho-analytic theories, trying to "go 
beneath the deceptive surface of conscious motives to give the 
real reasons for behaviour-reasons unknown to the agent". (118) 
These kinds of explanation are, by general consensus, held to be 
in the field of psychohistory. This field has generated much 
controversy. Voicing a common criticism, Bainton, when discussing 
psycho-analytic attempts to understand Luther, points to the lack 
of material on which to base a reconstruction of "all the turmoils 
of Luther's inner life". (119) But as Izenberg points out, without 
sufficient evidence no such analysis could or should be 
(120) 
attempted. Other criticisms include some which are, as 
Izenberg remarks, "misplaced or frivolous". They stem from the 
fear of the historians of "having the purity of their discipline 
contaminated by other disciplines with scientific pretensions and 
h · . ,,(121) Th tec n~cal Jargon. us, Barzun, for example, argues that 
history is "addressed to the common reader whose 'understanding' .•• 






Roland H. Bainton, 'Interpretations of the Reformation', 
American Historical Review, Vol. 66, no. 1, 1960, p.8l. 
Izenberg, op.cit., p.139. The usefulness of Erikson's 
analysis is accepted in this thesis. 
Ibid. 
is intelligible to him which he finds sufficiently congruent 
with his experience (direct or vicarious) to make him accept the 
neighbouring strangeness and integrate it into a new imaginative 
experience. For , this purpose the explanatory force of common 
d" (122) B th t speech cannot be bettere. arzun goes on to say a 
the "technical words" used by the psychohistorian "would not 
increase knowledge, would not explain further, because they 
would not really be about the man but about his situation con-
. d d . 1 ,,( 123) I th f th t B h s s~ ere typ~ca... . t seems ere ore a arzun a 
not grasped what is at stake in giving psycho-analytic 
explanations. 
The concept of irrational actions counts against the early 
hermeneutic claim that making sense of the past consists simply 
in the recovery of intention. To be fair, however, it must be 
pointed out that Dilthey had suggested that an interpreter, 
by conscientiously following an author's train of thought, 
could reveal elements which remained unconscious in the 
latter, hence being able to claim that he (the interpreter) 
understood the other better than he had understood himself. 
The idea of a hermeneutic of history, employing a double hermen-
eutic, endorses the possibility of using psycho-analytic explan-
ation where justified (as has already been indicated). Sanction 
for the use of psycho-analytic theory depends on the evidence 
available, as well as a well-founded judgment as to the ~ncom­
pleteness or inadequacy of the more "traditional" modes of 
explaining individual actions. As Passmore has pointed out, 
theories from psychology, sociology and economics, for example, 
have affected the procedures of the historian, although this 
occurs "usually after a decent interval and a considerable show 
122. Barzun, op.cit., p.46. 
123. op.cit., p.48. 
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" " (124) H" " of reluctance" on the part of the h~ston.ans. ~stor~ans 
may quite properly be wary of applying theories which they 
themselves do not fully u,nderstand, but they ought not thereby 
to dismiss out of court the possibility of others who are 
qualified to do so. 
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Justifying his attempt at working towards a psycho-analytic 
interpretation of Bismarck, Pflanze admits that historians operate 
under the severe handicap of insufficient evidence, "for the 
primal experiences that produce the basic character-traits which 
occur in the earliest years of life are hidden from the 
b " "If b "d h h" f d f " (125) su Ject h~mse y repress~on an ot er mec an~sms 0 e ence • 
Accepting too that Freudian psychology ~s speculative in character, 
Pflanze nevertheless argues that even if such an account may in 
the long run be judged a failure, insofar as it raises certain 
questions it may count as a pre-condition for a later more 
successful explanation. The kind of explanation a historian might 
give using psycho-analytic theory is illustrated in a passage 
(126 ) 
from Pflanze's paper. 
To sum up on the issue of "why" questions, it ~s held that histor-
ians do use the form of the hypothetico-deductive model of 
explanation conceived of in Popperean terms to answer these kinds 
of questions. The "laws" used are not laws ~n the nineteenth 
century positivist sense. Rather they must be seen as hypo-
theses, as conjectures, which the historian will test against the 
evidence in an attempt at their falsification. In so doing, he 
may alter or refine these hypotheses in his efforts to make the 
124. Passmore, op.cit., p.12l. 
125. Otto Pflanze, "Toward a Psycho-analytic Interpretation of 
Bismarck", American Historical Review, Vol. 77, no. 1, 1972. 
p.4l9. 
126. Appendix C. 
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event(s) in question intelligible. In short, the procedure occurs 
through the operation of the hermeneutic circle of understanding. 
Strange as it may seem, therefore, bearing in mind the traditional 
dichotomy between the naturwissenschaften and the geistes1.J)issen-
schaften, the operation of the hypothetico-deductive model of 
explanation conceived of in Popperean terms is itself "hermeneutic". 
To conclude on the ~ssue of explanation in history, it has been 
argued that there ~s no single, formal hermeneutic model of explan-
ation. The different kinds of questions asked by historians from 
their re.spective points of view require different kinds of answers. 
But it has also been shown that answers to "what", "how" and 
"why" questions are interlinked and interdependent. In practice 
the historian does not necessarily separate them out as has been 
done in this chapter for the sake of methodological clarity. But 
while there is no single specifically hermeneutic form of 
explanation, all explanations are essentially hermeneutic, insofar 
as they must always be contextual, and in as much as the historian's 
ultimate concern is with the fuller historical meaning of events. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Hermeneutics has been defined as the philosophical theory of in-
terpretation of the meaning of texts and actions. The idea of a 
hermeneutic of history has been developed through a fleshing out 
of that definition by firstly, considering the history of hermen-
eutics; secondly, taking into account contributions made by 
Popper and Kuhn to the philosophy of science; thirdly, relating 
hermeneutics to issues raised by the philosophy of history, and 
particularly the question of explanation in history and the 
problem of historical objectivity; and finally through a 
dialogue with written histo.ry . 
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The Renaissance emphasis on the importance of a critical scrutiny 
of texts, and the rejection by the Reformers of the idea of an 
institutionalized interpretation of patristic texts, stimulated 
the early development of hermeneutics as the concern with the in-
terpretation of the meaning of texts. Flacius, Spinoza and later, 
Ast, Wolf and Schleiermacher tried to develop interpretative 
rules which would guarantee the truth of such interpretations aimed 
at a recovery of the author's intention. All stressed the need 
for the interpreter to be linguistically competent, and that the 
work be placed in its literary and broader historical context, 
thereby g~v~ng expression to the idea of a hermeneutic circle in 
terms of which parts are always understood in terms of a whole, 
and the whole in terms of its parts. The Scientific Revolution 
and Enlightenment were also crucial in the development of hermen-
eutics insofar as they led to the extension of the notion of 
interpretation to actions. Gatterer's reaction against the 
early positivist conviction that history must become more 
scientific in its method was anticipated by Vico, both arguing 
that history was sui gene~is . Because its subject matter was 
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concerned with human ideas (vico), or the gei st or spirit of a 
nation (Gatterer), history required an appropriate mode of explan-
ation, namely imaginative rethinking. Anticipating Dilthey, 
Gatterer raised the question as to whether the objective recovery 
of the past through imaginative rethinking was possible in 
principle, given the subjective contribution by the historian to 
that task but he failed to analyse the dialogue between the 
historian and the past. 
The thought of Dilthey has proved crucial not only for the devel-
opment of hermeneutics in general, but for the idea of a hermeneutic 
of history in particular. His writings cemented the changed focus 
of hermeneutics from its early philological concerns towards 
epistemological issues. Although Dilthey explicitly recognised 
the historicality of existence , he too failed to follow up the 
methodological consequences of that insight for the interpretation 
of past events. If the historian himself is bound by the horizons 
of his own historical context, how is understanding of the past 
through imaginative rethinking possible? That question was 
begged by previous hermeneutic thinkers (apart from Gatterer), as 
was the even more fundamental question, how is understanding 
possible? Clearly too, the explicit recognition of the subjective 
contribution by the historian to the writing of history required 
a reex~nation of the question of objectivity. But because 
Dilthey was still influenced by the Cartesian tradition and the 
Enlightenment, he failed to relinquish the idea of a universally 
valid objective interpretation. For he was unable to see how to 
save historical knowledge from relativity' given the, historicality of 
exper1ence. These are issues with which subsequent hermeneutic 
philosophers have been concerned, and with which the idea of a 
hermeneutic of history must grapple in order that history be 
grounded on a sound epistemological foundation. 
234 
Like vico and Gatterer, Dilthey made a clear distinction between 
what he called the naturwissenschaften and the geisteswissenschaften 
While he emphasized that each required its own methodology, he did 
not deny that the latter might also use scientific explanatory 
techniques. But he insisted that objectifications of geist had 
always also to be understood in order to grasp their meaning. 
Extending the idea of verstehenfrom its psychologistic sense to 
include the elucidation of an event in its contextual wholes, 
Dilthey also stressed the linguistic competence of the interpreter. 
The idea ofa .hermeneutic of history accepts that both senses of 
verstehenare used in history, and play an important role in histori-
cal explanation. The elucidation of contextual meaning provides an 
answer to a "what" question, while verstehen, as imaginative re-
thinking, helps to generate hypotheses which are then expressed 
formally in rational explanations conceived of in a Popperean sense. 
In analysing the structure of understanding, Heidegger showed that 
all understanding and interpretation operates within the hermeneutic 
circle of understanding. The interpreter always begins with a 
preunderstanding of an event which is enlarged or changed in the 
process of coming to a fuller understanding. Thus understanding 
is always also self-understanding, and it involves the parts/whole 
hermeneutic circle so that every act of understanding is at once 
a movement between present and past, between fore-structure and that 
being investigated, as well as between parts and whole. 
Gadamer has attempted to fill out the circle by showing how 
tradition enters into and shapes the act of understanding a text. 
A historian's participation in the interpretative hist.orical 
tradition surrounding the event in question helps him to formulate 
a starting point in terms of which he grasps the meaning of that 
event. But understanding, as the fusion of horizons, entails 
that the meaning of a text always goes beyond its author. Under-
standing is not merely reproductive, that is insofar as it 
clarifies the historical horizon within which certain questions 
come to be posed; it is also always productive. reflecting the 
interpreter's own concerns. Although Gadamer has insisted that 
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his aim is not to provide a methodology for the geisteswissenchaften 
his thought has certain methodological consequences: it raises 
the issue of incommensurability, it invites the charge of hermen-
eutic anarchy, and also calls into question the possibility of an 
objectively valid interpretation. These charges have been levelled 
by Hirsch, for example, who insists that hermeneutics is concerned 
solely with the recovery of intention. 
The issue of intention ~s a crucial one ~n hermeneutics. The 
question as to whether the recovery of intention is possible in 
principle is answered by the interpreter's linguistic and cultural 
competence. But while the idea of a hermeneutic of history accepts 
that the recovery of intention is part of the historian's task, 
it by no means exhausts that task The speech act theory of 
meaning provides a useful model for the elucidation of the role of • 
intention in communication, but it is challenged in this thesis 
as being incomplete insofar as it conceives of the hearer or 
reader as being a passive partner in that communication. Part of 
the meaning of a text or action (regarded as a text analogue, 
following Ricoeur's argument), is given by the interpreter who is 
himself an historical being. Thus the past is not simply under-
stood in its own terms, as the early hermeneutic thinkers and possi-
bly Winch, .for example, held. It is also necessary to reinterpret the 
meaning of the past and thus practice what Giddens has called the 
double hermeneutic. Thus, as Taylor and the critical hermeneutic 
philosop.hers such as Apel and Habermas have also argued, a hermeneutic 
interpretation may well involve the imposition of theories which 
would have been unknown to the protagonists in question, for example, 
psycho-analytic theories. In short, hermeneutics is concerned 
with the fuller historical meaning of events. 
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The way the historian contributes to the mean~ng of the past is 
elucidated through an examination of the operation of the hermen-
eutic circle. Apart from transcendental presuppositions which 
provide the necessary conditions for the possibility of under-
standing anything at all, the fore-structure of the historian's 
understanding is constituted by two kinds of presupposition, 
namely those he has of the nature of his field and those which he 
holds with respect to the particular aspect of the past being 
investigated, including definitions and theories. The way the 
past is characterised and explained therefore depends on the 
point of view taken. 
A survey of the history of hermeneutics reveals that no hermeneutic 
philosophers have spelt out the idea of a formal hermeneutic 
explanation. It is argued in this thesis that there is no such 
single,formal model of explanation, but that historians use 
different kinds of explanation depending on different kinds of 
questions asked, these explanations being inter-linked and inter-
dependent. All explanations are, however, essentially hermeneutic 
in that they are always contextual and insofar as the historian's 
ultimate concern is with the meaning of events. In giving causal 
explanations it is argued that the historian makes use of the 
hypothetico-deductive model conceived of in a Popperean sense. 
While this may, at first sight, seem to be untenable in the idea 
of a hermeneutic of history (for history has traditionally been 
defined as antithetical to the natural sciences in hermeneutic 
thought, as we have seen), the explanation for this lies in 
science's hermeneutic turn as reflected in the philosophy of Popper 
and Kuhn. The concepts of a point of view and paradigm recognise 
that there is no absolute starting point for any investigation, 
and that scientists, like historians, always operate within specific 
historical contexts. Scientific laws, like historical generali-
zations, are put forward as hypotheses, conjectures or guesses 
offered for falsification. 
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There are many points of view or kinds of history, and present 
interests and concerns, the availability of new theories from related 
disciplines and the possibility of newly-discovered evidence, ensure 
the likelihood of changing foci on the past in accordance with the 
concept of a fuller historical mean1ng. The appropriateness and 
tenability of presuppositions about a particular event are tested by 
the self-reflective historian in a dialogue with the past within the 
hermeneutic circle. The intellectual and professional values shared 
by historians provide the criteria for jUdging objectivity within a 
point of view. While the imposition of moral value judgments on the 
past is regarded as part of the notion of the mediation of frames of 
meaning, judgments of their relevance must be clearly distinguished 
from assessments of objectivity. 
It must be stressed that the explicit recognition of the necessary 
role of the historian's subjectivity in the writing of history is 
not a weakness for which historians need apologise. History has 
long been regarded as science's "poor relation". One a1m of this 
thesis has been to dispel this sense of inferiority. For not only 
has science itself taken a "hermeneutic turn" but, even more strongly, 
it is only insofar as the historian does adopt a point of view that 
the past can be illuminated for his understanding. The essential 
contribution of the historian to his subject matter and to his disci-
pline, therefore, constitutes a strength of that discipline and 
ensures it dynamism. 
Each point of view must. however, be justified,that iustification 
being a pragmatic one. The sUGcess with which questions generated 
from within a particular point of view are answered, reflects ulti-
mately on the merit of that view itself. The opportunity for com-
paring and assessing the strengths and shortcomings of respective 
·claims is contained within the ideal of rational discourse in a 
politically free society as is sugges ted, for example, by Habermas' 
model of idealized dialogue. Not only I s this wider communication, 
that is the cooperation and competition which forms the social aspect 
of historial research, a necessary prerequisite for historical 
obiectivity, but the Socratic dialogue conducted by all historians 
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•.. In the course of the eighth and ninth centuries the growing 
influence of theology upon civil law produced a legal association 
of sorcerers with demons. The word maZeficium, originally 
'wrong-doing' in general, now came to mean malevolent sorcery 
in particular, and the maZeficus or maZefica was presumed to be 
closely associated with the Devil. Sorcery could now be prosecuted 
not simply as a crime against society but as a heresy against God. 
The law fixed the identification of paganism with demonolatry. 
A 'List of Superstitions' drawn up at the Council of Leptinnes in 
774 prohibited sacrifice to saints, evidence of the lingering con-
fusion in the popular mind between new saint and old deity. The 
same council approved a baptismal formula that asked the catechu-
men to 'renounce all the works of the demon, and all his words, 
and Thor, and Odin, and Saxnot, and all evil beings that are like 
them'. Charlemagne ordered death for anyone sacrificing 'a human 
being to the Devil and (offer i ng) sacrifice to demons as is the 
custom of the pagans'. . 
The law helped transfer the characteristics of evil spirits to 
human witches. The pagans had set out offerings of food and drink 
for minor spirits. The Synod of Rome in 743 assumed that these 
spirits were demons and outlawed the offerings. The demonic spirits 
were then transformed into bonae muZieres , the ghostly 'good women' 
who wandered out at night going into houses and stealing food. 
Finally, the bona muZi eres, were transformed into witches. Like-
wise the term stri ga or stria, originally a blood-drinking night 
spirit, became a common word for a witch. The early Middle Ages 
were tolerant of sorcery and heresy in comparison with the tortures 
and executions of the Roman Empire and with the hangings and 
burnings of the later Middle Ages and Renaissance. Two or three 
years' penance was normal for maZeficiwn, incantation and idolatry. 
But the law gradually became both more comprehensive and more 
severe. The Synod of Paris on 6 June 829 issued a decree with 
sinister implications for the future, citing the stern passages 
of Leviticus 20:6 and Exodus 22:18. The synod argued that since 
the Bible decreed that a maZeficus should not be permitted to live, 
the king had a right to punish sorcerers severely. In England 
Alfred the Great threatened wiccan with the death penalty, and 
Ethelstan ordered execution for wiccecraeft if it resulted in death. 
Such measures were bound to reduce and eventually eradicate pagan 
practices, and condemnations of pagan r i tes gradually became 
perfunctory repetitions of earl i er condemnations issued when the 
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problem was more serious. Once in a while the sources report some-
thing fresh, such as the struggle of St. Barbato against the 
residual paganism of the Lombards in the ninth century. At 
Benevento these pagans adored a snake and a sacred tree, around 
which they danced in a circle. The Synod of Rome in 826 complained 
that 'many people, mostly women, come to Church on Sundays and 
holy days not to attend the Mass but to sing broad songs, and do 
other such pagan things'. 
The most important legal document of the early Middle Ages relating 
to witchcraft is the Canon Episcopi, issued about AD 900. The 
canon says: 
'Some wicked women are perverted by the Devil and led astray by 
illusions and fantasies induced by demons, so that they believe 
that they rideout at night on beasts with Diana, the pagan goddess, 
and a horde of women. They believe that in the silence of the 
night they cross huge distances. They say that they obey Diana's 
commands and on certain nights are called out in her service ••• 
Many other people also believe this to be true, although it is a 
pagan error to believe that any other divinity exists than the 
one God ••. Such fantasies are thrust into the minds of faithless 
people, not by God, but by the Devil. For Satan has the power 
to transform himself into the figure of an angel of light. In 
this form he captures and enslaves the mind of a miserable woman 
and transforms himself into shapes of various different people. 
He shows her deluded mind strange things and unknown people, and 
leads it on weird journeys. It is only the mind that does this, 
but faithless people believe that these things happen to the body 
as well'. 
The Canon Episcopi had enormous influence. It was widely and in-
correctly believed to date back to the fourth century and, thus 
possessing the authority of great antiquity, entered into the 
major medieval collections of canon law. Since the canon dis-
missed the physical reality of witchcraft and condemned those who 
believed in it as weak in faith, it helped to forestall the 
witch-craze. Later, when canon lawyers and theologians accepted 
the reality of witchcraft, they had to twist their way around the 
canon. Yet the Canon Episcopi is far from a monument to early 
medieval scepticism~ for it indicates that belief in these 
strange phenomena was widespread, and its influence helped to 
spread them. The Canon Episcopi itself helped to establish the 
historical concept of the sabbat. As the chief of a demon horde 
Diana was equated with Satan. The women who followed her must ' 
then be worshippers of the Devil. Though they did not really 
follow her out in their physical bodies, they did ride with her in 
spirit, so that their spirits were servants of Satan. They obeyed 
the Lady goddess (domina) rather than the Lord Christ (Domi nus), 




The extent to which functional explanation has become institution-
alized as a mode of historical explanation is, at this stage, 
unclear. As G.A. Cohen has pointed out, a functional explanation 
is a special type of causal explanation, it is "a consequence 
explanation in which the occurrence of the explanandum event .•. 
is functional for something or other, whatever 'functional' turns 
out to be." Thus functional explanations derive their particul-
arity from "generalizations of distinctive logical form", namely, 
the function of x is to r/J, and therefore answer "why" questions 
under certain conditions. (p250, p253, p263). Burke argues 
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that the functionalist approach assumes that "a society cannot be 
understood simply by investigating the intentions of its members, 
because of the importance of unintended consequences". Clearly, 
therefore, in terms of arguments advanced in this thesis, Burke's 
recommendation that functional explanations be used in history 1S 
endorsed. But, as he states, they should not be seen as 
"replacements for other kinds of historical explanation, which they 
complement rather than contradict, since they tend to be answers 
to different questions rather than different answers to the same 
questions" (p50). Percy Cohen points out that "functional explan-
ations do not explain why there are functional interrelationships 
in social life, and why functional interdependence therein varies" 
(p66). David Walsh answers that demand by the call for "the 
phenomenological analysis of the everyday processes by which a 
known and taken-for-granted social world is constructed by its 
members in terms of common sense interpretations of that world" 
(p69). This clearly amounts to the operation of the first 
hermeneutic, that is an elucidation of the meaning of a situation 
for those participating within it. The functional explanation 
would then constitute part of the second hermeneutic. G.A. Cohen, 
in a similar vein, writes that while functional explanations 
answer some questions, they also give rise to others, and that 
these latter kinds of explanation may therefore require elaboration. 
His suggestions, amongst others, include a "purposive" elaboration, 
which articulates the beliefs and desires of agents, and a form of 
elaboration which he regards as appropriate in cases of self-
deception, that is when a functional fact operates through the 
mind of an agent without his full acknowledgement of that fact 
(pp 287-9). 
With regard to a historical materialist point of view, G.A. Cohen 
has argued "that there is no well stated alternative to the view 
that major Marxian explanations are functional in character" 
(p279). This view arises from Cohen's defense of the "Primary 
....• /Thesis" 
Thesis" which maintains that "the nature of a set of production 
relations is explained by the level of development of the product-
ive forces embraced by it (to a far greater extent than vice 
versa)" (p134). Thus, as Andrew Levine and Eric Olin Wright put 
it, Cohen is arguing that "productive forces ... explain relations 
of production functionally. A given set of relations of produc-
tion is determined by the functional requirements necessary for 
the expansion of productive forces (p51). Cohen writes, " ... the 
production relations are of a kind R at time t because relations 
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of kind R are suitable to the use and development of the productive 
forces at t, given the level of development of the latter" (p160). 
Clearly, therefore, Cohen is required to elucidate "the structure 
of interconnections between forces and relations of production 
which make functional explanations of this sort defensible", as 
Levine and Wright have pointed out (p51). As an illustration of 
his argument, Cohen has cited Marx's attempt to explain why the 
working day in Britain was reduced by the Factory Acts passed in 
the course of the nineteenth century. According to Cohen, Marx 
postulated two reasons without establishing a "bond uniting them". 
These two reasons are contained within the following: " 'apart from 
the working class movement that daily grew more threatening, the 
limiting of factory labour was dictated by' the need to 'curb the 
passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour power' ". 
Cohen's suggested "functional" generalization, which is not to be 
regarded as a general "law", reads as follows: "substantial 
changes in economic structure which favour the immediate welfare of 
the subordinate class occur when the class fights for them and 
they increase - or at least preserve - the stability of the system 
(for reasons independent of allaying a felt grievance of the 
exploited)". Thus, "the change is functional for the system 
other than because it reduces the anger of the proletariat l1 • 
(294-5). 
Cohen's thesis has been challenged by Levine and Wright who argue 
that Cohen has neglected the question of a theory of class 
capacities, which they hold to be "crucial for any adequate account 
of revolutionary social transformations". (p50) That theory 
must be based upon analysis of the development of social relations 
of production, as well as of the State and ideology (p68)._ Because 
Cohen's defense is therefore held to be "partial" and "one-sided", 
Levine and Wright characterise it as "defective both theoretically 
and politically" (p50). 
Leaving aside the question of the tenability of Cohen's thesis . . , 
~t ~s clear, from an examination of the writings of Marxist histor-
ians such as Perry Anderson and E.J. Hobsbawm, for example, that 
the analysis of historical explanation given in this thesis applies 
equally well to their interpretations. This conclusion is also 
suggested by E.P. Thompson, for his elucidation of "historical 
logic" in no way suggests that historical materialist historians 
employ different "rules of thought", even though they operate 
within a different theoretical framework. (pp 230-242). 
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In the following passage from his work, Lineages of the Absolutist 
State (1974), Anderson writes: .•. The American War of Independence 
allowed Paris to achieve a political revenge on London, by proxy: 
but the French role in North America, although vital to the 
success of the American Revolution, was essentially a spoiling 
operation, which brought no positive gains to France. Indeed, it 
was the costs of Bourbon intervention in the War of American 
Independence which forced on the ultimate fiscal crisis of French 
Absolutism at home. By 1788, the State debt was so large -
payment of interest on it accounting for nearly 50 per cent of 
current expenditure - and the budgetary deficit so acute, that 
Louis XVI's last ministers, Calonne and Lomenie de Brienne, re-
solved to impose a land tax on the nobility and clergy. The 
Parlements furiously resisted these schemes; the monarchy in 
desperation decreed their dissolution; then, retreating before 
the uproar from the propertied classes, reestablished them; and 
finally, capitulating to the Parl ements' demands for an Estates-
General before any tax-reform was granted, convoked the three 
Estates amidst the disastrous grain shortage, widespread unemploy-
ment and popular misery of 1789. The aristocratic reaction 
against Absolutism therewith passed into the bourgeois revolution 
which overthrew it. Fittingly, the historical collapse of the 
French Absolutist State was tied directly to the inflexibility of 
its feudal formation. The fiscal crisis which detonated the 
revolution of 1789 was provoked by its juridical inability to tax 
the class which it represented. The very rigidity of the nexus 
between State and nobility ultimately precipitated their common 
downfall. (plll-2). 
Anderson's concern here is to account for the occurrence of the 
French Revolution of 1789. Narrative is evident in the sequential 
linking of the War of American Independence, the attempt by two of 
Louis' ministers to impose a land tax on the first and second 
estates, the conflict between the crown and the parlements and the 
convoking of the Estates-General. A brief elucidation of the 
meaning of the War of American Independence is provided, and an 
hypothesis to account for the collapse of the French Absolutist 
State is suggested by the phrase "the historical collapse of the 
French Absolutist State was tied directly to the inflexibility of 
its feudal formation". (p 112) 
This brief extract from Hobsbawm's Age of Revolution (1977) provides 
an example of a kind of rational explanation: "The statesmen of 
1815 were wise enough to know that no settlement, however carefully 
carpentered, would in the long run withstand the strain of state 
rivalries and changing circumstance. Consequently they set out to 
provide a mechanism for maintaining peace - i.e. settling all out-
standing problems as they arose - by means of regular congresses". 
(p 131) 
Hobsbawm's aim is to provide an answer to the question, why did the 
Concert of Europe come into being after the Napoleonic Wars? Once 
..... /more, 
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more, in accordance with Donagan's argument, the formal explanation 
entails the following: 
(i) A singular hypothesis - if the statesmen of Europe judged 
that to maintain peace in Europe it was necessary to provide a 
mechanism for settling outstanding problems as they arose by means 
of regular congresses, they would provide that mechanism, if they 
wanted to maintain peace. 
(ii) Statement of initial conditions - they judged it so and 
wanted to maintain peace. The postulation of these statements pre-
supposes an understanding of the effects both of the French 
Revolution and the wars which followed on Britain and on Europe. 
In short, the context within which the decision was taken requires 
elucidation. 
(iii) The explanandtim- the statesmen arranged the holding of 
regular congresses. 
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APPENDIX C 
Extract from: Otto Pflanze, "Toward a Psycho-analytic Interpre-
tation of Bismarck", American Historical Review, Vol 77, no 1, 1972. 
In the successive stages of Bismarck's development can be discerned 
the emergence of an inner conflict whose origin may lie in the 
oedipal triangle with his parents. The frustration of his rela-
tionship to his mother, who failed to provide the warmth and 
approval he required, and his natural ambivalence toward his father, 
heightened by the latter's failure to act out his role as the 
figure of authority in the household, were further complicated by 
displacement from a friendly environment (associated with the 
father, his ancestry and social milieu) to a hostile one (associated 
with the mother, her ancestry and social milieu). As his horizon 
enlarged, Bismarck became aware of the developing conflict between 
Junker and bourgeois, conservative and progressive, authority and 
freedom, which reached a preliminary climax in the revolutions of 
1830, the Hambach Festival of 1832, and the Frankfurt putsch of 
1833 - events that occurred when Bismarck was fifteen to eighteen 
years old. The personal problem that began in the nursery became 
immensely complicated and ramified by his widening social con-
sciousness in adolescence. Hence it was more or less a foregone 
conclusion that in 1832 the Burschenschaft at Gottingen would lose 
him as a prospective recruit. Other attitudes of Bismarck that 
appeared in later years may perhaps be traced to these early 
experiences: his contempt for men dominated by wives, his contempt 
for intellectuals (the word "professor" was a favourite derogatory 
epithet), his hostility toward bureaucratic government and suspicion 
of Geheimrate (his maternal grandfather's career), his proclivity 
for rising late (the children of the Plamann Anstalt were awakened 
at 6:00 A.M.), his constant longing for the country and dislike of 
Berlin, and his preference in agriculture for forests (his mother 
had ordered the cutting of an ancient wood at Kniephof). 
Psychoanalysts tell us that the trauma we all normally suffer 1n 
childhood may be repressed but never extinguished. It may be that 
Bismarck's resumption in 1847 of the career he had abandoned in 
1838 a few months before his mother's death stemmed from an 
unconscious wish to fulfill her ambition for him, from his desperate 
need to win the maternal love he felt had been denied him. That 
the "man of blood and iron" was plagued by enduring internal 
stresses he himself admitted to an aide and personal friend, Robert 
von Keudell. "Faust complains about having two souls in his 
breast, but I harbor a whole crowd of them and they quarrel. It 
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is like being in a republic ..•.• I tell most of what they say, but 
there are also whole provinces into which I will never let another 
person look." To another close associate, Christoph von Tiedemann, 
he was a strange "mixture of hard, iron energy and childish soft-
ness." "There is no good picture of me," Bismarck once complained. 
All the artists had painted a "forceful expression". "Actually I 
have a dreamy, sentimental nature." This softer, more vulnerable 
side to Bismarck's personality can also be seen in his health 
problem of the 1870s and 1880's. (pp. 431-2) 
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